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A STUDY OF EXPROPRIATION FOR URBAN RENEWAL

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IN THE CITY OF TORONTO

BY THE TORONTO REAL ESTATE BOARD

ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL OF

THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF TORONTO

FOR SUBMISSION TO THE

ONTARIO PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

MAY, 1967



THE TORONTO REAL

ESTATE

BOARD

1883 Yonge Street Toronto 7 Ontario · Hu.1.6151

PRESIDENT . E W DEMPSTER

GENERAL MANAGER . A W TRELEAVEN

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY . F W STAUNTON

May 26th, 1967

His Worship Mayor William Dennison, and Members of the Council of the Corporation of the City of Toronto, City Hall, Toronto, Ontario.

Sirs:

We are submitting for the consideration of the Council of the Corporation of the City of Toronto a Study on Expropriation for Urban Renewal in the City of Toronto by The Toronto Real Estate Board on behalf of the Council of the Corporation of the City of Toronto for submission to the Ontario Provincial Government.

You will recall that this Report was authorized as a result of a recommendation contained in Report No. 21 of the Board of Control (Clause No. 37), which was adopted by City Council at its meeting held on April 26, 1967.

This Report is the result of a study which was carried out, as a public service over the past six weeks with the assistance, time and experienced counsel of a Special Sub-Committee of the Zoning & Legislation Committee of The Toronto Real Estate Board.

The Study is based on an extensive research programme which was carried out by Mr. D. B. Kirkup, Research Director of The Toronto Real Estate Board.

In addition to field surveys conducted by the permanent staff of The Toronto Real Estate Board a number of background studies were reviewed and noted in the Appendix section of this Report.



A great many persons and agencies co-operated in the Study. Particular acknowledgement should be given to members of your official family Mr. David Alexander, Commissioner of Real Estate, and Mr. Walter F. Manthorpe, Commissioner of Development, for their helpful attitude and utmost co-operation in providing data vital to our work.

We appreciate our relationship with the political leaders of the City of Toronto and commend the spirit of civic responsibility which impelled you to seek a fresh viewpoint from unbiased observers as background in planning the City's future.

We are hopeful that this Report will form the basis for political action to keep in balance the healthy growth of Toronto's economy with the social needs of its citizens, by eliminating unfit living conditions in neglected neighbourhoods.

Yours very truly,

THE TORONTO REAL ESTATE BOARD

E. W. Dempster,

President.



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Ву

THE TORONTO REAL ESTATE BOARD

On behalf of

THE COUNCIL OF THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF TORONTO

For submission to the ONTARIO PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

May, 1967

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COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE

This Study has been carried out by a Special Committee of The Toronto Real Estate Board composed of members, each of whom is thoroughly familiar with the subject matter, either

As a real estate appraiser appearing frequently as an expert witness in arbitration hearings dealing with determination of compensation, or

As an expert in the field of negotiations with, or on behalf of, expropriated owners or expropriating authorities, or

As an experienced real estate broker thoroughly familiar with real estate values and market trends in the Metropolitan Toronto area.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

This Study has been carried out by The Toronto Real Estate

Board as a public service, on behalf of the Corporation of the City

of Toronto.

This report gives consideration to procedures which might be followed as well as amounts of compensation which might be appropriately paid by the City to owners of substandard homes expropriated for urban renewal. This report also presents recommendations for legislation which may be required and outlines suggestions for implementation of equitable solutions to the problems of expropriation and urban renewal in the City of Toronto.



The following specific matters have been taken into consideration in this Study:

- (a) the increase in the price level of houses between the date of taking and the date of payment to the homeowner in a strongly rising market,
- (b) the effect on the market brought about by the expropriation of a large number of homes and the effect of the sudden withdrawal from the market of these homes and the sudden introduction onto the market of a large number of buyers, all occurring subsequent to the date of expropriation and as a direct result of the expropriation,
- (c) the usefulness of considering market value if there is no substitute home on the market since the scheme of expropriation is to remove the substandard home from the market,
- (d) the difference between the small home market in Metropolitan Toronto and in any other City as a result of the dynamic influx of immigrants,



and also the state of the market in respect of homes within the Metropolitan area during the past twelve months at prices comparable to those paid by the City during the same period for properties in urban renewal areas.

This Study relates to real estate market activity in the areas of the Alexandra Park, Don Mount Village and Trefann Court urban renewal schemes.

"DUE COMPENSATION"

The Toronto Real Estate Board is not entirely satisfied that the City of Toronto is doing all within its power and existing legislation to equitably compensate property owners expropriated for urban renewal. Those responsible should deal with every issue on its true merits and discharge their duties with the strictest sense of rectitude and fair play. High standards of technical efficiency should be combined with a lively sense of corporate responsibility to provide an atmosphere of competence and goodwill which is required when private property is expropriated.



It should be noted here that The Toronto Real Estate
Board and the Ontario Association of Real Estate Boards submitted
a Brief to the Ontario Law Reform Commission on the "Basis for
Compensation for those Affected by the Exercise of Powers of
Expropriation" on September 26, 1966. Certain recommendations
contained in this Association's Brief are similar in intent to
those outlined in a Resolution which was brought to the attention
of Board of Control by the Commissioner of Development in a report
dated January 23, 1967.

SUBMISSION TO THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO

The following is the City of Toronto Resolution and Recommendation:

"That the Co-ordinating Committee recommend to the Board of Control that the City make representation to the Provincial Minister of Economics and Development, requesting him to make available loans under Section 2(1)(c) of the Housing and Development Act to persons whose property is expropriated in urban renewal areas which are the subject of agreements between Federal, Provincial and Municipal governments, to enable them to buy alternative accommodation, on the following general terms:

- (a) the loans be available without interest
- (b) the loans be the subject of a mortgage charge against the property, such monies to be repayable either on the death of the owner, or owners, to whom the loan is given, or on the sale of the property.

Recommendation:

That a request be submitted to the Minister of Economics and Development in the terms of the above resolution by the Corporation of the City of Toronto and that the Minister be requested to give earnest consideration to the granting of such authorities as may be required and upon the most favourable terms possible."



The following are quotations from The Toronto Real Estate Board Brief:

"The expropriation of residential properties frequently involves problems, both economic and human, peculiar to such expropriation. Perhaps the most common is the expropriation of a house, the market value of which, if awarded to the claimant, would not be sufficient to enable him either by purchase or construction to reinstate himself in a reasonably similar house. In addition such expropriations are frequently the cause of emotional and sentimental disturbance for which no compensation in money has been or probably can be allowed.

Lying at the root of the application of the principle of reinstatement to such cases is the possibility that the consequence would be to put the owner in a better financial position, should he wish to live without owning a house, than he was before the expropriation.

It is the respectful submission of these Associations that the sociological problem which is involved here should be resolved in favour of the owner. Legislation should provide that the compensation payable upon expropriation of a residential property should be adequate to enable the owner to reinstate himself in reasonably comparable premises and should include the incidental costs of doing so including appraisal, moving and legal expenses.

In this connection these Associations endorse the principle of compensation underlying the recent Newfoundland statute entitled the 'Family Homes Expropriation Act'."

EXISTING LEGISLATION

Any examination of a social economic problem must surely take into consideration existing legislation to determine whether the objectives of such regulations are being achieved.

In the case of expropriation for urban renewal, it is generally unclear as to the exact aims of the legislation and the declared public objectives with respect to it.



- 6 -

The initiative for public action with respect to urban renewal lies with the Municipalities. The legislation governing urban renewal is, however, Provincial and Federal. A growing part of the public financing and a greater or lesser degree of the impulse to urban renewal comes from the senior governments.

The definition of what constitutes renewal, in the statutory sense, is found in the National Housing Act and in the Ontario Planning Act.

Since quotations from statutes which have been repeatedly amended and revised tend to make dull reading, the following review will seek to highlight those parts of the legislation which are of the utmost importance to the subject matter of this study.

The National Housing Act, 1954, is "An Act to promote the construction of new houses, the repair and modernization of existing houses and the improvement of housing and living conditions".

Part III, Section 23 of the National Housing Act gives the following definitions:

- (a) "urban renewal area" means a blighted or substandard area of a municipality for which the government of the province in which the area is located has approved the implementation of an urban renewal scheme; and
- (b) "urban renewal scheme" means a scheme for the renewal of a blighted or substandard area of a municipality that includes
 - (i) a plan designating the buildings and works in the area that are to be acquired and cleared by the municipality in connection with the scheme and for making available to persons dispossessed of housing accommodation by such acquisition or clearance, decent, safe and sanitary housing accommodation at rentals that, in the opinion of the Corporation, are fair and reasonable having regard to the incomes of the persons to be dispossessed, etc., etc.



Section 2.(1)(c) of The Housing Development Act —
Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1960, Chapter 182 (as amended by 1960-61, Chapter 37 and 1961-62, Chapter 59) allows that ...

"The Lieutenant Governor in Council may, (c) advance monies or guarantee monies loaned to persons to acquire and rehabilitate housing units;" etc.

The above sections of legislation would lead one to conclude that a broad use of the present machinery would allow for financial assistance for the relocation of occupants of homes expropriated for urban renewal.

Whether special consideration in the form of relocation allowances could be awarded to property owners expropriated by urban renewal schemes may be a matter of modification, interpretation and application of existing legislation, i.e. Section 23 of the National Housing Act:

"For making available to persons dispossessed of housing accommodation by such acquisition or clearance, decent, safe and sanitary housing accommodation at rentals that, in the opinion of the Corporation are fair and reasonable having regard to the incomes of the persons to be dispossessed."

and/or Section 2.(1)(c) of the Housing Development Act:

"Advance monies or guarantee monies loaned to persons to acquire and rehabilitate housing units."



BASIS OF COMPENSATION

Section 6 of the Expropriation Procedures Act, 1962-63, Chapter 43 R.S.O. provides the following:

"Where land is expropriated or is injuriously affected by an expropriating authority in the exercise of its statutory powers, the expropriating authority shall make due compensation to the owner of the land for the land expropriated or for any damage necessarily resulting from the exercise of such powers, as the case may be, beyond any advantage that he may derive from any work for which the land was expropriated or injuriously affected."

This provision is similar to the due compensation provision contained in other Ontario statutes under which powers of expropriation may be exercised, e.g. The Highway Improvements Act.

These provisions have been construed by the courts to entitle the property owner to that compensation which is generally termed as "value to the owner". The courts have defined this term variously as:

- a) "The owners were entitled to that which a prudent man in their position would have been willing to give for the land sooner than fail to obtain it." (Pastoral Finance Association v. The Minister, 1914 A.C. 1083) and
- b) "The owner at the moment of expropriation is to be deemed as without title, but all else remaining the same and the question is, what would he as a prudent man, at that moment, pay for the property rather than be ejected from it?" (Diggon-Hibben Ltd. v. The King 1949, S.C.R. 712, Woods Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The King 1951 S.C.R. 504).

The Real Estate Department of the City of Toronto maintains that it is now paying the maximum amount of compensation that it is warranted in paying, based on its interpretation of the compensation provisions of the Expropriation Procedures Act, 1962-63.

In the respectful submission of this Association, a restrictive or limiting interpretation of the existing statute is neither warranted or justified. It is not uncommon for expropriating authorities, endowed with a genuine desire to compensate the owners to the extent that they will not suffer pecuniarily as a result of the expropriation, to pay more than the market value of the property,



indeed frequently to pay in excess of an amount which might be rationally suggested as "value to the owner", if such added payment appears warranted in order to achieve the desired results, that is to say to make the expropriated owner whole. Numerous examples are available.

In our respectful submission the due compensation provisions of the Expropriation Procedures Act were never intended to be limiting. In the report of the Select Committee on Land Expropriation of February 19, 1962, the Committee in reviewing suggestions to codify the compensation provision in the then proposed Expropriation Procedures Act, had rejected the recommendations on the grounds that a codification would tend to limit and restrict the compensation, whereas the general provision permitted a broader interpretation under all circumstances.

However, if some expropriating authorities elect to place a restricted interpretation on the general compensation provisions of the existing statute, an amendment to the said statute appears essential so as to insure that the expropriated owner receives adequate compensation to enable him to reinstate himself elsewhere without any financial hardship.

OBJECTIVES OF URBAN RENEWAL

The purpose of urban renewal, according to the National Housing Act, is to improve housing and living conditions and make "available to persons dispossessed of housing accommodation by such acquisition or clearance, decent, safe and sanitary housing accommodation at rentals that in the opinion of the Corporation, are fair and reasonable having regard to the incomes of the persons dispossessed."



The key word in the paragraph immediately above is "rentals". If the words "or prices" were added immediately following the word "rentals", this may allow CMHC to contribute one-half of the costs of acquiring and clearing the lands and buildings, and of assisting the relocation of persons dispossessed of housing accommodation by the implementation of the urban renewal scheme.

Existing NHA legislation discriminates against the homeowner in that it does not provide for his relocation other than in public rental housing.

Existing NHA legislation creates a demand for public housing in that some owners in the urban renewal area ultimately become tenants in public housing.

Most subsidized public housing built to replace the blighted housing removed by urban renewal is occupied by persons from outside the area.

THE H.O.M.E. PLAN

The H.O.M.E. Plan is the name given to a number of schemes to be implemented by Ontario Housing Corporation in conjunction with Central Mortgage & Housing Corporation.

The purpose of the H.O.M.E. Plan is to provide or assist in the provision of substantial quantities of residential accommodation, both for rent and for sale to meet the needs of the citizens of Ontario in the low and middle income categories.

Incorporated in the H.O.M.E.Plan are all existing programmes including the provision of rent-to-income accommodation for families and senior citizens and residential accommodation for students.



Each scheme within the H.O.M.E. Plan is designed so that it may be implemented separately, depending upon a community's needs.

A publication intended as a guide and source of information for municipalities, educational institutions, provincial and local organizations, and individuals who wish to obtain assistance under the H.O.M.E. Plan, outlines regulations which provide for assistance to homeowners displaced as a result of urban renewal.

The following is a section from the H.O.M.E. Plan of the Ontario Provincial Government concerning Land Lease with Deferment of Ground Rent:

"The purpose of this scheme is to assist homeowners of advanced years and limited fixed income, who are displaced as a result of compulsory acquisition of their dwelling by a public authority, to purchase suitable alternative accommodation without financial hardship.

For the time being, assistance under this scheme is confined to homeowners displaced as a result of an urban renewal scheme undertaken by a municipality under the terms of the National Housing Act and the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1960.

Deferred Land Ground Rentals

Under this scheme title to the land will vest in Ontario Housing Corporation. A ground rental will be established based on current NHA rates of interest and at the book value of the land as determined by Ontario Housing Corporation.

The lessee will have the option of paying the ground rental in full or requesting a partial or total deferment. The lessee will also have the option to purchase the land outright at its established value at any time after the fifth year subsequent to the commencement of the lease.

Where there is a partial or total deferment of ground rent, the unpaid portion together with interest thereon will become a charge against the dwelling. Should the lessee exercise his option to purchase the land, all deferred charges then become due and payable.



Under the terms of the lease, the homeowner and his spouse shall, during their lifetime, be entitled to maintain a dwelling on the land for their own occupancy. Upon the death of the surviving partner, or in the event that the property is no longer occupied by the lessee and/or his spouse, all deferred charges shall become due and payable.

Initiation

A municipality which has expropriated residential properties for urban renewal purposes under the terms of the National Housing Act and the Planning Act may request Ontario Housing Corporation to provide assistance to displaced homeowners eligible under this scheme.

A municipality requesting assistance through Ontario Housing Corporation under the terms of this scheme shall be deemed to be providing the relocation services required in urban renewal schemes carried out under the terms of the National Housing Act. Assistance in finding suitable alternative accommodation shall be provided by the Relocation Officer of the municipality concerned.

In requesting such assistance the municipality will provide complete details of the financial status of each eligible homeowner, the amount of compensation payable in respect of the expropriated property and details of the alternative accommodation selected.

Implementation

Upon receipt of a municipal request for assistance under this scheme, Ontario Housing Corporation will carry out an evaluation of the alternative accommodation selected by the homeowner with the asistance of the municipal Relocation Officer. The land and the dwelling will be evaluated separately. On the basis of the appraised value of the land, Ontario Housing Corporation will by agreement with the homeowner purchase the land and dwelling. The Ontario Housing Corporation will then resell the dwelling portion of the property to the homeowner and will grant a lease of the land component at a ground rental as specified in the lease.

Eligibility

To obtain assistance under this scheme, homeowners must meet the following eligibility requirements:

- (a) Have been an established homeowner-occupant in the area prior to expropriation.
- (b) Be sixty (60) years of age or more
- (c) Have a fixed limited income in the form of annuities, pensions or some form of transfer allowance.
- (d) Have received sufficient compensation from the expropriated dwelling to enable them to purchase the alternative dwelling outright, exclusive of land and services."



Here Provincial housing administrators join Federal and Municipal authorities in acknowledging the need for special assistance for the relocation of homeowners expropriated for urban renewal.

While social conscience dictates it, the public demands it, politicians would like it, urban renewal requires it, responsible enterprise feels it is justified and legislation just about provides for it, the relocation allowance still remains impossible to secure within existing circumstances, except by (a) a broader interpretation in the existing compensation provisions to include it as part of the due compensation or (b) by an amendment to the Expropriation Procedures Act providing for the payment of this special financial assistance to the expropriated owner.

Something is surely wrong with the principles behind regulations which allow for the subsidization of people in public housing at an enormous expense to the taxpayers without obligation to pay back such assistance while insisting, upon death of the surviving partner in a self-supported family, or in the event that the property is no longer occupied by the lessee and/or his spouse (sold), all deferred charges shall become due and payable.

This is tantamount to suggesting that, notwithstanding individual circumstances, if one wishes to become dependent on the state for accommodation, he may certainly be provided for but if he wishes to continue to enjoy the dignity and justifiable pride which comes from providing, through his own resources, a home for his family, he is subject to a different set of rules even though, from an economic standpoint, the investment of public funds is comparatively smaller.



One might be inclined to query whether the objective of urban renewal is to force private owners to become dependents at subsidies currently averaging \$54 per month per unit in the Metropolitan Toronto area, or whether the goal is to assist families to improve their housing and living conditions through their own productivity and resources with a relatively small government financial supplement.

It requires little debate to determine the most acceptable alternative between the expense of subsidizing a government owned housing unit over its economic life on land acquired at between \$10,000 to \$15,000 per unit and the one-time investment of an average of \$2,000 or \$3,000 per unit to assist persons dispossessed of housing to relocate themselves, through purchase, in decent, safe and sanitary accommodation with no further administrative or management costs.

Most social welfare workers should agree that the economic return on this investment in a family's future through the provision of home ownership does much to rescue the personalities of children and break the chain which links them to generations of dependents.

ADVANTAGES OF HOME OWNERSHIP

Measuring the impact of the home and home ownership on the Canadian way of life is difficult. Certainly, the home is the centre and cement of the family. But actual ownership of it expands the horizon and adds an exciting new dimension to the home. It generates greater interest in the general well-being and character of the neighbourhood, in improved community services, in better government. It represents the owners' tangible interest in their communities and their country. It reflects the soul and substance of a solid citizen.



URBAN RENEWAL STUDIES

Just about everyone who has conducted a study of urban renewal has referred to the problem of relocation of families evicted as a result of the expropriation and clearance of blighted residential structures.

The Metropolitan Toronto Urban Renewal Study which was carried out with the co-operation of the local area municipalities, the Province of Ontario and Central Mortgage & Housing Corporation, and with the financial participation of Central Mortgage & Housing Corporation recommends:

- "24. The costs of renewal should include the relocation and moving expenses of displaced residents and businesses, the cost of professional and technical assistance, and special financial assistance for:
 - (a) Displaced homeowners who cannot be suitably accommodated in available purchase housing nor readily relocated into rental housing, by means of special loans to purchase a replacement property with a moratorium on repayment until the property is sold;
 - (b) Homeowners whose properties require improvement but who cannot readily absorb the necessary expenditure or consequent indebtedness, by means of:
 - (i) Direct grants to low-income families;
 - (ii) Special loans at below-market rates or with a moratorium on repayment until the property is sold."

SEE APPENDIX I and II

"The Role of Private Enterprise in Urban Renewal", a study carried out by Murray V. Jones under contract with the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board and commissioned as a component part of the Metropolitan Toronto Urban Renewal Study, having at the same time a broader scope and application, was given financial assistance by the Canadian Council of Urban and Regional Research.



This study, in its Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations, recommends the following:

"(7) Section 23B of the N.H.A. provides for contributions towards the cost of staff to assist owners of property affected by an urban renewal scheme to adjust to its implementation and to assist in the relocation of people dispossessed of their housing, but no contribution to the actual cost of residential and non-residential relocation is envisaged. This is a serious weakness. Expenses of relocation arising out of the implementation of renewal schemes ought to be borne in part at least by the governments concerned and shared by them in the same way as other costs of the scheme."

SEE APPENDIX III

The City of Toronto Development Department has consulted with officials of the Federal, Provincial, Metropolitan and City governments and with their assistance the policy outlined below has been evolved, though none of the governments concerned has given approval to it:

"Policy for Hardship Cases following Expropriation in Urban Renewal Areas:

- A. 'Hardship' is to be defined as the special need of a particular owner-occupant, having regard to his personal circumstances in relation to the expropriation of his house.
- B. Only owner-occupants who have resided in their houses for at least two years, (unless there are unusual circumstances), and whose compensation is fixed at not more than \$12,000.00, will be given consideration under these rules.
- C. Those owner-occupants qualifying for consideration under these rules shall be entitled to receive a deferred repayment loan for the purchase and rehabilitation of another house.
- D. In arriving at the amount of the deferred repayment loan regard shall be had to:-



- i. The age and health of the owner-occupant.
- ii. His financial circumstances.
- iii. The equity position of the owner-occupant prior to expropriation.
 - iv. His housing needs.
 - v. The details of any alternative house proposed to be acquired and the reasonableness thereof.
- E. Deferred repayment loans shall be provided by the Province of Ontario and the agency to be responsible for determining 'hardship' cases and for the granting of deferred repayment loans shall be established by that government. It is suggested that loans be made available on the following general terms:
 - (a) Without interest.
 - (b) As the subject of a mortgage charge against the property to be acquired.
 - (c) To be repayable either on the death of the owner, or owners, to whom the loan was granted, or on the sale of the property.
 - (d) To be the subject of a life insurance policy maturing on the death of the owner so as to secure repayment of the loan in that event."

It is the respectful submission of The Toronto Real Estate
Board that relocation allowances should be paid in the form of outright cash payments to expropriated owners because of the special
circumstances which tend to devalue properties prior to expropriation
not only particularly for the purpose of urban renewal but in takings
for other public projects.

There should be no obligation for the recipient to repay the cash relocation allowance.



INDIVIDUAL ADJUSTMENT IS A FACTOR

It is debatable in many instances because of the basis for compensation whether urban renewal is in the best interests and to the ultimate benefit of residents in the area. Although expropriation of the land in part or in whole is reasonably necessary for the purpose of the applicant, it may not be in the best public interests, bearing in mind that "the public" are the owners of substandard homes who will suffer financially and emotionally as a result of the expropriation.

All social change places heavy burdens of adaptation on the individuals involved, for man is both the creator and the product of his social environment. In his role as creator of a better social order, he may be required not only to abandon the comfort and security of established ways, but also to defer the material satisfactions for which he has made the sacrifice. Other forms of security and satisfaction must be found to help him over the difficult process of adaptation. This is especially true when change, however valuable and essential to the social order as a whole, imposes disproportionate burdens, both material and physchological, on particular segments of the population. It is also true when the exigencies of a changing social order require a degree of effort or adaptation from particular groups of individuals who would not be willing or able to make that effort without special aid or encouragement.

Above all people must retain their faith in the future to which these developmental adaptations are directed. They must have confidence in their own social instrumentalities, especially their government, and must be able to identify their own welfare with that of the larger community.



In all these respects, the feelings and adaptive capacities of individuals play an indispensable role in the developmental process.

FORMULATION OF GOALS

A deliberate effort to guide redevelopment assumes articulated goals and these goals must represent at best the will and at least the acceptance of a considerable part of the population. (If this were not so, people would not make the efforts, adaptations, and sacrifices a developmental policy requires. They might even deliberately seek to thwart such development through open revolt, passive sabotage, or civil disorder).

One leader of a residents' association in an urban renewal area in the City of Toronto publicly insulted Board of Control. Another spokesman for a property owners' group involved in expropriation has demanded the resignation of one of the senior administrators of the City's urban renewal scheme. Housing professionals and newspaper editorial writers are highly critical of urban renewal implementation and the municipality's interpretation of the laws dealing with compensation.

SEE APPENDIX IV, V and VI

Even the most neutral observer would have to conclude that we are not going about this thing in quite the right way.

Thus an important aspect of developmental planning involves the articulation of popular will, as well as its guidance and moderation by those with knowledge of what is feasible under any particular circumstances. Successful development therefore requires a widespread availability, not only of guiding expertise, but also of opportunities for groups of people to understand and participate in the formulation of goals.



SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS INVOLVED

Urban renewal involves both "economic" and "social" factors but the distinction between the two is extremely hard to draw.

In a sense it is all "economic", contributing to the nation's capacity to expand its production. But, in another sense, it is all "social", involving basic social relationships among people and directed toward their immediate and ultimate welfare.

DATE FOR DETERMINING COMPENSATION

The terms of reference for this Study as set out hereinbefore are related essentially to economic considerations. The following section will deal with <u>Point (a)</u> in the terms of reference, specifically "The increase in the price level of houses between the date of taking and the date of payment to the homeowner in a strongly rising market."

TABLE I (page 21) illustrates the increase in the price level of houses sold through the Multiple Listing Service of The Toronto Real Estate Board over the past thirteen years and four months. This survey shows that the average price of properties sold through MLS has increased 64 percent from \$14,424 in 1953 to a present level of \$23,695. This is an average increase of approximately 5 percent per year and illustrates the nature of real estate investment as a hedge against inflation. This is not to suggest that the annual increase was constant from year to year. Indeed, during certain periods the rate of increase was substantially in excess of or less than this average.



TABLE I

METROPOLITAN TORONTO

MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE

The following is a breakdown of the number of Photo MLS Sales and Dollar Volume

	Sales and	1 Dollar volume	
Year	Number of Sales	Dollar Volume	Average Price
1953	2,699	\$ 38,935,130	\$14,424
1954	3,061	\$ 44,835,245	\$14,647
1955	3,555	\$ 53,153,433	\$14,952
1956	4,885	\$ 73,486,822	\$15,043
1957	5,916	\$ 93,072,456	\$15,732
1958	7,968	\$ 128,163,813	\$16,085
1959	9,559	\$ 158,821,137	\$16,615
1960	9,298	\$ 151,828,112	\$16,329
1961	9,264	\$ 151,314,565	\$16,334
1962	9,669	\$ 161,878,920	\$16,742
1963	11,096	\$ 183,272,930	\$16,517
1964	13,895	\$ 241,218,500	\$17,360
1965	14,890	\$ 281,164,558	\$18,883
1966	14,883	\$ 326,687,333	\$21,950
1967	050	¢ 22 170 926	\$23 142
Januar Februa March April		\$ 22,170,836 \$ 27,052,644 \$ 33,466,545 \$ 36,024,320 \$ 118,714,345	\$23,142 \$23,689 \$23,501 \$24,242 \$23,695



In the case of land held for investment, or for future development, there should be recognition of the foresight of the owner and a reasonable return for the same notwithstanding the fact that the prospective development has been precluded by the expropriation.

It has been customary to fix the compensation as of the date of expropriation. Consideration of various alternatives has led this Association to the conclusion that no acceptable alternative can be found.

However, in the inflationary period which has existed now for some time, owners have been prejudicially affected by the increase in value which frequently takes place between the date of expropriation and the date upon which compensation is finally determined. On the latter date the owner may find himself in a position of having to pay substantially more for a substitute property than he is awarded by way of compensation, having regard for values on the date upon which the expropriation occurred.

In order to avoid this consequence it is often prudent for the owner to proceed as rapidly as possible after expropriation to acquire a substitute property. In many cases since the full compensation is not immediately available to the owner this may necessitate the making of financial arrangements by way of loan for the purpose of acquiring the new property.



- 23 -

In the current state of the money market the five percent interest which is customarily awarded upon the amount of compensation from the date of expropriation or of the taking of possession down to the date of payment is quite inadequate to compensate the owner for the money cost to which he is put by reason of having to finance a new property in that interval. At the present time delay in settling compensation can be actually advantageous to expropriating authorities because they need pay only five percent on the amount of compensation and none of them are in a position to borrow money at such a rate.

It is respectfully submitted that by statute the provision for the five percent interest should be varied to substitute a formula which would provide for the payment of interest commensurate with the realistic cost of obtaining money at the relevant time.

HOUSE PRICES BY AREA


TABLE II (pages 24 to 30) shows the increase in house prices in 36 districts throughout Metropolitan Toronto.

The Alexandra Park Urban Renewal Area is bounded by Dundas Street West, Queen Street West, Bathurst Street and Spadina Avenue and is contained in MLS District C-1.


The Don Mount Village Urban Renewal Area is bounded by Dundas Street East, Queen Street East, the Don River and Broadview Avenue and is contained in MLS District E-1.

The Trefann Court Urban Renewal Area is bounded by Shuter Street, Queen Street East, Parliament Street and River Street and is contained in MLS District C-8.










ALEXANDRA PARK

EXISTING LAND USE



SCALE 1"= 300





HOUSES IN POOR CONDITION

CLEARANCE AND REHABILITATION AREAS

CLEARANCE

DON MOUNT VILLAGE

POSSIBLE REHABILITATION

RIVERDALE I AREA SUB-AREA A.

NON-RESIDENTIAL

V VACANT

50 100 150 200

APRIL 1965 CITY OF TORONTO PLANNING BOARD



TABLE II

		19	65	19	66	19	1967			
CENTR DISTR		# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price			
C-1	January February March April	36 39 50 <u>63</u> 188	\$15,723 \$14,716 \$14,484 \$16,133 \$15,322	30 36 65 <u>63</u> 194	\$17,393 \$18,321 \$17,916 \$17,915 \$17,910	41 38 48 <u>57</u> 184	\$21,062 \$20,867 \$21,317 \$21,750 \$21,301			
C-2	January February March April	40 46 42 <u>56</u> 184	\$16,976 \$17,944 \$16,879 \$19,207 \$17,875	46 57 81 <u>62</u> 246	\$19,640 \$20,144 \$22,579 \$21,121 \$21,098	39 59 77 49 224	\$22,527 \$24,311 \$23,500 \$24,474 \$23,757			
C-3	January February March April	26 34 34 37 131	\$18,763 \$15,139 \$18,888 \$19,512 \$18,066	27 31 47 <u>41</u> 146	\$20,602 \$18,390 \$24,315 \$23,817 \$22,231	27 39 43 <u>46</u> 155	\$24,028 \$23,415 \$25,446 \$26,002 \$24,853			
C-4	January February March April	11 13 17 20 61	\$18,145 \$21,711 \$21,035 \$20,430 \$20,460	11 16 14 <u>14</u> 55	\$23,936 \$24,541 \$26,940 \$20,553 \$24,015	11 19 16 <u>12</u> 58	\$28,486 \$26,882 \$24,148 \$30,808 \$27,244			
C-5	January February March April	13 21 22 23 79	\$18,494 \$17,783 \$16,957 \$ <u>15,191</u> \$16,915	11 27 25 21 84	\$22,973 \$21,746 \$27,774 \$21,157 \$23,554	20 19 14 <u>13</u> 66	\$23,630 \$25,515 \$23,114 \$25,962 \$24,522			
C-6	January February March April	7 10 15 22 54	\$20,700 \$16,079 \$21,086 \$23,707 \$21,176	9 6 18 <u>11</u> 44	\$22,294 \$18,800 \$24,930 \$23,009 \$23,078	10 5 8 <u>14</u> 37	\$36,095 \$30,147 \$27,920 \$26,612 \$29,936			



TABLE II (cont'd.)

		19	65	19	166	19	1967			
CENTR DISTR		# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price			
C-7	January February March April	13 15 17 <u>24</u> 69	\$20,192 \$17,823 \$17,326 \$17,732 \$18,115	5 14 30 <u>18</u> 67	\$23,360 \$26,736 \$21,649 \$20,638 \$22,568	6 18 15 <u>22</u> 61	\$24,600 \$22,471 \$23,507 \$24,332 \$23,686			
C-8	January February March April	2 12 5 <u>7</u> 26	\$28,250 \$11,817 \$11,920 \$10,457 \$12,735	9 4 15 <u>5</u> 33	\$13,733 \$14,925 \$13,463 \$14,120 \$13,814	9 15 5 <u>17</u> 46	\$26,144 \$16,420 \$15,050 \$22,276 \$20,338			
C-9	January February March April	4 2 2 4 12	\$35,375 \$33,250 \$28,000 \$35,300 \$33,767	5 2 2 7 16	\$50,550 \$59,250 \$29,000 \$46,514 \$47,178	3 2 5 <u>6</u> 16	\$32,573 \$31,250 \$36,500 \$48,335 \$39,546			
C-10	January February March April	9 4 11 <u>12</u> 36	\$21,439 \$21,612 \$17,186 \$28,633 \$22,557	7 8 15 10 40	\$34,316 \$26,412 \$33,246 \$24,180 \$29,800	13 7 13 <u>12</u> 45	\$27,985 \$23,736 \$36,198 \$23,842 \$28,592			
C-11	January February March April	- 2 2 4	\$ - \$ - \$14,000 \$29,000 \$21,500	1 4 4 1 10	\$27,250 \$27,900 \$29,600 \$16,900 \$27,415	2 1 3 2 8	\$32,250 \$24,500 \$27,917 \$30,750 \$29,281			
C-12	January February March April	12 17 14 <u>12</u> 55	\$31,108 \$35,568 \$24,675 \$26,392 \$29,820	14 13 14 <u>14</u> 55	\$33,343 \$32,184 \$35,587 \$39,261 \$35,146	8 13 12 <u>10</u> 43	\$33,356 \$44,738 \$55,033 \$47,525 \$46,142			



TABLE II (cont'd.)

		19	65	19	66	19	1967		
CENTRA DISTRI		# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price		
C-13	January February March April	8 13 10 <u>11</u> 42	\$20,863 \$26,400 \$21,985 \$24,845 \$23,887	8 6 9 <u>8</u> 31	\$23,025 \$26,167 \$28,488 \$28,962 \$26,752	6 11 7 11 35	\$24,292 \$27,814 \$30,093 \$ <u>33,141</u> \$29,340		
C-14	January February March April	13 14 24 <u>19</u> 70	\$21,038 \$17,321 \$18,925 \$20,721 \$19,484	6 8 14 <u>16</u> 44	\$22,166 \$24,313 \$21,023 \$23,259 \$22,590	9 8 6 <u>10</u> 33	\$27,856 \$22,538 \$26,533 \$25,980 \$25,757		
C-15	January February March April	8 10 22 <u>24</u> 64	\$25,049 \$24,613 \$26,944 \$ <u>22,814</u> \$24,794	13 14 25 <u>38</u> 90	\$29,233 \$25,143 \$26,065 \$20,173 \$23,892	19 20 17 <u>22</u> 78	\$31,258 \$31,513 \$31,979 \$31,455 \$31,536		
EAST DISTRI	<u>CT</u>								
E-1	January February March April	35 54 40 <u>64</u> 193	\$12,364 \$12,055 \$12,329 \$12,279 \$12,242	51 59 86 <u>86</u> 282	\$13,741 \$13,345 \$14,644 \$14,648 \$14,210	41 70 80 <u>82</u> 273	\$15,352 \$15,794 \$15,994 \$16,957 \$16,109		
E-2	January February March April	23 27 38 <u>29</u> 117	\$12,765 \$13,037 \$12,378 \$13,928 \$12,990	$ \begin{array}{r} 12 \\ 29 \\ 53 \\ \underline{48} \\ 142 \end{array} $	\$14,792 \$16,221 \$15,581 \$17,156 \$16,177	14 37 43 51 145	\$17,024 \$17,903 \$18,129 \$19,217 \$18,254		



TABLE II (cont'd.)

		19	65		19	66	1967			
EAST DISTRI	CT	# Sales	Average Price	#	Sales	Average Price	-	# Sales	Average Price	
E-3	January February March April	37 42 60 <u>54</u> 193	\$13,699 \$13,473 \$14,303 \$14,609 \$14,092		36 32 57 52 177	\$15,378 \$16,298 \$14,946 \$17,522 \$16,035		45 42 51 59 197	\$18,387 \$18,329 \$19,406 \$20,626 \$19,309	
E-4	January February March April	25 28 43 30 126	\$17,468 \$17,207 \$16,933 \$16,435 \$16,982		12 37 47 <u>33</u> 129	\$18,358 \$18,920 \$18,336 \$19,652 \$18,842		19 27 36 40 122	\$21,375 \$23,565 \$21,931 \$26,776 \$23,794	
E-5	January February March April	15 11 18 <u>19</u> 63	\$16,623 \$19,636 \$19,261 \$17,916 \$18,293		14 16 18 <u>13</u> 61	\$19,189 \$19,572 \$19,947 \$20,558 \$19,804		15 13 18 <u>14</u> 60	\$23,957 \$26,892 \$23,967 \$25,268 \$24,902	
E-6	January February March April	23 37 35 28 123	\$13,563 \$15,072 \$13,965 \$14,030 \$14,238		18 23 34 34 109	\$16,288 \$15,442 \$15,484 \$17,867 \$16,352		18 27 31 44 120	\$18,650 \$17,837 \$19,515 \$19,501 \$19,003	
E-7	January February March April	13 28 34 34 109	\$15,646 \$15,257 \$15,552 \$15,698 \$15,533		23 22 50 39 134	\$17,223 \$17,745 \$18,654 \$18,085 \$18,094		14 18 28 26 86	\$21,029 \$24,106 \$20,430 \$21,081 \$21,494	
E-8	January February March April	40 42 57 70 209	\$17,449 \$16,372 \$17,541 \$17,349 \$17,224		39 57 61 <u>54</u> 211	\$18,896 \$20,312 \$20,313 \$24,000 \$20,994		35 38 62 50 185	\$21,990 \$22,178 \$23,942 \$23,511 \$23,094	



TABLE II (cont'd.)

		19	65	19	066	1967			
EAST DISTRI	CCT	# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price		
E-9	January February March April	36 39 46 52 173	\$16,204 \$16,276 \$16,536 \$16,514 \$16,402	26 35 51 <u>33</u> 145	\$17,498 \$18,056 \$18,802 \$19,628 \$18,576	21 32 50 <u>39</u> 142	\$22,828 \$22,341 \$22,346 \$23,204 \$22,652		
E-10	January February March April	4 5 10 <u>11</u> 30	\$14,275 \$13,100 \$11,570 \$17,164 \$14,236	12 16 16 <u>19</u> 63	\$20,608 \$18,256 \$19,709 \$17,557 \$18,863	8 10 <u>8</u> 34	\$22,450 \$29,622 \$19,420 \$21,050 \$21,644		
E-11	January February March April	- - - -	\$ - \$ - \$ - \$ - \$ -	3 - - - 3	\$23,100 \$ - \$ - \$ - \$23,100	- 1 1 2	\$ - \$15,900 \$20,900 \$18,400		
WEST DISTRI	CT								
W-1	January February March April	12 13 30 <u>39</u> 94	\$17,125 \$15,992 \$16,933 \$16,128 \$16,493	20 39 59 42 160	\$18,505 \$17,442 \$18,873 \$21,976 \$19,293	29 32 42 48 151	\$22,233 \$20,909 \$20,714 \$23,507 \$21,935		
W-2	January February March April	40 46 52 70 208	\$14,270 \$16,532 \$15,547 \$15,921 \$15,645	49 53 72 <u>58</u> 232	\$18,073 \$17,663 \$18,731 \$21,547 \$19,052	58 59 68 <u>76</u> 261	\$21,182 \$20,658 \$20,203 \$22,291 \$21,131		



TABLE II (cont'd.)

		19	65	19	66	1967			
WEST DISTRI	CT	# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price		
W-3	January February March April	50 67 72 <u>72</u> 261	\$14,814 \$14,497 \$14,575 \$15,017 \$14,722	56 73 102 <u>66</u> 297	\$17,017 \$17,600 \$18,504 \$17,910 \$17,870	49 59 84 <u>82</u> 297	\$20,636 \$19,805 \$21,532 \$20,662 \$17,870		
W-4	January February March April	35 29 40 36 140	\$17,147 \$15,443 \$21,963 \$19,719 \$18,831	29 30 52 <u>39</u> 150	\$21,790 \$23,325 \$21,635 \$23,898 \$22,588	34 36 36 42 148	\$22,396 \$23,924 \$25,271 \$25,682 \$24,399		
W-5	January February March April	32 71 76 77 256	\$18,089 \$17,736 \$17,394 \$ <u>17,853</u> \$17,718	69 126 170 <u>104</u> 469	\$22,431 \$20,806 \$20,671 \$21,727 \$21,201	75 90 121 111 397	\$23,123 \$23,457 \$24,910 \$24,531 \$24,137		
W-6	January February March April	19 21 23 24 87	\$16,137 \$14,655 \$13,436 \$17,065 \$15,321	29 26 31 28 114	\$19,772 \$17,771 \$20,778 \$20,537 \$19,765	19 26 21 <u>30</u> 96	\$19,626 \$19,035 \$19,336 \$18,442 \$19,032		
W-7	January February March April	10 13 22 27 72	\$19,005 \$20,111 \$22,324 \$20,783 \$20,886	7 13 13 <u>15</u> 48	\$29,329 \$21,635 \$25,500 \$26,443 \$25,306	7 12 15 <u>13</u> 47	\$26,264 \$25,904 \$25,433 \$27,931 \$26,368		
W-8	January February March April	35 48 51 <u>66</u> 200	\$25,930 \$22,351 \$21,983 \$22,083 \$22,795	43 58 124 <u>50</u> 235	\$27,214 \$27,583 \$17,848 \$28,942 \$27,363	35 48 43 <u>56</u> 182	\$28,761 \$29,669 \$29,865 \$30,892 \$29,917		



TABLE II (cont'd.)

		19	65	19	66	19	1967		
WEST DISTRICT		# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price	# Sales	Average Price		
W-9	January	14	\$18,607	16	\$21,434	18	\$26,497		
	February	19	\$21,726	16	\$25,838	19	\$28,737		
	March	35	\$18,961	32	\$23,265	32	\$29,459		
	April	_36	\$19,634	_37	\$26,662	40	\$29,239		
		104	\$19,652	101	\$24,627	109	\$28,763		
W-10	January	18	\$18,181	28	\$16,496	27	\$26,285		
	February	35	\$18,129	26	\$20,838	30	\$27,968		
	March	40	\$17,625	32	\$24,189	50	\$24,656		
	April	_38	\$19,077	46	\$20,917	45	\$24,735		
		131	\$18,257	132	\$20,757	152	\$25,623		



PLEASE SEE MAP OF PROPOSED RENEWAL DISTRICTS

Alexandra Park Area - The average prices of houses sold through MLS in District C-1, where Alexandra Park is located, have increased from an average of \$15,322 in the first four months of 1965 to \$17,910 at the end of April 1966 and \$21,301 in the similar four month period of this year. This is a two-year increase of 39 percent or \$5,979 per unit.

Don Mount Village Area — The average prices of houses sold through MLS in District E-1, where Don Mount Village is located, have increased from an average of \$12,242 in the first four months of 1965 to \$14,210 at the end of April 1966 and \$16,109 in the similar four month period of this year. This is a two-year increase of 32 percent or \$3,867 per unit.

Trefann Court Area - The average prices of houses sold through MLS in District C-8, where Trefann Court is located, have increased from an average of \$12,735 in the first four months of 1965 to \$13,814 at the end of April 1966 and \$20,338 in the similar four month period of this year. This is a two-year increase of 60 percent or \$7,603 per unit.

TABLE III (page 32) shows the percentage increase in house prices in each MLS District in the last two years.

Alexandra Park corresponds exactly to Census Tract 61 as established by the 1961 Census of Canada. Don Mount Village is in Census Tract 114 and Trefann Court is in Census Tract 102.








TABLE III

DISTRICT	AVERAGE PRICE Jan.1 - Apr.30 1965	AVERAGE PRICE Jan.1 - Apr.30 1967	% INCREASE
C-1	\$15,322	\$21,301	39%
C-2	\$17,875	\$23,757	33%
C-3	\$18,066	\$24,853	38%
C-4	\$20,460	\$27,244	33%
C-5	\$16,915	\$24,522	45%
C-6	\$21,176	\$29,936	41%
C-7	\$18,115	\$23,686	31%
C-8	\$12,735	\$20,338	60%
C-9	\$33,767	\$39,546	17%
C-10	\$22,557	\$28,592	27%
C-11	\$21,500	\$29,281	36%
C-12	\$29,820	\$46,142	55%
C-13	\$23,887	\$29,340	23%
C-14	\$19,484	\$25,757	32%
C-15	\$24,794	\$31,536	27%
E-1	\$12,242	\$16,109	32%
E-2	\$12,990	\$18,254	41%
E-3	\$14,092	\$19,309	37%
E-4	\$16,982	\$23,794	40%
E-5	\$18,293	\$24,902	36%
E-6	\$14,238	\$19,003	33%
E-7	\$15,533	\$21,494	38%
E-8	\$17,224	\$23,094	34%
E-9	\$16,402	\$22,652	38%
E-10	\$14,236	\$21,644	52%
E-11	-	\$18,400	-
W-1	\$16,493	\$21,935	33%
W-2	\$15,645	\$21,131	35%
W-3	\$14,722	\$17,870	21%
W-4	\$18,831	\$24,399	30%
W-5	\$17,718	\$24,137	36%
W-6	\$15,321	\$19,032	24%
W-7	\$20,886	\$26,368	26%
W-8	\$22,795	\$29,917	31%
W-9	\$19,652	\$28,763	46%
W-10	\$18,257	\$25,623	40%

^{*} No sale in this area in the four month period.



In 1961 the general population characteristics, and household, family and dwelling characteristics, and characteristics of the labour force of Census Tracts 61, 114 and 102 as they compare with the Metropolitan Toronto area and the City of Toronto are found in the publication "Population and Housing Characteristics by Census Tracts — 1961 Census of Canada"

Census tracts are designed to be relatively uniform in area and population, and such that each is homogeneous with respect to economic status and living conditions. They are established in co-operation with local authorities, and wherever possible local census tract committees are formed to delineate the areas.

The census data available for these statistical units are of value in comparisons of social and economic factors within an urban community which may not be revealed in totals for a city or metropolitan area as a whole. This basic information provides background material for local surveys and is of value, also, in disclosing trends within a community. Needless to say the census is of tremendous value in determining the population and housing characteristics in urban renewal areas.

According to the 1961 Census of Canada, the median value of 325,435 owner occupied dwellings in the Metropolitan Toronto census area was \$17,301, while the median value of 97,407 owner occupied dwellings in the City of Toronto was \$17,523.

The median values of owner occupied dwellings in Census
Tracts 61 and 102 for some unknown reason are not provided. The
median value of owner occupied dwellings in Census Tract 114 is
\$11,920.



There is no doubt that prices have risen dramatically in all areas since the 1961 census was conducted.

It is recommended that an owner whose property has been expropriated should be entitled to have his compensation monies increased if it can be shown that values in general have increased between date of filing of the plan of expropriation and the date he receives compensation, provided however that the owner was not responsible for the delay in reaching settlement.

TABLE IV (page 35) shows increases in the average prices of new houses in Metropolitan Toronto over the last four years. The average price of a new house in Metro, according to the most recent survey, January 30, 1967, is \$29,666. This compares with an average of \$20,811 at July 15, 1963.

SUPPLY AND DEMAND DETERMINES PRICE

The Committee has drawn upon present and past practical experience in dealing with <u>Point (b)</u> in the terms of reference for this study. This section seeks to determine "<u>The effect on the market brought about by expropriation of a large number of homes and the effect of the sudden withdrawal from the market of these homes and the sudden introduction onto the market of a large number of buyers, all occurring subsequent to the date of expropriation and as a direct result of the expropriation."</u>

It has become obvious from our conversations with recently expropriated homeowners that their main concern is to find suitable places to live when they lose possession of their properties.



* AVERAGE PRICES OF NEW HOUSES IN

METROPOLITAN TORONTO

All Houses in Survey	\$20,811	\$21,371	\$19,297	\$21,312	\$21,914	\$23,800	\$27,622	\$29,666
0ver \$30,000	70.4	%0.4	%0.4	7.0%	18.0%	13.0%	31.4%	43.5%
Over \$16,000 to \$22,500 \$22,500 to \$30,000	15.0%	17.0%	19.0%	23.0%	18.0%	37.0%	23.9%	31.9%
Over \$16,000 to \$22,500	72.0%	65.0%	%0.09	%0.09	52.0%	41.0%	43.9%	22.9%
\$16,000 and Under	%0.6	14.0%	17.0%	10.0%	12.0%	%0.6	%8.	1.7%
Survey Date	July 15, 1963	Dec. 15, 1963	Apr. 15, 1964	Sept.15, 1964	Jan. 15, 1965	Jan. 30, 1966	June 30, 1966	Jan. 30, 1967

All surveys based on more than 500 units including semi-detached houses.

Source: The Toronto Real Estate Board, Public Relations Department (D.B. Kirkup)



These families invariably seek similar accommodation in the same price range within the same neighbourhood. This set of circumstances and preferences creates a demand for a specific type of property when there is no corresponding increase in supply. Although more than 40,000 homes were sold for over \$1.1 billion in Metropolitan Toronto in 1966, relatively few properties could be found at prices below \$12,500. In fact less than one percent of the properties sold through Multiple Listing Service this year will be at a price below \$10,000. This compares with three percent in the under \$10,000 category just one year ago.

TABLE V (pages 37 and 38) shows the shifts in house price categories brought about by unusual demand.

As the supply of new houses dwindles because of the slow-down in residential construction (housing starts of all types in the Metropolitan Toronto area dropped 32 percent with 22,155 starts in 1966 compared to 32,506 starts in 1965), prices rise to the point where homeowners are discouraged from upgrading their standards of housing by purchasing a new or better quality home.

These persons who would normally become vendors once they found a reasonably priced property, must be temporarily satisfied with their present dwelling until production of housing, the supply, increases again or at least until the shortage is relieved.

As a result of all this, many people fail to become vendors to vacate their homes which become part of the filtering down process.



PRICE CATEGORIES OF MLS SALES

1967	January February March	Sales % of Sales % of Total Total	7 1% 7 1% 5 1%	29 3% 32 3% 21 1%	%9 72 %9 79 %9 97	75 9% 106 10% 121 10%	141 17% 129 13% 182 15%	157 19% 226 23% 230 19%	139 17% 162 16% 236 19%	95 12% 100 10% 141 11%	51 6% 57 6% 92 8%	85 10% 117 12% 122 10%	825 100% 1000 100% 1224 100%
7	March	Sales % of Total	37 3%	27 4%	148 11%	248 18%	289 20%	228 16%	167 12%	83 6%	76 3%	95 7%	1398 100%
90	lary	% of S. Total	3%	2%	13%	20%	20%	16%	10%	2%	2%	%9	100%
1966	reprua	Sales	32	45	125	196	202	157	97	20	23	79	991
	ary	% of Total	2%	2%	14%	22%	23%	13%	1%	2%	2%	1%	100%
	January	Sales	16	34	102	158	168	98	51	39	17	57	740
			- \$10,000	\$10,000 to	\$12,500 to	\$15,000 to	\$17,500 to	\$20,000 to	\$22,500 to	\$25,000 to	\$27,500 to	\$30,000 0ver \$30,000	Total



PRICE CATEGORIES OF MLS SALES

	4												
. P	mber	% of Total	1%	3%	%6	11%	15%	17%	16%	10%	7%	11%	100%
6	December	Sales	10	19	70	87	117	135	125	98	56	86	791
99	lber	% of Total	1%	2%	8%	11%	15%	18%	14%	%6	7%	12%	100%
1966	November	Sales	10	57	98	128	170	203	157	109	74	137	1131
	er	% of Total	2%	3%	8%	12%	18%	18%	17%	8%	%9	%8	100%
	October	Sales	23	34	96	133	201	197	190	93	67	95	1129
-	Der	% of Total	2%	%9	16%	16%	23%	12%	%6	2%	3%	%8	100%
	December	Sales	15	41	115	118	165	87	63	35	23	54	716
5	Der	% of Total	3%	%8	15%	20%	18%	12%	%6	%9	3%	%9	100%
1965	November	Sales	34	82	147	196	179	117	91	50	32	09	988
	ler	% of Total	3%	1%	15%	21%	23%	10%	1%	2%	2%	7%	100%
1	October	Sales	39	87	165	236	258	102	87	8 7	23	78	1123
			- \$10,000	\$10,000 to	\$12,500 to \$15,000	\$15,000 to	\$17,500 to \$20,000	\$20,000 to \$22,500	\$22,500 to \$25,000	\$25,000 to \$27,500	\$27,500 to \$30,000	30	Total Homes Sold



The filtering down process is thus halted while at the same time those dwellings suitable for families are removed from the market either through private redevelopment or public urban renewal. This is why Realtors complain about the shortage of listings and also explains why most properties, priced at below \$25,000 and representing reasonable value, are sold almost immediately.

TABLE VI (page 40) shows the average length of time required to sell a home through Multiple Listing Service.

SEE APPENDIX VII — A REPORT ON SALES OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY UNDER \$12,000 — METROPOLITAN AREA

The Toronto Real Estate Board recommends that expropriating authorities should make every reasonable effort to acquire real property through negotiated purchase on the open market well in advance of urban renewal, rather than suddenly affect the market by the expropriation of a large number of homes at one time. The senior levels of government should provide financial assistance to accommodate this in order to encourage the acquisition of real property by amicable agreements with owners, to relieve congestion in the courts, to assure consistent treatment of owners in the many programmes, and to promote public confidence in land acquisition practices.



TABLE VI

The following is a breakdown of the number and percentage of properties sold through Multiple Listing Service and the length of time to effect the sale in January, February and March, 1967.

				196	7		
		JANU	ARY	FEBRU	ARY	MAR	СН
	Length of Time	No.Sold	% Sold	No.Sold	% Sold	No.Sold	% Sold
CENTRAL	1 week	44	18%	43	16%	61	18.4%
	2 weeks	51	21%	79	29%	88	28%
	3 ''	34	13%	40	14%	45	14%
	4 11	18	7%	35	13%	21	7%
	5 "	24	10%	22	8%	22	7%
	6 11	16	6.5%	15	5%	20	6%
	7 "	14	6%	7	3%	21	7%
	8 "	15	6%	6	2%	15	5%
	9 11	10	4%	5	2%	8	2%
	10 ''	8	3%	8	3%	4	1%
	11 "	1	.5%	3	1%	2	.6%
	Over 11 weeks		5%	12	4%	12	4%
		247		275		319	
EAST	1 week	41	17%	61	19%	73	17%
	2 weeks	63	25%	95	29%	129	30%
	3 "	30	13%	47	14%	66	16%
	4 11	16	6%	43	13%	48	11%
	5 ''	22	9%	16	5%	27	7%
	6 ''	9	3%	15	5%	21	5%
	7 ''	20	9%	8	2.3%	14	3%
	8 ''	16	6%	6	1.8%	16	4%
	9 ''	11	5%	8	2.3%	10	2%
	10 ''	9	3%	9	2.7%	4	. 9%
	11 "	6	2%	3	.9%	6	1.1%
	Over 11 week	s <u>8</u>	2%	_17	5%	_14	3%
		251		328		428	
WEST	1 week	87	22%	99	23%	113	21%
1,201	2 weeks	82	21%	105	25%	146	27%
	3 "	62	16%	76	18%	85	16%
	4 "	32	8%	53	12%	53	10%
	5 "	30	8%	26	6%	40	8%
	6 ''	25	6%	21	5%	24	4%
	7 ''	14	3%	5	1%	27	5%
	8 "	22	6%	8	2%	10	2%
	9 11	14	3%	7	2%	10	2%
	10 ''	12	3%	8	2%	8	1%
	11 "	5	1%	6	1%	6	1%
	Over 11 week		3%	14	3%	14	3%
		396		420		536	



Point (c) of the terms of reference for this report
queries "The usefulness of considering market value if there
is no substitute home on the market since the scheme of expropriation is to remove the substandard home from the market."

It is not generally clear that the objective of urban renewal is "to remove the substandard home from the market".

The only substitute home on the market is another substandard dwelling in perhaps another area designated for urban renewal.

And expropriated owners are certainly reluctant to take a chance on a second round of expropriation.

It is most difficult to determine market value of a blighted dwelling by using the market data approach to appraisal. Value in real estate is broadly defined as the present worth of anticipated benefits. The identification and measurement of those benefits has given rise to the profession of appraising.

The appraisal profession recognizes the intangibility of many value factors which render appraising an inexact science. The intangible factor which adds value to a substandard dwelling is that slums are disappearing. The supply of slum structures is disappearing. This is fortunate if the process is gradual. It is unfortunate if the only housing presently suitable for a certain segment of the population is eliminated in a fell swoop.

If a government decides to remove all the houses priced under \$12,000, then it has a responsibility to provide for all those families who cannot afford to buy from the remaining stock.



The market data approach arises from the premise that the value of a property can be measured by the price at which comparable properties have been sold.

Market Price is defined as the price paid for a property; the amount of money that must be given or which can be obtained at the market in exchange under the immediate conditions existing at a certain date. To be distinguished from "market value".

Market Value is the quantity of other commodities a property would command in exchange; specifically the highest price estimated in terms of money which a buyer would be warranted in paying and a seller justified in accepting, provided both parties were fully informed, acted intelligently and voluntarily, and, further, that all the rights and benefits inherent in or attributable to the property were included in the transfer. (See Market Price and Value).

At any given moment of time "market value" connotes what a property is actually worth and "market price" what it can be sold for. The amounts may or may not coincide, since current supply and demand factors enter strongly into "market price".

<u>Value</u> is ability to command goods, including money, in exchange; the quantity of goods, including money, which should be commanded or received in exchange for the thing valued; utility; desirability. As applied to a property — value may be broadly defined as "the present worth of all of the rights to future benefits arising from ownership".

It is the view of this Association that the test of "value to the owner" which is that presently applied by the Courts is satisfactory if its full potential is realized by the claimants in the development of their evidence and by tribunals in dealing with it. Unfortunately a sophisticated use of this test is not always made either by claimants or by tribunals assessing compensation.



It is submitted that consideration should be given to a statutory definition of "value to the owner" which, without limiting in any way the present generality of that test, would make it explicit that certain elements were to be included, e.g. full market value, costs incidental to relocation, business disruption and other elements.

The Toronto Real Estate Board is strongly critical of practices which provide less compensation for the property owner than the expropriating authority's approved value estimate.

Every property owner should be entitled to reasonable information concerning the authority's opinion of the value of his property, and he should be entitled to receive an offer at the full amount of the authority's approved appraisal. Any other practice in a situation where, in effect, the owner must sell, is unfair.

Further, any other policy penalizes the uninformed owner as compared to the owner who is knowledgeable about property values; and it makes the amount of compensation more dependent on the aggressiveness of the owner than on the value of his property.

A general practice of "trading on each property" is undesirable and does not promote public confidence in government land acquisition activities.



It is recommended that the market value standard be retained as the basic measure of compensation, provided that owners and tenants are compensated for other losses and necessary expenses, including relocation, and that no person who is caused to move from his home, farm or place of business, or to lose his employment, or incur other economic injury, shall have to suffer hardships by reason of expropriation programmes.

TABLE VII (page 45) shows that Metropolitan

Toronto has a lower percentage of dwellings in need of repair than any other city in Canada. Therefore Metro has a relatively small supply of inexpensive houses for which normally there is a great demand.

In the case of expropriation, the prior knowledge of the contemplated expropriation for urban renewal in effect eliminates this demand on the open market, with the result that properties within areas designated for urban renewal are devalued.

Furthermore the expropriation or intended expropriation causes an increased demand and higher prices for substitute housing in areas outside urban renewal areas.



Summary Dwelling Characteristics, by Area, 1961 Census able 102 ableau 102 Relevé des particularités des logements, par région, recensement de 1961

		Dwellings in Need of Repair Logements a) ant besoin de réparations		Dwellings Lacking Exclusive Use of Facilities Logements ne fournissant pas l'usage exclusif de		Average Monthly Rent of Tenant-		Median Value of Owner- Occupied Single- Detached	
	Number of Occupied _ Dwellings Nombre - de logements occupés	Major I Gros répara	tions	Minor Repair Petites réparations	Flush Toilet Toilette	Bath or Shower Baignoire ou bain-douche	Occupied Dw Loyer men- moyen de logements oc	ensuel i des	Dwellings Valeur médiane des maisons unifamiliales
Area Centre		19512		1961 wellings (Per es logements (Cent)	пип-ионене	Cash Comptant	Gross Brut \$	occupées par leur propriétaire \$
Metropolitan Areas Districts métropolitains									
Calgary Edmonton Halifax Hamilton Kitchener	78,396 89,003 42,366 105,240 42,174	7.7 11.0 13.7 5.8 5.9	3.5 4.5 6.3 3.1 4.3	16.7 16.0 19.2 17.1 18.6	12.7 14.2 17.4 10.2 7.9	10.1 11.5 16.8 7.7 7.6	77 72 78 73 61	85 80 95 83 71	14,850 14,517 14,716 14,078 12,396
London Montréal Ottawa-Hull Québec Saint John St. John's	50,494 549,652 107,570 79,140 24,143 17,917	6.0 10.8 9.8 11.6 15.7 9.5	3.1 2.8 3.6 3.1 12.0 6.4	15.4 15.3 15.9 14.2 28.2 18.5	8.4 5.7 8.5 5.2 15.1 23.3	5.5 7.6 8.5 15.4 24.6 29.6	77 67 84 54 48 62	85 80 94 64 67 83	13,128 15,305 16,433 13,673 9,899 12,704
Sudbury Toronto Vancouver Victoria Windsor Winnipeg	26,255 482,490 228,596 47,485 53,315 128,530	11.4 5.9 6.2 5.1 8.0 7.5	5.2 2.2 3.7 2.9 4.5 5.0	21.2 13.6 17.8 17.6 19.7 18.9	19.0 10.2 8.5 7.4 7.7 13.3	21.9 7.9 5.8 5.1 4.7 11.5	65 101 75 65 56 71	78 109 86 77 69 79	13,269 17,301 13,932 11,656 10,349 12,999
Total	2,152,766	8.4	3.4	16.1	9.2	8.9	74	85	14,840
Major Urban Areas Grands centres urbains									
Brantford Chicoutimi-Jonquière Drummondville Ft. William-Pt. Arthur Guelph	16,319 19,193 8,619 24,000 11,330	4.8 21.2 9.2 10.9 5.6	4.7 4.0 5.7 5.4 3.0	21.6 15.9 20.8 22.2 17.5	9.4 5.5 3.6 10.4 7.8	7.3 17.9 9.2 11.4 5.6	60 48 36 62 64	72 64 52 73 78	10,828 12,109 9,912 10,093 12,059
Kingston Moncton Niagara Falls Oshawa Peterborough	15,864 13,258 14,884 21,395 13,474	11.3 14.2 6.1 8.6 8.2	4.8 8.5 4.4 2.4 3.4	19.0 19.6 21.0 14.6 21.9	10.4 7.8 8.1 9.1 8.1	9.5 9.5 3.2 7.4 6.4	76 60 62 72 62	87 78 75 82 77	14,331 10,663 11,423 13,096 11,484
Regina St. Catharines St-Jean Sarnia Saskatoon Sault Ste. Marie	30,123 26,148 8,025 16,393 25,910 14,507	11.2 7.8 9.8 7.6 7.0 11.8	4.8 3.0 2.7 3.2 4.5 6.3	18.8 14.2 16.6 18.0 17.0 22.7	17.7 8.1 2.9 6.0 13.7 11.0	16.9 4.3 5.1 4.3 12.5 11.1	76 61 47 68 69 72	89 73 62 79 80 87	12,190 11,227 14,082 11,860 11,752 13,361
Shawinigan Sherbrooke Sydney-Glace Bay Timmins Trois-Rivières Valleyfield	13,892 16,794 22,734 10,088 18,839 6,947	5.3 9.9 12.5 10.0 7.8 16.9	2.1 3.5 7.1 11.0 3.1 1.7	14.1 16.6 25.9 26.7 14.1 15.8	4.1 4.3 18.9 9.5 4.5 4.4	11.5 7.0 31.9 11.1 11.6 14.3	41 47 40 44 42 42	54 60 57 60 57 58	11,216 13,193 5,819 9,026 11,221 10,850
Total	368,736	9.7	4.4	18.5	9.4	11.1	56	70	11,300
Other Areas Autres centres	2,032,991	17.4	8.0	24.9	35.5	39.9	49 3	62 *	6,852 1
Canada	4,554,493	13.4	5.6	20.3	21.0	22.9	65 3	77 3	11,021

3 Non-farm.

Data on household characteristics are shown in Table 76.
 Data for 1951 have not been adjusted to provide consistency with 1961 Census boundary definitions. Excludes fringe areas of Major Urban Areas.

¹ Les données relatives aux caractéristiques des ménages sont indiquées au

tableau 76.

Les données pour 1951 n'ont pas été corrigées afin de les rendre conformes aux délimitations de territoire employées au recensement de 1961. Ne comprend pas les zones en bordure des grands centres urbains.

3 Milieux non agricoles.



It is apparent therefore that if the compensation payable to an expropriated owner is limited
to the depressed market value caused by the scheme for
which the property is required, he would be unable to
acquire even an equally desirable substitute property
at the inflated price likely caused by the same scheme.

We would suggest market value based on evidence of sales outside the urban renewal area should form the basis of compensation, but the compensation should not be limited to the market value.

Prices paid by the City of Toronto to owners expropriated for urban renewal are generally lower than those paid to owners selling on the private competitive market in areas adjacent to urban renewal areas. As evidenced in TABLES VIII and IX this would suggest that the compensation paid to these owners was inadequate.

In Alexandra Park the average price paid by the City was \$12,739.69 for 210 owner-occupied residential properties and \$10,398.53 for 124 tenant-occupied properties, or \$11,870.52 for the total 334 properties. This does not include 37 commercial properties nor two vacant properties.



In Don Mount Village the average price paid by the City was \$9,516.85 for 127 owner-occupied residential properties and \$8,668.75 for 88 tenant-occupied properties, or \$9,169.72 for the total 215 properties. This does not include 2 commercial properties nor 2 vacant properties.

SEE APPENDIX VIII and IX

In both the above areas prices paid for owneroccupied dwellings are higher than for tenant-occupied
residential units because "owned" dwellings are
maintained in better condition.

Again, this reflects the grandeur and pride of ownership against the attitude of tenants who do not have a financial stake in the community.

The following TABLES VIII and IX (pages 49 to 70) provide historical data on sales prices of residential properties in areas adjacent to the urban renewal areas: Alexandra Park and Don Mount Village. In each case average prices paid to expropriated owners in the urban renewal areas were considerably lower than the average sales prices of similar properties sold on the private market in areas adjacent to the urban renewal areas.



To illustrate "the difference between the small home market in Metropolitan Toronto and in any other city as a result of the dynamic influx of immigrants" is Point (d) of our terms of reference.

Housing demand arises from several factors:

1. Population growth due to (a) natural increase, (b)

urbanization, and (c) family formation; 2. Replacement

due to (a) structural deterioration, and (b) relocation of

public works; and 3. The improvement of living standards.

POPULATION GROWTH

The world's population is growing at the rate of 1.9 percent a year. This is the most fundamental factor in housing demand. In addition, although a common characteristic of modern society is the reduced size of families, the concomitant accelerated family formation rate due to early marriages is creating an increased demand for housing.



RECORD OF SALES COMPARISONS OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES
SOLD ON THE PRIVATE MARKET ADJACENT TO
ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
Larch Street				
8 Larch St. 8 Larch St.	\$ 13,500. 7,000.	Dec. 24/63 Sept.3/63	\$ 4,000. 7,000.	1 - \$ 9,500. Paid Full
11 Larch St. 11 Larch St.	14,000. 11,900	Sept.15/65 Mar. 26/59	4,500. 1,800.	1 - \$ 9,500. 1 - \$ 6,800. 2 - \$ 3,300.
11 Larch St.	10,500	Aug. 14/53	2,000.	1 - \$ 5,500. 2 - \$ 3,000.
12 Larch St. 12 Larch St.	12,500 7,500.	Feb. 26/62 Dec. 1/61	1,500. 7,500.	1 - \$11,000. Clear
14 Larch St.	8,000.	Dec. 10/54	1,500.	1 - \$ 6,500.
16 Larch St. 16 Larch St.	14,300. 7,000.	Sept. 7/66 Feb. 2/60	3,000. 7,000.	1 - \$11,300. Clear
17 Larch St. 17 Larch St. 17 Larch St.	14,000. 10,000. 10,700.	Sept.26/66 Oct. 15/63 Mar. 31/55	4,000. 4,000. 2,000.	1 - \$10,000. 1 - \$ 6,000. 1 - \$ 8,700.
20 Larch St.	14,500.	Nov. 5/63	5,000.	1 - \$ 9,500.
Bulwer Street 37 Bulwer St.	16,500.	Nov. 28/66	5,000.	1 \$11,500.
Sullivan Street 1 Sullivan St.	14,500.	July 31/64	3,000.	1 \$11,500.
4 Sullivan St.	11,000.	Apr. 30/56	500.	1 - \$ 7,500. 2 - \$ 3,000.
6 Sullivan St.	12,500.	Feb. 16/54	2,700.	1 - \$ 6,075. 2 - \$ 3,725.
8 Sullivan St. 8 Sullivan St.	12,500. 19,000.	Oct. 28/66 May 15/58	12,500. 8,000.	
23 Sullivan St. 23 Sullivan St. 23 Sullivan St. 23 Sullivan St.	18,900. 13,250. 10,500. 11,500.	Apr. 25/66 Feb. 1/66 Apr. 1/64 June 5/58	3,000. 6,732. 10,500. 767.	1 - \$15,900. 1 - \$ 6,517. Clear 1 - \$ 8,583. 2 - \$ 2,150.

Average Price of most recent sales:

13 units at \$176,700 = \$13,592



TABLE VIII (cont'd.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down <u>Payment</u>	Mortgage Details
24 Sullivan St. 24 Sullivan St.	\$ 11,500. 9,000.	Feb. 21/57 July 11/56	\$ 4,150. 9,000.	1 - \$ 7,350. Clear
25 Sullivan St.	8,250.	(1954)	2,775.	1 - \$ 5,475.
27 Sullivan St.	7,000.	Oct. 5/61	7,000.	Clear
28 Sullivan St.	10,000.	Feb. 28/56	3,000.	1 - \$ 7,000.
29 Sullivan St.	9,000.	Mar. 12/63	2,000.	1 - \$ 7,000.
31 Sullivan St.	12,000.	Aug. 1/58	12,000.	Clear
32 Sullivan St.	14,500.	Apr. 1/56	2,000.	1 - \$12,500.
33 Sullivan St. 33 Sullivan St.	11,000. 8,500.	Aug. 31/62 Apr. 29/54	5,000. 3,000.	1 - \$ 6,000. 1 - \$ 5,500.
34 Sullivan St.	17,000.	Apr. 29/66	5,000.	1 - \$12,000.
36 Sullivan St. 36 Sullivan St.	14,500. 14,500.	May 29/59 Nov. 19/56	2,800. 1,000.	1 - \$11,700. 1 - \$ 9,300. 2 - \$ 4,200.
38 Sullivan St. 38 Sullivan St.	10,700. 12,500.	Feb. 24/61 July 11/58	10,700. 1,000.	Clear 1 - \$10,500. 2 - \$ 1,000.
39 Sullivan St.	17,500.	May 14/65	6,000.	1 - \$11,500.
41 Sullivan St.	9,000.	Feb. 22/65	3,000.	1 - \$ 6,000.
43 Sullivan St.	10,700.	Mar. 7/61	5,000.	1 - \$ 7,700.
44 Sullivan St. 44 Sullivan St. 44 Sullivan St.	12,700. 12,000. 12,500.	Jan. 12/66 May 23/62 Nov. 5/54	2,900. 1,000. 3,500.	1 - \$ 9,900. 1 - \$11,000. 1 - \$ 9,000.
45 Sullivan St.	13,500.	Oct. 8/64	4,000.	1 - \$ 9,500.
46 Sullivan St.	13,800.	Jan. 10/66	3,700.	1 - \$ 9,150. 2 - \$ 950.
46 Sullivan St.	12,700.	Sept.28/65	2,440.	1 - \$ 9,259. 2 - \$ 1,000.
46 Sullivan St.	10,500.	Nov. 17/64	1,000.	1 - \$ 9,500.

Average Price of most recent sales:

17 units at \$202,650 = \$11,920



ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
47 Sullivan St.	\$ 11,500.	Oct. 8/64	\$11,500	Clear
50 Sullivan St. 50 Sullivan St.	19,000. 14,500.	Oct.14/65 Aug.10/56	7,000. 3,500.	1 - \$12,000. 1 - \$11,000.
52 Sullivan St.	20,300.	June 28/66	7,300.	1 - \$13,000.
54 Sullivan St. 54 Sullivan St.	13,500. 12,500.	June 17/59 May 28/59	1,600. 600.	1 - \$11,900. 1 - \$11,900.
55 Sullívan St.	13,500.	Apr. 30/64	8,000.	1 - \$ 5,500.
56 Sullivan St. 56 Sullivan St.	11,300. 11,500.	Sept.30/63 May 27/54	3,000. 4,000.	1 - \$ 8,300. 1 - \$ 6,300. 2 - \$ 1,200.
57 Sullivan St.	16,000.	May 20/60	3,000.	1 - \$13,000.
58 Sullivan St.	12,000.	Sept.30.64	2,500.	1 - \$ 8,450. 2 - \$ 1,050.
58 Sullivan St. 58 Sullivan St.	5,700. 11,800	Jan. 18/63 July 18/62	1,200. 2,550.	1 - \$ 4,500. 1 - \$ 9,250.
59 Sullivan St.	14,900.	Aug. 5/64	5,000.	1 - \$ 9,900.
60 Sullivan St. 60 Sullivan St.	13,500. 13,000.	Nov. 10/64 Dec. 7/56	13,500. 2,000.	Clear 1 - \$11,000.
61 Sullivan St.	15,000.	Mar. 10/58	3,000.	1 - \$12,000.
62 Sullivan St.	10,700.	Nov. 18/55	1,200.	1 - \$ 5,000. 2 - \$ 4,500.
65 Sullivan St.	12,500.	June 30/54	2,500.	1 - \$10,000.
67 Sullivan St.	11,850.	May 31/55	5,000.	1 - \$ 6,850.
68 Sullivan St.	9,500.	Sept. 9/53	3,000.	1 - \$ 6,500.
69 Sullivan St. 69 Sullivan St. 69 Sullivan St. 69 Sullivan St.	17,450. 11,950. 11,800. 14,500.	July 28/65 Apr. 26/65 June 9/61 Oct. 30/59	10,000. 11,950. 2,200. 4,000.	1 - \$ 7,450. Clear 1 - \$ 9,600. 1 - \$10,500.

Average Price of most recent sales:

16 units at \$222,500 = \$13,906



ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

Address	Selling	Selling	Down	Mortgage
	Price	Date	Payment	Details
71 Sullivan St.	\$ 14,200.	Dec. 7/61	\$ 6,700.	1 - \$ 7,500
71 Sullivan St.	13,900.	Mar. 3/60	4,150.	1 - \$ 9,750.
73 Sullivan St.	17,000.	Sept.29/66	8,200.	1 - \$ 8,800.
73 Sullivan St.	12,800.	Feb. 25/64	3,000.	1 - \$ 9,800.
73 Sullivan St.	13,000.	Sept.28/56	2,500.	1 - \$10,500.
75 Sullivan St.	16,000.	May 15/64	2,000.	1 - \$14,000.
75 Sullivan St.	8,855.	Mar. 2/64	8,855	Clear
75 Sullivan St.	11,500.	May 15/54	4,550	1 - \$ 6,950.
76 Sullivan St.	16,200.	Aug. 31/62	10,000.	1 - \$ 6,200.
77 Sullivan St.	13,000.	Apr. 30/65	13,000.	Clear
79 Sullivan St.	18,200.	July 30/65	6,000.	1 - \$12,200.
79 Sullivan St.	12,000.	May 17/65	12,000.	Clear
81 Sullivan St.	15,250.	Nov. 1/65	3,000.	1 - \$11,250.
81 Sullivan St.	10,100.	Apr. 1/63	10,100.	Clear
83 Sullivan St.	9,500.	Oct. 31/61	1,750.	1 - \$ 7,750.
83 Sullivan St.	16,000.	Mar. 7/58	400.	1 - \$15,600.
Soho Street 15 Soho St.	14,500.	Aug. 25/58	14,500.	Clear
16 Soho St.	10,700.	June 20/63	2,000.	1 - \$ 8,700.
17 Soho St.	11,000.	Aug. 16/57	11,000.	Clear
18 Soho St.	10,400.	Mar. 7/63	2,000.	1 - \$ 8,400.
19 Soho St.	12,590.	Sept.24/63	NIL	1 - \$12,590.
20 Soho St.	10,900.	Nov. 15/62	600.	1 - \$ 9,200.
20 Soho St.	12,000.	Sept.23/60	2,000.	1 - \$10,000.
22 Soho St.	10,750.	Jan. 15/64	•	1 - \$ 6,750.
22 Soho St.	12,000.	May 14/58		1 - \$10,000.
27-33 Soho St.	32,614.	Sept.24/63	NIL	1 - \$32,614.

Average Price of most recent sales:

19 units at \$232,804 = \$12,252



TABLE VIII (cont'd.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
Phoebe Street 8 Phoebe St.	\$ 9,500.	June 26/59	\$ 1,500.	1 - \$ 4,575.
8 Phoebe St.	8,000.	Apr. 16/58	2,000.	2 - \$ 3,425. 1 - \$ 4,750. 2 - \$ 1,250.
12 Phoebe St.	7,000.	Apr. 24/64	1,000.	1 - \$ 6,000.
13 Phoebe St. 13 Phoebe St.	8,250. 11,500	Nov. 23/54 Dec. 29/54	1,500. 900.	1 - \$ 6,750. 1 - \$ 5,750. 2 - \$ 3,850.
14 Phoebe St.	13,500.	July 21/66	13,500.	Clear
22 Phoebe St.	7,800.	July 26/65	1,000.	1 - \$ 4,700. 2 - \$ 2,100.
24 Phoebe St. 24 Phoebe St.	7,000. 4,000.	July 22/66 Apr. 2/54	3,500. 1,050.	1 - \$ 3,500. 1 - \$ 2,000. 2 - \$ 950.
28 Phoebe St. 28 Phoebe St.	15,400. 7,000.	May 14/65 Sept. 5/62	6,000. 2,000.	1 - \$ 9,400. 1 - \$ 5,000.
32 Phoebe St. 32 Phoebe St.	17,000. 10,700.	Aug. 20/65 June 11/63	8,100. 1,000.	1 - \$ 8,900. 1 - \$ 9,700.
36 Phoebe St.	17,000.	Dec. 14/65	4,000.	1 - \$13,000.
40 Phoebe St. 40 Phoebe St.	10,000. 13,500.	Apr. 26/62 Nov. 18/53	10,000. 6,000.	Clear 1 - \$ 5,250. 2 - \$ 2,250.
44 Phoebe St. 44 Phoebe St.	14,500. 14,900.	Mar. 24/64 Dec. 13/57	8,000. 4,000.	1 - \$ 6,500. 1 - \$10,900.
46 Phoebe St.	12,000.	Aug. 9/54	3,500.	1 - \$ 8,200. 2 - \$ 300.
46 Phoebe St.	12,500.	Aug. 7/53	3,700	1 - \$ 6,400. 2 - \$ 2,400.
48 Phoebe St.	14,400.	Nov. 13/53	2,500.	1 - \$ 9,500. 2 - \$ 2,400.
48 Phoebe St.	13,000.	Oct. 30/53	3,500.	1 - \$ 9,500.

Average Price of most recent sales:

13 units at \$156,600 = \$12,046



TABLE VIII (cont'd.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
50 Phoebe St. 50 Phoebe St.	\$ 6,327. 10,000.	Sept. 6/63 Nov. 6/61	\$ 2. 2,525.	1 - \$ 6,325. 1 - \$ 7,475.
54 Phoebe St. 54 Phoebe St.	16,300. 11,500.	Jan. 28/65 Sept.10/64	8,300. 11,500.	1 - \$ 8,000. Clear
56 Phoebe St.	12,000.	Sept. 6/61	2,000.	1 - \$10,000.
58 Phoebe St. 58 Phoebe St.	14,300. 8,900.	Dec. 21/61 July 6/61	1,000. 8,900.	1 - \$13,300. Clear
Huron Street South of D	undas 1 - 68			
3 Huron St.	7,500.	July 15/66	7,500.	Clear
5 Huron St. 5 Huron St.	6,250. 9,500.	Apr. 1/66 Apr. 11/56	6,250. 1,000.	Clear 1 - \$ 8,500.
7 Huron St.	6,000.	Jan. 7/66	6,000.	Clear
9 Huron St Comm. 9 Huron StDwlg. & Bus 9 Huron St Dwlg.	8,250 . 5,000. 6,000.	July 8/66 Sept.23/60 May 3/56	8,250. 5,000. 6,000.	Clear Clear Clear
10 Huron St.	12,000.	May 17/63	5,000.	1 - \$ 7,000.
11 Huron St.	7,000.	Nov. 25/66	7,000.	Clear
12 Huron St. 12 Huron St.	13,000. 13,500.	July 10/63 Mar. 26/54	13,000. 3,458.	Clear 1 - \$ 2,300 2 - \$ 7,741.
15 Huron St. 15 Huron St. 15 Huron St.	8,250. 7,000. 6,500.	July 11/66 Jan. 12/65 Aug. 11/53	2,732. 1,000. 800.	1 - \$ 5,517. 1 - \$ 6,000. 1 - \$ 3,600. 2 - \$ 2,100.
15 Huron St.	3,600.	June 19/53	1,500.	1 - \$ 1,800. 2 - \$ 300.
17 Huron St.	7,900.	Sept. 3/54	720.	1 - \$ 6,429. 2 - \$ 750.
23 Huron St. 23 Huron St.	14,500. 18,500.	Nov. 30/60 July 16/57	2,000. 18,500.	1 - \$12,500 Clear

Average Price of most recent sales:

14 units at \$139,577 = \$9,969



TABLE VIII (cont'd.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
24 Huron St.	\$12,500.	Mar. 10/66	\$ 3,000.	1 - \$ 6,275. 2 - \$ 3,225.
24 Huron St.	10,000.	May 5/65	3,500.	1 - \$ 6,500.
26 Huron St. 26 & 28 Huron St.	6,500. 22,500.	Aug. 9/65 May 5/65	NIL 6,500.	1 - \$ 6,500. 1 - \$16,000.
28 Huron St. 28 Huron St.	9,000. 7,200.	Aug. 4/61 Dec. 9/60	500. 2,200.	1 - \$ 8,500. 1 - \$ 3,150 2 - \$ 1,850.
28 Huron St.	4,365.	Apr. 2/57	865.	1 - \$ 3,500.
31 Huron St. 31 Huron St.	11,700. 10,400.	Sept. /66 Nov. 6/53	3,000. 1,000.	1 - \$ 8,700. 1 - \$ 6,300. 2 - \$ 3,100.
31 Huron St.	10,000.	Apr. 29/55	1,000.	1 - \$ 4,750. 2 - \$ 3,250.
36 Huron St. & 51 Grang 36 Huron St. & 51 Grang		Dec. 21/56 Mar. 21/56	7,000. 8,000.	Clear Clear
37 Huron St.	22,500.	Dec. 30/65	5,000.	1 - \$17,500.
39 Huron St. 39 Huron St.	7,500. 4,250.	Mar. 6/62 Sept.14/56	1,000. 2,000.	1 - \$ 6,500. 1 - \$ 2,250.
41 Huron St.	8,500.	Oct. 4/62	2,000.	1 - \$ 6,500.
43 Huron St.	21,000.	Mar. 7/67	5,000.	1 - \$16,000.
44 Huron St. 44 Huron St. 44 Huron St.	14,000. 10,300. 8,100.	July 28/64 May 28/64 May 30/61	2,000. 10,300. 8,100.	1 - \$12,000. Clear Clear
45 Huron St.	15,200.	Oct. 15/57	8,200.	1 - \$ 7,000.
46 Huron St. 46 Huron St.	13,500. 14,300.	Nov. 27/63 Mar. 27/58	5,000. 3,000.	1 - \$ 8,500. 1 - \$ 6,400. 2 - \$ 4,900.
48 Huron St.	10,500.	July 27/59	1,398.	1 - \$ 8,602.
48 Huron St.	17,000.	Mar. 27/57	1,200.	2 - \$ 500. 1 - \$ 9,800. 2 - \$ 6,000.

Average Price of most recent sales:

14 units at \$166,400 = \$11,885



ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
50 Huron St.	\$12,900.	Dec. 2/60	\$ 3,000.	1 - \$ 4,900. 2 - \$ 5,000.
50 Huron St.	10,500.	Apr. 14/54	3,000.	1 - \$ 7,500.
51 Huron St. 51 Huron St.	16,500. 13,500.	Mar. 30/61 July 30/54	10,000. 5,500.	1 - \$ 6,500. 1 - \$ 5,600. 2 - \$ 2,400.
53 Huron St.	15,000.	Oct. 7/63	15,000.	Clear
54 Huron St.	13,000.	Jan. 10/56	3,000.	1 - \$10,000.
55 Huron St.	14,500.	Apr. 18/63	3,000.	1 - \$11,500.
57 Huron St.	12,750.	Oct. 29/59	1,500.	1 - \$11,250.
60 Huron St. 60 Huron St.	22,500. 18,000.	Oct. 1/65 Dec. 1/64	8,000. 5,000.	1 - \$14,500. 1 - \$13,000.
63 Huron St. 63 Huron St.	11,000. 11,400.	Mar. 18/54 Oct. 30/57	2,500. 3,900.	1 - \$ 8,500. 1 - \$ 7,500.
65 Huron St.	12,500.	Feb. 15/62	3,000.	1 - \$ 9,500.
Beverley Street South of	f Dundas 1 -	136		
15 Beverley St.	8,000.		8,000.	Clear
27 Beverley StComm. 27 Beverley StDwlg.	36,000. 20,000.	Feb. 11/66 May 14/63	21,750. 3,000.	1 - \$14,250. 1 - \$13,000. 2 - \$ 4,000.
27 Beverley StDwlg.	21,500.	July 10/59	5,500.	1 - \$16,000.
31 Beverley St.	10,000.	Nov. 15/62	4,000.	1 - \$ 6,000.
35 Beverley St.	7,500.	Jan. 27/60	3,000.	1 - \$ 4,500.
37 Beverley St.	16,500.	Aug. 4/66	6,000.	1 - \$10,500.
39 Beverley St.	13,000.	Jan. 25/55	3,000.	1 - \$ 7,750. 2 - \$ 2,250.
39 Beverley St.	15,000.	Dec. 17/53	5,995.	1 - \$ 5,155. 2 - \$ 3,850.
40 Beverley St.	17,000.	June 28/62	17,000.	Clear
41 Beverley St.	18,000.	June 28/65	18,000.	Clear

Average Price of most recent sales:

17 units at \$257,050 = \$15,120



ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
42 Beverley St. 42 Beverley St.	\$15,000. 12,200.	Aug. 1/62 Jan. 5/62	\$15,000. 2,000.	Clear 1 - \$ 6,400. 2 - \$ 3,800.
43 Beverley St.	18,000.	June 16/65	18,000.	Clear
45 Beverley St.	20,000.	June 10/65	10,000.	1 - \$10,000.
46 Beverley St.	14,000.	Aug. 5/58	7,000.	1 - \$ 7,000.
47 Beverley St. 47 Beverley St.	24,000. 15,000.	July 30/65 Mar. 28/62	16,880. 15,000.	1 - \$ 7,120. Clear
48 Beverley St.	17,000.	Aug. 5/65	7,000.	1 - \$10,000.
49 Beverley St.	10,500.	June 14/62	1,500.	1 - \$ 9,000 -
50 Beverley St. 50 Beverley St.	15,000. 10,000.	Oct. 29/64 Mar. 31/53	15,000. 3,000.	Clear 1 - \$ 7,000.
51 Beverley St. 51 Beverley St. 51 Beverley St.	15,800. 16,000. 11,000.	Apr. 1/65 Mar. 1/65 Sept. 1/60	10,600. 8,654 4,000.	1 - \$ 5,200. 1 - \$ 7,345. 1 - \$ 7,000.
53 Beverley St Dwlg. 53 Beverley St Apt.	37,000. 20,000.	June 4/65 Jan. 13/56	14,000. 4,000.	1 - \$23,000. 1 - \$16,000.
54 Beverley St. 54 & 56 Beverley St.	10,500. 10,000.	Oct. 19/54 Apr. 1/54	7,000. 10,000.	1 - \$ 3,500. Clear
55 Beverley St.	34,000.	June 30/65	16,000.	1 - \$18,000.
56 Beverley St.	11,000.	Jan. 16/67	1,500.	1 - \$ 6,800. 2 - \$ 2,700.
56 Beverley St.	10,500.	June 29/56	1,100.	1 - \$ 7,000. 2 - \$ 2,400.
60 Beverley St.	16,000.	Mar. 10/60	3,000.	1 - \$10,000. 2 - \$ 3,000.
60 Beverley St.	9,500.	Dec. 1/59	9,500.	Clear
64 Beverley St. 64 Beverley St.	17,000. 8,502.	Oct. 11/63 Sept.26/63	5,000. 8,502.	1 - \$12,000. Clear

Average Price of most recent sales:

15 units at \$274,800 = \$18,320



TABLE VIII (cont'd.)

ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
68 Beverley St. 68 Beverley St.	\$14,000. 11,000.	Nov. 16/62 Aug. 5/54	\$ 6,000. 11,000.	1 - \$ 8,000. Clear
70 Beverley St. 70 Beverley St. 70 Beverley St. 70 Beverley St.	15,500. 13,000. 16,500. 9,800.	Dec. 2/64 Nov. 6/64 Nov. 12/57 Oct. 25/57	5,000. 5,550 2,000. 9,800.	1 - \$10,500. 1 - \$ 7,450. 1 - \$14,500. Clear
76 Beverley St.	24,000.	Dec. 22/67	8,000.	1 - \$11,500. 2 - \$ 8,000.
76 Beverley St.	18,900.	Jan. 2/59	6,500.	1 - \$12,400.
78 Beverley St.	17,800.	Nov. 20,63	3,000.	1 - \$14,800.
90 Beverley St.	16,500.	Mar. 15/60	2,000.	1 - \$13,320
90 Beverley St.	17,000.	June 5/59	3,000.	2 - \$ 1,180. 1 - \$10,000. 2 - \$ 4,000.
106 Beverley St.	94,000.	Feb. 28/58	30,350.	1 - \$63,650.
108 Beverley St.	17,000.	Apr. 15/54	17,000.	Clear
114 Beverley St.	17,500.	Oct. 20/55	5,000.	1 - \$12,500.
118 Beverley St.	26,000.	June 30/66	12,000.	1 - \$ 4,000.
118 Beverley St.	17,000.	Feb. 11/65	3,000.	2 - \$10,000. 1 - \$ 5,000. 2 - \$ 9,000.
Grange Avenue 1 - 82 5 Grange Ave. 5 Grange Ave. (balance of above property)	14,500. 14,500	June 10/60 June 10/60	14,500. 5,000.	Clear 1 - \$ 9,500.
7 Grange Ave.	13,000.	July 17/53	2,500.	1 - \$10,500.
9 Grange Ave.	13,500.	Oct. 17/57	8,000.	1 - \$ 5,500.
10 Grange Ave.	17,000.	June 1/60	3,000.	1 - \$10,600. 2 - \$ 3,400.
10 Grange Ave.	16,000.	June 4/58	4,000.	1 - \$12,000.
11-13 Grange Ave. 13 Grange Ave.	20,000 40,000.	Sept.20/55 July 19/60	10,000. 40,000.	1 - \$10,000. Clear

Average Price of most recent sales:

15 units at \$350,300 = \$23,353



TABLE VIII (cont'd.)

ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

Address		Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
12 Grange	Ave.	\$21,000.	May 2/66	\$ 5,000.	1 - \$16,000.
17 Grange	Ave.	15,000.	Mar.31/55	14,000.	Clear
18 Grange	Ave.	13,500.	Apr. 4/62	1,971	1 - \$ 8,728 2 - \$ 2,800
18 Grange	Ave.	15,500.	Feb. 2/61	602.	1 - \$ 9,397. 2 - \$ 5,500.
21 Grange	Ave.	20,500.	Aug.26/58	10,500.	1 - \$10,000.
23 Grange	Ave.	15,500.	Sept.12/56	10,300.	1 - \$ 5,200.
24 Grange 24 Grange 24 Grange	Ave.	24,000. 15,000. 17,500.	Nov.30/65 Aug.27/65 Jan.24/63	24,000. 15,000. 1,800.	Clear Clear 1 - \$ 6,000. 2 - \$ 9,700.
24 Grange		18,500.	Oct.26/61	4,500.	1 - \$14,000.
25 Grange	Ave.	18,800.	July 5/60	5,000.	1 - \$13,800.
26 Grange 26 Grange		11,100. 20,000.	July 28/54 Oct. 22/53	5,300. 8,000.	1 - \$ 5,800. 1 - \$12,000.
28 Grange 28 Grange		7,500. 14,000.	Nov. 25/55 July 3/53	7,500. 4,500.	Clear 1 - \$ 6,050. 2 - \$ 3,450.
29 Grange	Ave.	20,000.	Aug. 16/66	20,000.	Clear
30 Grange	Ave.	14,500.	Dec. 11/61	5,000.	1 - \$ 9,500.
31 Grange 31 Grange		8,650 13,500.	June 7/54 Apr. 10/53	4,400. 4,500.	1 - \$ 4,250. 1 - \$ 9,000.
32 Grange 32 Grange		10,900. 14,000.	Oct. 3/63 Sept.22/59	6,475. 8,000.	1 - \$ 4,425. 1 - \$ 6,000.
34 Grange	Ave.	17,000.	Nov. 1/63	4,000.	1 - \$11,450. 2 - \$ 1,550.
34 Grange	Ave.	16,500.	Jan. 2/57	1,000.	1 - \$15,500.
35 Grange 35 Grange		14,400. 14,500.	Dec. 3/54 Aug. 7/53	5,338. 4,800.	1 - \$ 9,061. 1 - \$ 9,700.

Average Price of most recent sales:

15 units at \$232,350 = \$15,490



TABLE VIII (cont'd.)

ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
36 Grange Ave.	\$12,500.	Jan. 29/54	\$ 4,000.	1 - \$ 8,500.
39 Grange Ave. 39 Grange Ave.	13,000. 8,500.	Dec. 1/64 Sept. 2/64	5,575. 8,500.	1 - \$ 7,425. Clear
40 Grange Ave. 40 Grange Ave.	7,500. 11,500.	June 20/62 Aug. 14/62	7,500. 4,000.	Clear 1 - \$ 7,500.
41 Grange Ave.	16,000.	Aug. 9/66	4,000.	1 - \$12,000.
42 Grange Ave.	10,500.	July 5/55	3,949.	1 - \$ 6,250. 2 - \$ 300.
42 Grange Ave.	10,000.	May 19/54	3,000.	1 - \$ 7,000.
44 Grange Ave. 44 Grange Ave.	17,500. 11,000.	July 26/65 Mar. 16/65	10,000. 11,000.	1 - \$ 7,500. Clear
45 Grange Ave.	14,000.	Nov. 29/66	8,000.	1 - \$ 6,000.
48 Grange Ave. 48 Grange Ave.	22,300. 7,100.	May 14/65 Mar. 5/56	22,300. 4,000.	Clear 1 - \$ 3,100.
54 Grange Ave.	25,000.	Jan. 25/67	6,000.	1 - \$19,000.
56 Grange Ave.	15,100.	Jan. 25/67	5,000.	1 - \$10,100.
57 Grange Ave. 57 Grange Ave.	14,300. 15,000.	May 31/62 Dec. 4/58	4,000. 1,500.	1 - \$10,300. 1 - \$ 6,150. 2 - \$ 7,350.
60 Grange Ave.	12,000.	Dec. 2/63	2,000.	1 - \$10,000.
61 Grange Ave. 61 Grange Ave.	19,300. 18,250.	Apr. 6/61 Apr. 14/54	14,000. 7,000.	1 - \$ 5,300. 1 - \$11,250.
62 Grange Ave. 62 Grange Ave.	12,000. 10,500.	Sept.23/60 Feb. 17/56	1,000. 2,000.	1 - \$11,000. 1 - \$ 8,500.
64 Grange Ave. 64 Grange Ave.	11,025. 12,000.	May 26/61 June 4/59	2,053. 2,000.	1 - \$ 8,971. 1 - \$ 7,600. 2 - \$ 2,400.
65 Grange Ave.	15,000.	Aug. 24/65	5,000.	1 - \$10,000.

Average Price of most recent sales:

16 units at \$241,025 = \$15,064



TABLE VIII (cont'd.)

ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
66 Grange Ave.	\$18,800.	Oct. 12/66	\$10,163.	1 - \$ 4,000. 2 - \$ 4,636.
66 Grange Ave. 66 Grange Ave.	13,000. 14,200.	Sept.20/60 Sept.14/55	2,000. 6,500.	1 - \$11,000. 1 - \$ 7,700.
67 Grange Ave. 67 Grange Ave.	19,000. 18,000.	May 6/60 Mar. 13/58	6,525. 4,000.	1 - \$12,475. 1 - \$ 5,250. 2 - \$ 8,750.
68 Grange Ave. 68 Grange Ave.	15,500. 10,250.	Mar. 25/64 Dec. 11/63	6,000. 10,250.	1 - \$ 9,500. Clear
73 Grange Ave. 73 Grange Ave.	11,250. 10,000.	Dec. 19/63 May 17/63	1,500. 10,000.	1 - \$ 9,750. Clear
76 Grange Ave.	17,000.	Feb. 12/58	6,500.	1 - \$10,500.
77 Grange Ave. 77 Grange Ave.	19,600. 16,500.	Nov. 21/66 Aug. 28/53	19,600. 3,000.	Clear 1 - \$13,500.
78 Grange Ave.	22,500.	July 11/66	4,000.	1 - \$18,500.
80 Grange Ave.	14,700.	May 15/63	4,500.	1 - \$ 7,500.
80 Grange Ave.	14,500.	Mar. 27/58	4,000.	2 - \$ 2,700. 1 - \$10,500.
81 Grange Ave. 81 Grange Ave.	12,000. 13,200.	Mar. 11/59 Mar. 4/60	1,000. 2,348.	1 - \$11,000. 1 - \$10,301 2 - \$ 350.

Average Price of most recent sales:

9 units at \$151,550 = \$16,838



RECORD OF SALES COMPARISONS OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES SOLD ON THE PRIVATE MARKET ADJACENT TO DON MOUNT VILLAGE REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down <u>Payment</u>	Mortgage <u>Details</u>
Grant Street				
6 Grant St. 8 Grant St. 12 Grant St. 6,8,10,12, Grant St.	\$ 9,000. 9,500. 9,000. 22,000.	Apr. 26/66 May 2/66 July 16/65 Aug. 4/64	\$ 1,000. 750. 700. 22,000.	1 - \$ 8,000. 1 - 8,750. 1 - 8,300. Clear
9 Grant St.	7,500.	Sept.14/56	500.	1 - 7,000.
17 Grant St. 17 Grant St.	5,000. 12,800.	Oct. 6/61 Dec. 10/58	NIL 800.	1 - 5,000. 1 - 12,000.
18 Grant St. 18 Grant St. 18 Grant St.	10,200. 10,000. 11,200	May 29/64 Aug. 8/61 Feb. 16/56	700. 600. 500.	1 - 9,500. 1 - 9,400. 1 - 10,700.
19 Grant St. 19 Grant St.	14,000. 9,600.	Aug. 26/65 Dec. 11/63	2,000. 9,600.	1 - 12,000. Clear
23 Grant St.	11,900.	Oct. 20/61	600.	1 - 11,300.
25 Grant St. 25 Grant St.	10,000. 11,100	Feb. 2/65 Apr. 14/54	10,000. 4,500.	Clear 1 - 6,600.
26 Grant St.	3,000.	Dec. 29/55	1,800.	1 - 1,200.
28 Grant St. 28 Grant St.	11,000. 6,500.	June 30/59 Sept.19/56	500. 500.	1 - 10,500. 1 - 4,600. 2 - 1,400.
30 Grant St.	10,500.	Sept.17/53	1,500.	1 - 9,000.
32 Grant St. 32 Grant St. 32 Grant St.	14,000. 13,500. 6,500.	Jan. /67 May 3/57 Mar. 29/57	1,380. 500. 6,500.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
34 Grant St. 34 Grant St. 34 Grant St.	5,961. 13,900. 6,800.	May 10/65 July 19/56 May 22/56	1. 1,000. 6,800.	1 - 12,900.
35 Grant St.	9,000.	Oct. 9/62	1,000.	1 - 8,000.

Average Price of most recent sales:

16 units at \$145,061 = \$9,066



TABLE IX (con+'d.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
36 Grant St. 36 Grant St. 36 Grant St.	\$ 12,000. 12,500. 13,500.	Sept.15/65 Dec. 29/59 Mar. 6/56	\$ 1,200. 3,000. 1,000.	1 - \$10,800. 1 - 9,500. 1 - 4,660. 2 - 7,840.
37 Grant St.	14,502.	Jan. 5/66	2.	1 - 9,000. 2 - 5,500.
37 Grant St.	6,300.	Nov. 29/65	6,300.	Clear
38 Grant St. 38 Grant St.	7,000. 12,900.	May 15/63 Jan. 14/57	1,000. 1,000.	1 - 6,000. 1 - 11,900.
39 Grant St.	14,000.	Nov. 28/55	2,125.	1 - 5,875. 2 - 6,000.
40 Grant St.	7,500.	Sept.18/56	7,500.	Clear
41 Grant St. 41 Grant St. 41 Grant St.	11,700. 11,365. 11,400	Mar. 27/67 Jan. 29/65 Apr. 30/64	1,500. 665. 500.	1 - 10,200. 1 - 10,700. 1 - 10,900.
42½ Grant St.	3,500.	Nov. 19/64	3,500.	Clear
48 Grant St.	11,000.	May 4/54	2,368.	1 - 5,931. 2 - 9,430.
49 Grant St.	11,500.	May 3/63	569.	1 - 1,500. 2 - 9,430.
49 Grant St.	10,500.	June 6/61	600.	1 - 9,900.
51 Grant St.	12,900.	Nov. 1/66	1,500.	1 - 5,150. 2 - 6,250.
51 Grant St. 51 Grant St.	9,900. 10,000.	Oct. 28/66 Aug. 31/60	3,650. 2,000.	1 - 6,250. 1 - 8,000.
52 Grant St.	11,500.	Dec. 27/57	1,500.	1 - 10,000.
55 Grant St. 55 Grant St.	10,000. 11,000.	Jan. 24/62 Sept.15/58	800. 1,000.	1 - 9,200. 1 - 2,875. 2 - 7,125.
56 Grant St.	5,240.	June 30/54	3,500.	1 - 1,740.
58 Grant St. 58 Grant St. 58 Grant St.	12,900. 8,800. 11,900.	May 3/66 May 2/66 Nov. 14/60	1,000. 8,800. 1,000.	1 - 11,900. Clear 1 - 10,900.

Average Price of most recent sales:

14 units at \$145,242 = \$10,374



TABLE IX (Cont'd.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
59 Grant St.	\$ 7,500.	Dec. 2/58	\$ 7,500.	Clear
62 Grant St.	12,900.	May 26/55	1,500.	1 - \$11,400.
63 Grant St. 65 Grant St.	13,800. 12,500.	Nov. 7/57 Feb. 27/58	500. 1,418.	1 - 13,300. 1 - 7,581. 2 - 3,500.
63, 65 Grant St.	13,400.	Oct. 22/57	13,400.	Clear
66 Grant St. 66 Grant St.	17,121. 17,000.	Feb. 18/66 Nov. 13/64	2,004. 1,500.	1 - 15,116. 1 - 13,000. 2 - 2,500.
66 Grant St. 66 Grant St.	15,000. 14,500.	Sept.28/64 Oct. 30/59	1,266. 5,000.	1 - 13,734. 1 - 9,500.
67 Grant St. 67 Grant St.	13,400. 13,600.	May 5/58 Oct. 18/57	825. 700.	1 - 12,575. 1 - 7,500. 2 - 5,400.
68 Grant St.	12,000.	Feb. 28/58	1,000.	1 - 5,500. 2 - 5,500.
68 Grant St.	12,000.	May 15/56	1,050.	1 - 8,000. 2 - 2,950.
69 Grant St.	6,300.	Nov. 6/53	6,300.	Clear
70 Grant St.	14,250.	July 23/58	817.	1 - 13,330. 2 - 102.
70 Grant St.	15,600.	Oct. 28/57	2,000.	1 - 13,600.
72 Grant St.	10,000.	Apr. 6/66	2,000.	1 - 2,700. 2 - 5,300.
72 Grant St.	11,900.	Feb. 17/64	1,625.	1 - 4,275. 2 - 6,000.
72 Grant St.	5,500.	Nov. 6/63	5,500.	Clear
73 Grant St.	8,000.	Oct. 3/61	8,000.	Clear
75 Grant St.	12,900.	July 4/58	5,500.	1 - 4,800. 2 - 4,600.
76 Grant St. 76 Grant St.	10,931. 12,000.	Jan. 12/59 Nov. 14/58	2. 1,000.	1 - 10,929. 1 - 7,948. 2 - 3,051.
77 Grant St.	12,500.	Aug. 16/55	1,000.	1 - 11,500.

Average Price of most recent sales:

14 units at \$164,102 = \$11,721



TA LE IX (Cont'd.)

Address	'elling Price	Colling Date	CM Nay to all	ericas Petrils
78 Grant St. 78 Grant St.	\$ 9,500. 12,600.	June 20/62 July 3/56	\$ 500. 1,000.	1 - \$ 9,000. 1 - 11,600.
79 Grant St.	9,800.	Sept.29/61	700.	1 - 4,400.
79 Grant St.	13,500.	July 20/56	800.	2 - 7,000. 1 - 5,700. 2 - 7,000.
80 Grant St.	10,500.	Aug. 12/56	1,000.	1 - 5,525. 2 - 3,970.
80 Grant St.	12,000.	Jan. 11/56	3,000.	1 - 8,800. 2 - 200.
Clark Street				
11 Clark St.	5,500.	Oct. 24/57	3,000.	1 - 2,500.
17 Clark St.	12,500.	Sept.21/59	1,000.	1 - 5,350. 2 - 5,150.
17 Clark St.	8,665.	Dec. 4/57	1,814.	1 - 6,85.
23 Clark St. 23 Clark St. 23 Clark St. 23 Clark St.	6,800. 7,000. 7,500. 6,000.	Feb. 8/66 Apr. 2/65 Oct. 1/62 July 4/62	6,800. 1,300. 1,000. 6,000.	Clear 1 - 5,700. 1 - 6,500. Clear
27 Clark St. 27 Clark St.	8,500. 8,500.	May 31/66 Mar. 15/57	1,500. 8,500.	1 - 7,000. Clear
29 Clark St. 29 Clark St. 29 Clark St.	5,500. 5,500. 6,000.	Nov. 6/64 Nov. 15/63 Aug. 11/60		Clear 1 - 2,800. 1 - 6,000.
Howie Avenue				
1 Howie Ave.	7,500.	Oct. 9/57	7,500.	Clear
2 Howie Ave.	12,500.	Jan. 25/67	970	1 - 8,429. 2 - 3,100.
2 Howie Ave.	10,000.	Sept.14/66	1,500.	1 - 8,500.
3 Howie Ave.	9,000.	Apr. 1/54	5,500.	1 - 3,500.
4 Howie Ave. 4 Howie Ave.	11,500. 5,800.	Apr. 11/57 Mar. 1/57	1,000. 5,800.	1 - 10,500. Clear

Average Price of most recent sales:

12 units at \$109,100 = \$9,091



TABLE IX (Cont'd.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
5 Howie Ave. 5 Howie Ave.	\$ 7,700. 6,500.	Aug. 3/60 Dec. 4/59	\$ 7,700. 1,500.	Clear 1 - \$ 5,000.
11 Howie Ave.	7,700.	Oct. 8/53	2,036.	1 - 1,130. 2 - 4,533.
13 Howie Ave.	15,900.	Oct. 6/66	600.	1 - 12,000. 2 - 3,300.
13 Howie Ave.	8,500.	July 15/66	8,500.	Clear
17 Howie Ave. 17 Howie Ave.	9,100 10,900.	May 25/64 Mar. 1/57	300. 1,000.	1 - 8,800. 1 - 9,900.
22 Howie Ave.	10,900.	Dec. 23/64	1,000.	1 - 8,000. 2 - 1,900.
22 Howie Ave. 22 Howie Ave.	4,500. 10,000.	Aug. 19/64 Jan. 30/58	4,500. 500.	Clear 1 - 5,025. 2 - 4,475.
22 Howie Ave.	11,900.	Sept. 1/55	900.	1 - 9,100. 2 - 1,900.
24 Howie Ave.	8,500.	Mar. 25/55	1,700.	1 - 6,800.
26 Howie Ave. 26 Howie Ave.	5,500. 9,900.	Dec. 18/63 Feb. 28/56	1,025. 500.	1 - 4,475. 1 - 9,400.
27 Howie Ave.	9,150.	Jan. 25/60	2,000.	1 - 7,150.
28 Howie Ave.	7,000.	Nov. 29/54	7,000.	Clear
30 Howie Ave. 30 Howie Ave.	10,000. 5,800.	Mar. 1/56 Feb. 7/56	1,000. 5,800.	1 - 9,000. Clear
31 Howie Ave.	7,000.	June 4/64	500.	1 - 6,500.
33 Howie Ave.	10,000.	Sept.29/59	500.	1 - 9,500.
34 Howie Ave.	12,000.	June 15/65	1,000.	1 - 4,000. 2 - 7,000.
34 Howie Ave. 34 Howie Ave.	8,000. 9,000.	Apr. 15/65 Oct. 21/55	1,000. 1,500.	1 - 7,000. 1 - 7,500.
36 Howie Ave.	7,400.	Oct. 15/54	3,450.	1 - 3,950
38 Howie Ave.	11,900.	Sept.12/66	1,000.	1 - 7,200. 2 - 3,700.
38 Howie Ave. 38 Howie Ave.	8,800. 5,500.	Mar. 16/60 Mar. 15/60	800. 1,705.	1 - 8,000. 1 - 3,795.

Average Price of most recent sales:

15 units at \$139,750 = \$9,316



TABLE IX (Cont'd.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
49 Howie Ave. 49 Howie Ave.	\$ 10,500. 9,000.	May 4/59 Apr. 23/54	\$10,500. 1,500.	Clear 1 - \$ 300. 2 - 7,200.
51 Howie Ave. 51 Howie Ave.	9,500. 12,500.	May 4/59 Nov. 26/58	9,500. 1,000.	Clear 1 - 3,800. 2 - 7,700.
52 Howie Ave.	6,500.	Oct. 30/53	6,500.	Clear
53 Howie Ave. 53 Howie Ave.	10,500. 12,900.	Mar. 31/60 June 23/59	10,500. 167.	Clear 1 - 9,300. 2 - 3,433.
54 Howie Ave. 54 Howie Ave.	7,592. 8,316.	May 16/55 Sept.17/54	900. 1,500.	1 - 6,692. 1 - 6,816.
55 Howie Ave. 55 Howie Ave.	5,500. 8,500.	May 12/58 May 1/54	5,500. 1,725.	Clear 1 - 4,300. 2 - 2,475.
57 Howie Ave. 57 Howie Ave.	14,500. 11,500.	Nov. 9/64 Mar. 26/54	14,500. 1,450.	Clear 1 - 2,550. 2 - 7,500.
59 Howie Ave.	10,500.	Oct. 1/64	10,500.	Clear
Boulton Avenue				
11 Boulton Ave. 11 Boulton Ave.	30,000. 22,447.	Dec. 15/64 Nov. 25/54	5,000. 11,096.	1 - 25,000. 1 - 11,351.
12 Boulton Ave.	6,000.	Mar. 3/59	6,000.	Clear
15 Boulton Ave.	14,000.	Mar. 29/56	2,000.	1 - 7,000. 2 - 5,000.
18 Boulton Ave.	10,500.	Nov. 28/63	346.	1 - 5,600. 2 - 4,554.
18 Boulton Ave.	5,300.	Feb. 22/63	500.	1 - 4,800.
29 Boulton Ave. 29 Boulton Ave.	12,292. 13,500.	Aug. 27/65 Dec. 19/61	1,298. 1,000.	1 - 10,994. 1 - 12,500.
32,34 Boulton Ave. 32,34 Boulton Ave. 32,34 Boulton Ave. 32,34 Boulton Ave.	30,000. 27,000. 20,500. 7,000.	Oct. 15/65 June 1/64 Apr. 15/64 July 24/63	9,000. 5,000. 20,500. 7,000.	1 - 21,000. 1 - 22,000. Clear Clear

Average Price of most recent sales:

15 units at \$177,884 = \$11,859



TABLE IX (Cont'd.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down <u>Payment</u>	Mortgage Details
33 Boulton Ave.	\$15,900.	July 24/59	\$ 1,000.	1 - \$ 3,775. 2 - 11,125.
33 Boulton Ave.	15,500.	Dec. 3/58	4,000.	1 - 11,500.
35 Boulton Ave. 35 Boulton Ave.	10,000. 8,500.	July 22/60 Dec. 17/57	700. 5,000.	1 - 9,300. 1 - 3,500.
37 Boulton Ave. 37 Boulton Ave.	9,000. 9,650.	Apr. 22/64 June 1/60	3,000. 9,650.	1 - 6,000. Clear
39 Boulton Ave. 39 Boulton Ave.	11,200. 10,400.	Sept.24/65 July 31/59	1,500. 1,500.	1 - 9,700. 1 - 8,900.
40 Boulton Ave. 40 Boulton Ave.	7,000. 9,000.	Oct. 15/62 June 30/53	1,000. 1,500.	1 - 6,000. 1 - 7,500.
45 Boulton Ave.	14,500.	Jan. 15/67	115.	1 - 8,035. 2 - 6,350.
45 Boulton Ave. 45 Boulton Ave.	8,500. 12,200.	July 5/66 Dec. 15/55	1,500. 500.	1 - 7,000. 1 - 11,700.
49 Boulton Ave.	8,000.	Dec. 11/56	500.	1 - 7,500.
50 Boulton Ave.	7,000.	Mar. 22/55	500.	1 - 6,500.
52 Boulton Ave.	5,000.	Oct. 30/57	5,000.	Clear
54 Boulton Ave.	12,500.	Oct. 14/58	1,000.	1 - 2,200. 2 - 9,300.
54 Boulton Ave.	10,300.	Oct. 10/58	1,000.	1 - 9,300.
63 Boulton Ave. 63,65 Boulton Ave.	,	Dec. 21/66 Aug. 2/63	,	1 - 6,500. 1 - 25,000.
69,71 Boulton Ave. 69 Boulton Ave.	12,100. 5,000.		12,100. 5,000.	
73 Boulton Ave.	3,500.	Dec. 22/53	3,500.	Clear
75 Boulton Ave.	12,500.	Dec. 6/54	2,400.	1 - 10,100.
81 Boulton Ave.	34,500.	July 6/66	18,786.	1 - 15,713.
82 Boulton Ave.	7,500.	June 4/57	7,500.	Clear

Average Price of most recent sales:

18 units at \$203,700 = \$11,317



Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
84 Boulton Ave. 84 Boulton Ave.	\$ 5,200. 5,500.	Dec. 15/55 Mar. 8/54	\$ 1,000 700.	1 - \$ 4,200. 1 - 4,800.
85 Boulton Ave. 85 Boulton Ave. 85 Boulton Ave.	8,850. 7,874. 11,500.	Feb. 26/62 Dec. 27/61 Sept.19/58	500. NIL 1,500.	1 - 8,350. 1 - 7,874. 1 - 1,580. 2 - 8,420.
86 Boulton Ave. 86 Boulton Ave.	14,400. 6,000.	June 4/57 Jan. 14/54	14,400. 650.	Clear 1 - 800. 2 - 4,550.
87 Boulton Ave.	5,000.	July 13/56	5,000.	Clear
88 Boulton Ave. 88 Boulton Ave.	6,500. 4,750.	June 4/57 May 12/55	6,500. 4,750.	Clear Clear
90 Boulton Ave.	7,500.	June 4/57	7,500.	Clear
91 Boulton Ave. 91 Boulton Ave. 91 Boulton Ave.	12,300. 5,000. 11,500.	July 18/66 Nov. 7/61 July 6/59	3,000. 2. 1,500.	1 - 9,300. 1 - 5,000. 1 - 2,200. 2 - 7,800.
93 Boulton Ave. 93 Boulton Ave. 93 Boulton Ave.	12,500. 5,500. 10,000.	Feb. 2/67 Dec. 6/56 Feb. 15/55	1,500 1,700. 1,110.	1 - 11,000. 1 - 3,800. 1 - 2,300. 2 - 6,589.
96 Boulton Ave.	12,000.	Aug. 29/56	12,000.	Clear
97 Boulton Ave. 97 Boulton Ave.	7,500. 8,000.	Oct. 14/58 July 8/54	7,500. 2,145.	
98 Boulton Ave. 98 Boulton Ave.	10,000. 9,400.	Sept.12/56 May 25/56	10,000. 1,000.	
100 Boulton Ave.	11,400.	Sept.25/56	11,400.	Clear
101 Boulton Ave.	7,500.	Mar. 15/60	7,500.	Clear
102 Boulton Ave.	11,000.	Oct. 1/56	11,000.	Clear
105 Boulton Ave.	8,800.	July 23/58	900.	1 - 5,000. 2 - 2,900.
105 Boulton Ave.	12,950.	Jan. 31/55	2,000.	1 - 1,800. 2 - 9,150.

Average Price of most recent sales:

15 units at \$140,450 = \$9,363



TABLE IX (Cont'd.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
106 Boulton Ave.	\$ 8,500.	Aug. 30/56	\$ 8,500.	Clear
107 Boulton Ave. 107 Boulton Ave. 107 Boulton Ave.	9,485. 3,800. 6,300.	May 13/64 May 3/62 May 15/54	200. 3,800. 1,300.	1 - \$ 9,285. Clear 1 - 3,300. 2 - 1,700.
108 Boulton Ave. 108 Boulton Ave.	7,000. 6,800.	Aug. 14/56 Nov. 2/54	7,000. 700.	Clear 1 - 3,500. 2 - 2,600.
110 Boulton Ave. 110 Boulton Ave.	6,600. 5,000.	July 31/56 Feb. 9/56	6,600. 500.	Clear 1 - 1,100. 2 - 3,400.
110A Boulton Ave. 110A Boulton Ave.	13,500. 10,500.	Sept. 4/56 Sept. 4/53	13,500. 1,500.	Clear 1 - 9,000.
112 Boulton Ave.	10,000.	Oct. 3/56	10,000.	Clear
113 Boulton Ave.	11,500.	May 23/56	1,000.	1 - 7,000. 2 - 3,500.
114 Boulton Ave.	9,000.	Sept.24/56	9,000.	Clear
114A Boulton Ave.	8,500.	Sept.19/56	8,500.	Clear
120 Boulton Ave.	9,500.	Sept. 3/53	1,000.	1 - 1,750. 2 - 6,750.
121 Boulton Ave.	10,500.	Feb. 18/55	1,500.	1 - 5,500. 2 - 3,500.
123 Boulton Ave.	13,000.	Aug. 11/58	2,000.	1 - 11,000.
125 Boulton Ave.	12,000.	Oct. 15/65	2,000.	1 - 10,000.
126 Boulton Ave.	15,000.	May 31/60	15,000.	Clear
DeGrassi Street				
12 DeGrassi St.	11,500.	May 15/57	800.	1 - 2,700. 2 - 8,000.
14 DeGrassi St.	8,900.	Dec. 30/57	900.	1 - 800. 2 - 7,200.
14 DeGrassi St.	8,000.	Apr. 1/57	800.	1 - 7,200.

Average Price of most recent sales:

16 units at \$164,485 = \$10,280



TABLE IX (Cont'd.)

Address	Selling	Selling	Down	Mortgage
	Price	Date	Payment	Details
20 DeGrassi St.	\$13,500.	Oct. 14/66	\$ 110.	1 - \$ 7,890. 2 - 5,500.
20 DeGrassi St.	12,500.	Oct. 10/56	300.	1 - 12,200.
20 DeGrassi St.	5,300.	Aug. 14/56	2,100.	1 - 3,200.
22 DeGrassi St.	7,500.	Aug. 13/62	3,500.	1 - 4,000.
22 DeGrassi St.	6,500.	Jan. 3/61	2,025.	1 - 4,475.
26 DeGrassi St.	6,325.	Apr. 1/66	6,325.	Clear
26 DeGrassi St.	4,800.	July 16/54	4,800.	Clear
40 DeGrassi St.	8,500.	Mar. 25/64	300.	1 - 8,200.
40 DeGrassi St.	5,000.	Mar. 9/64	5,000.	Clear
45 DeGrassi St.	7,300.	Oct. 20/53	7,300.	Clear
54 DeGrassi St.	11,000.	Nov. 9/65	100.	1 - 10,900.
56 DeGrassi St.	8,000.	Feb. 20/67	2,000.	1 - 6,000.
57 DeGrassi St.	4,500.	June 3/63	NIL	1 - 4,500.
57 DeGrassi St.	2,400.	May 31/56	2,400.	Clear
58 DeGrassi St. 58 DeGrassi St.	6,621. 9,800.	May 4/62 Aug. 31/56	1,000. 500.	1 - 5,621. 1 - 3,660. 2 - 5,640.
60 DeGrassi St.	6,900.	Oct. 2/62	1,200.	1 - 5,700.
60 DeGrassi St.	4,800.	July 24/62	4,800.	Clear
63 DeGrassi St.	10,500.	Sept. 4/56	2,500.	1 - 8,000.
64 DeGrassi St.	10,200.	Feb. 7/58	90.	1 - 10,110.
64 DeGrassi St.	10,000.	Nov. 19/56	700.	1 - 9,300.
66 DeGrassi St. 66 DeGrassi St.	11,100. 11,800.	Mar. 10/66 Feb. 12/64	400. 1,365.	1 - 10,700. 1 - 4,900. 2 - 5,535.
67 DeGrassi St.	7,900.	May 11/62	400.	1 - 7,500.
67 DeGrassi St.	5,000.	May 4/62	5,000.	Clear
68 DeGrassi St.	13,000.	Feb. 3/67	1,495.	1 - 7,136. 2 - 4,368.
68 DeGrassi St. 68 DeGrassi St.	8,500. 9,800.	Aug. 8/66 Sept. 3/53	2,810 5,000.	2 - 4,368. 1 - 5,690. 1 - 4,800.

Average Price of most recent sales:

15 units at \$132,846 = \$8,856



TABLE IX (Cont'd.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
69 DeGrassi St. 69 DeGrassi St. 69 DeGrassi St. 69 DeGrassi St.	\$ 10,000. 8,000. 7,083. 7,200.	May 3/65 Apr. 27/65 Dec. 29/60 Oct. 2/56	\$10,000. 8,000. 1,486. 800.	Clear Clear 1 - \$ 5,597. 1 - 2,175. 2 - 4,225.
72 DeGrassi St. 72 DeGrassi St.	10,900. 12,900.	Apr. 4/66 Feb. 27/56	8,500. 520.	1 - 2,400. 1 - 7,600. 2 - 4,780.
72 DeGrassi St. 75 DeGrassi St.	8,100. 5,710.	Nov. 15/55 Aug. 18/64	1,520. 700.	1 - 6,579. 1 - 1,200. 2 - 3,800.
76 DeGrassi St. 76 DeGrassi St.	8,700. 7,900.	Mar. 8/63 Jan. 21/63	500.	1 - 800. 2 - 7,400. 1 - 7,400.
77 DeGrassi St. 77 DeGrassi St.	10,000. 12,000.	Nov. 7/57 June 7/55	700. 400.	1 - 9,300. 1 - 3,200. 2 - 8,400.
78 DeGrassi St. 78 DeGrassi St.	6,002. 10,900.	Jan. 17/67 June 19/64	2. 1.	1 - 6,000. 1 - 4,605. 2 - 6,294.
78 DeGrassi St. 78 DeGrassi St.	10,900.	Sept.23/63 Jan. 7/63	50. 50.	1 - 4,200. 2 - 6,600. 1 - 3,400. 2 - 6,700.
79 DeGrassi St.	6,000.	Oct. 14/66	2,000.	1 - 4,000.
81 DeGrassi St.	9,500.	July 16/58	1,000.	1 - 8,500.
82 DeGrassi St.	9,500.	Oct. 4/54	3,625.	1 - 5,875.
84 DeGrassi St. 84 DeGrassi St.	11,900. 11,500.	Feb. 18/58 June 28/57	1,600. 1,000.	1 - 10,300. 1 - 3,000. 2 - 7,500.
84 DeGrassi St.	6,200.	June 28/57	6,200.	•
85 DeGrassi St.	11,000.	Sept.12/57	1,000.	1 - 3,500. 2 - 6,500.
87 DeGrassi St. 87 DeGrassi St.	7,000. 11,250.	Sept. 4/62 Dec. 3/54	7,000. 2,150.	
88 DeGrassi St. 88 DeGrassi St.	11,000. 11,186.	May /61 Jan. 3/61		1 - 10,400. 1 - 11,186.

Average Price of most recent sales:

13 units at \$117,212 = \$9,016



Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down <u>Payment</u>	Mortgage Details
89 DeGrassi St.	\$15,200.	July 11/66	\$ 4,000.	1 - \$ 2,700. 2 - 8,500.
89 DeGrassi St. 89 DeGrassi St.	11,500. 15,900.	Aug. 15/62 July 18/55	1,500. 1,000.	1 - 10,000. 1 - 14,900.
90 DeGrassi St.	11,000.	Oct. 13/61	1,000.	1 - 10,000.
90A DeGrassi St. 90A DeGrassi St. 90A DeGrassi St.	10,400. 8,500. 10,500.	Sept.19/61 Sept.19/61 July 26/55	100. 900. 500.	1 - 10,300. 1 - 7,600. 1 - 10,000.
90½ DeGrassi St. 90½ DeGrassi St.	10,900. 7,000.	Sept. 3/65 Apr. 9/65	400. 7,000.	1 - 10,500. Clear
92 DeGrassi St.	10,250.	Mar. 10/55	3,500.	1 - 6,750.
93 DeGrassi St.	6,100.	Oct. 2/62	6,100.	Clear
96 DeGrassi St.	14,900.	Nov. 29/66	2,500.	1 - 3,529. 2 - 11,346.
96 DeGrassi St. 96 DeGrassi St. 96 DeGrassi St.	12,500. 7,000. 9,100.	Oct. 6/66 Apr. 21/65 Apr. 30/57	1,000. 7,000. 500.	1 - 11,500. Clear 1 - 3,100.
96 DeGrassi St.	7,500.	Nov. 18/54	1,500.	2 - 5,500. 1 - 6,000.
97 DeGrassi St.	10,500.	Jan. 22/59	1,800.	1 - 8,700.
98 DeGrassi St.	9,500.	Sept. 3/57	1,000.	1 - 8,500.
100 DeGrassi St. 100 DeGrassi St. 100 DeGrassi St.	9,500. 7,000. 10,500.	Nov. 30/64 Oct. 23/64 Nov. 14/62	1,000. 7,000. 800.	
	11,000.	•	·	ŕ
101 DeGrassi St.	12,800.	Feb. 13/59	2,000.	·
102 DeGrassi St.	12,400.	July 17/57	1,500.	
103 DeGrassi St. 103 DeGrassi St.	15,436. 9,000.	Nov. 3/59 Jan. 16/59	5,281. 9,000.	1 - 10,155. Clear
105 DeGrassi St.	10,200.	Aprl 4/66	500.	1 - 9,700.
107 DeGrassi St. 107 DeGrassi St.	7,000. 13,500.	Sept.17/65 May 15/59	500. 1,001.	1 - 6,500. 1 - 1,570. 2 - 10,928.
107 DeGrassi St.	11,900.	Nov. 17/58	800.	1 - 11,100.

Average Price of most recent sales:

15 units at \$166,086 = \$11,072



TABLE IX (Cont'd.)

Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
\$19,000.	Aug. 15/66	\$ 8,000.	1 - \$11,000.
9,500.	Sept. 6/66	2,000.	1 - 1,500. 2 - 6,000.
7,000.	Aug. 15/66	1,000.	2 - 6,000. 1 - 6,000.
7,200. 10,966.	May 1/62 May 12/58	700. 500.	1 - 6,500. 1 - 10,466.
10,500.	July 12/56	1,000.	1 - 1,655. 2 - 7,845.
10,500.	June 25/54	1,500.	1 - 400. 2 - 8,600.
7,500.	Nov. 26/65	500.	1 - 1,500. 2 - 5,500.
6,000. 8,000.	Nov. 19/65 Nov. 6/58	500 500	1 - 5,500. 1 - 7,500.
10,500.	Oct. 30/59	100	1 - 2,520. 2 - 7,880.
10,500.	Nov. 27/53	1,500.	1 - 9,000.
9,600. 10,500.	Mar. 9/65 Dec. 9/55	NIL 500.	1 - 9,600. 1 - 10,000.
13,500.	Aug. 26/57	1,000.	1 - 12,500.
6,700.	Aug. 26/57	6,700.	Clear
14,500. 12,000.		•	1 - 6,781. Clear
13,000. 11,900.	May 30/60 Sept.25/59	2,204. 900.	
6,500.	Mar. 1/60	1,000.	1 - 5,500.
6,500.	Oct. 1/57	6,500.	Clear
8,500.	Sept.26/55	1,500.	1 - 7,000.
	Price \$19,000. 9,500. 7,000. 7,200. 10,966. 10,500. 10,500. 10,500. 10,500. 10,500. 10,500. 13,500. 13,000. 12,000. 13,000. 11,900. 6,500. 6,500.	Price Date \$19,000. Aug. 15/66 9,500. Sept. 6/66 7,000. Aug. 15/66 7,200. May 1/62 10,966. May 12/58 10,500. July 12/56 10,500. June 25/54 7,500. Nov. 26/65 6,000. Nov. 19/65 8,000. Nov. 6/58 10,500. Oct. 30/59 10,500. Nov. 27/53 9,600. Mar. 9/65 10,500. Dec. 9/55 13,500. Aug. 26/57 6,700. Aug. 26/57 6,700. Aug. 26/57 14,500. Nov. 4/66 12,000. Nov. 20/64 13,000. May 30/60 11,900. Sept. 25/59 6,500. Mar. 1/60 6,500. Oct. 1/57	Price Date Payment \$19,000. Aug. 15/66 \$ 8,000. 9,500. Sept. 6/66 2,000. 7,000. Aug. 15/66 1,000. 7,200. May 1/62 700. 10,966. May 12/58 500. 10,500. July 12/56 1,000. 10,500. June 25/54 1,500. 7,500. Nov. 26/65 500. 6,000. Nov. 19/65 500. 8,000. Nov. 6/58 500. 10,500. Oct. 30/59 100 10,500. Nov. 27/53 1,500. 9,600. Mar. 9/65 NIL 10,500. Dec. 9/55 500. 13,500. Aug. 26/57 1,000. 6,700. Aug. 26/57 6,700. 14,500. Nov. 4/66 7,718 12,000. Nov. 20/64 12,000. 13,000. May 30/60 2,204. 1,900. Sept.25/59 900. 6,500. Mar. 1/60 <

Average Price of most recent sales:

14 units at \$143,000 = \$10,214



TABLE IX (Cont'd.)

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
26 Cummings St.	\$ 8,500.	Sept.30/53	\$1,500	1 - \$ 7,000.
28 Cummings St. 28 Cummings St. 28 Cummings St.	11,900. 9,000. 9,000.	June 2/65 June 2/65 Sept.18/53	300. 9,000. 1,500.	1 - 11,600. Clear 1 - 5,900. 2 - 1,600.
31 Cummings St.	5,300。	Aug. 7/64	1,000.	1 - 4,300.
35 Cummings St. 35 Cummings St.	6,500. 5,000.	Sept. 5/56 June 16/54	4,000. 5,000.	1 - 2,500. Clear
39 Cummings St.	5,750.	Sept.15/66	5,750.	Clear
41 Cummings St. 41 Cummings St. 41 Cummings St.	5,800. 8,000. 5,900.	July 15/66 May 30/58 Nov. 2/53	5,800. 500. 1,200.	Clear 1 - 7,500. 1 - 4,700.
43 Cummings St, 43 Cummings St.	7,800. 7,500.	Nov. 15/65 Dec. 2/58	4,700. 750.	1 - 3,100. 1 - 4,460. 2 - 2,290.
43 Cummings St.	6,420。	June 18/54	1,500.	1 - 4,920.
45 Cummings St.	8,500.	Aug. 27/54	1,500.	1 - 7,000.
48 Cummings St. 48 Cummings St.	11,000. 7,200.	July 15/65 Sept.21/56	11,000. 7,200.	Clear Clear
49 Cummings St. 49 Cummings St.	11,900. 5,000.	Sept.17/57 July 26/57	1,000. 5,000.	1 - 10,900. Clear
50 Cummings St.	10,500.	Nov. 10/55	1,000.	1 - 9,500.
Wardell Street				
14 Wardell St.	6,200.	Dec. 10/64	200.	1 - 3,250. 2 - 2,750.
14 Wardell St.	5,700.	Jan. 23/62	61.	1 - 1,973. 2 - 3,664.
18 Wardell St. 18 Wardell St. 18 Wardell St.	6,400. 6,900. 3,800.	Nov. 19/65 July 20/62 June 15/62	826. 400. 3,800.	1 - 6,500.

Average Price of most recent sales:

13 units at \$106,050 = \$8,158



TABLE IX (Cont'd.)

DON MOUNT VILLAGE REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

Address	Selling Price	Selling Date	Down Payment	Mortgage Details
22 Wardell St.	\$ 3,000.	May 2/55	\$3,000.	Clear
26 Wardell St.	3,000.	June 28/56	3,000.	Clear
34 Wardell St. 34 Wardell St.	6,650. 10,000.	Aug. 22/63 July 27/54	1,250. 1,500.	1 - \$ 5,400. 1 - 8,500.
$36\frac{1}{2}$ Wardell St. $36\frac{1}{2}$ Wardell St.	6,150. 8,500.	Mar. 3/58 Oct. 26/53	6,150. 6,000.	Clear 1 - 2,500.
38 Wardell St. 38 Wardell St. 38 Wardell St. 38 Wardell St.	13,000. 6,200. 10,000. 10,000.	May 3/66 Oct. 29/65 Dec. 6/56 Mar. 31/55	600. 6,200. 620 4,850.	1 - 12,400. Clear 1 - 9,380. 1 - 5,150.
40 Wardell St. 40 Wardell St.	11,900. 8,700.	Nov. 12/54 Apr. 14/54	1,000. 1,450.	1 - 10,900. 1 - 1,850. 2 - 5,400.
42 Wardell St. 42 Wardell St.	6,026. 10,500.	Dec. 23/63 Apr. 15/54	6,026. 1,500.	Clear 1 - 2,500. 2 - 6,500.
46 Wardell St. 46 Wardell St. 46 Wardell St.	13,000. 10,800. 4,800.	Jan. 18/67 Feb. 27/58 Nov. 28/58	352. 1,500. 4,800.	1 - 8,298. 1 - 5,350. 2 - 3,950. Clear
68 Wardell St. 68 Wardell St. 68 Wardell St.	9,500. 8,000.	May 3/65 Feb. 26/63 Dec. 3/62	800. 800.	1 - 8,700. 1 - 7,200. Clear
72 Wardell St.	10,500.	July 30/65	2,500.	1 - 8,000.
76 Wardell St. 76 Wardell St.	5,500. 6,375.	June 8/59 Mar. 11/57	1,000. 3,700.	
84 Wardell St. 84 Wardell St.	8,500. 6,100.	Jan. 31/61 Nov. 15/60	·	
86 Wardell St.	13,200.	July 6/66	2,000.	1 - 3,200. 2 - 8,000.
86 Wardell St. 86 Wardell St.	9,900. 10,600.	Apr. 28/66 Apr. 15/	9,900. 5,500.	Clear
88 Wardell St. 88 Wardell St.	9,950. 7,900.	Aug. 3/61 June 15/59		· ·
113 Wardell St.	8,600.	June 1/54	8,600.	Clear

Average Price of most recent sales:

15 units at \$128,476 = \$8,565

Source: Teela Market Surveys



The foregoing record of sales comparisons of residential properties sold on the private market adjacent to the ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT shows that 193 properties were sold for \$2,804,306 or an average of \$14,530 per unit.

The foregoing record of sales comparisons of residential properties sold on the private market adjacent to the DON MOUNT VILLAGE REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT shows that 220 properties were sold for \$2,183,444 or an average of \$9,924 per unit.



Urbanization is also a big factor in housing demand and urbanization is expected to continue unabated in the future creating large demands for urban dwellings. The phenomena observed throughout the world is not merely urbanization but metropolitanization.

REPLACEMENT

The existing housing stock is replaced in three general situations: (1) When a structure ceases to be habitable due to advanced physical deterioration; (2) When the environment deteriorates; and (3) as a result of expropriation to carry out a public work or urban renewal programme.

IMPROVEMENT IN LIVING STANDARDS

Economic development results in demands for better housing.

People want more single houses, larger units, and more rooms. One housing unit for each household and one room for each person will be the minimum standard to be achieved as a goal.

The expansion of Canada's economy has had a significant part in our population growth. The opportunity for bettering one's life and for living independently offered by plentiful land, easy to obtain, encouraged many people to move westward, to marry young, and to raise families. The same opportunity brought many people here from foreign countries.

Because of the dynamic and prosperous economies of the Province of Ontario and Metropolitan Toronto, this area has become one of the most powerful attractions for people from all parts of the world.



Metropolitan Toronto is the fastest growing area of over 2,000,000 population in North America.

Between June 1965 and June 1966, Canada's population growth increased 1.78 percent from 19,571,000 to 19,919,000. Natural increase — the difference between births and deaths — accounted for 240,000 of the total 348,000 gain in population in the twelve month period. Immigration between the middle of 1965 and the middle of 1966 totalled 171,361, but net migration totalled 108,000 which means 63,361 people must have left the country. From these figures it can be calculated that net migration accounted for 31 percent of Canada's population growth in the twelve month period. See TABLES X and XI (pages 73 and 74).

Over the past 20 years Ontario was the Province of destination for more than 50 percent of all the immigrants to Canada, and Metropolitan Toronto received half of the immigrants to Ontario, according to the estimates of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. See TABLE XII (page 75).

In recent history immigration to Canada totalled 282,164 in 1957. 52.1 percent of these immigrants settled in Ontario and about one-quarter settled in Metropolitan Toronto. In that year Canada's population increased 3.3 percent Ontario's population increased 4.3 percent and Metropolitan Toronto's population showed a 5.3 percent gain.

These figures illustrate that a higher level of immigration in any one period proportionately increases the population growth rates in the same period.



Table 1: population, by provinces (thousands)

	rs and onths	Canada	Nfld.	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	Que.	On t.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.	Yukon	N.W.T.
1962	June	18,570	470	106	746	607	5, 366	6,342	935	930	1,370	1,659	15	24
1963	June	18, 896	481	107	756	614	5,468	6,448	950	933	1,405	1, 695	15	24
1963	Oct.	19,012	485	1 07	757	615	5, 503	6,494	952	935	1,415	1,708	16	25
1964	Jan.	19,093	486	107	757	615	5,524	6,532	954	936	1,421	1,720	16	25
	Apr.	19, 174	488	107	759	616	5,548	6,562	956	940	1,427	1,730	16	25
	June	19, 235	491	107	760	617	5, 562	6,586	958	943	1,432	1,738	16	25
	July	19, 271	491	107	760	617	5,573	6,604	959	944	1,433	1,742	16	25
	Oct.	19, 361	493	108	761	619	5,599	6,637	960	946	1,439	1,758	16	25
1965	Jon.	19, 440	494	108	761	621	5,624	6,668	960	946	1,446	1,771	16	25
	Apr.	19,516	496	108	761	623	5, 645	6,702	961	949	1,448	1,782	16	25
	June	19, 571	498	108	761	623	5,657	6,731	962	951	1, 451	1,789	1.5	25
	July	19,604	498	108	761	624	5,667	6,746	962	952	1,452	1, 794	15	25
	Oct.	19, 705	501	108	760	625	5,692	6.794	960	953	1,454	1,818	15	25
1966	Jon.	19,785	501	108	759	626	5,712	6,832	959	953	1, 456	1,838	15	26
	Apr.	19,859	503	108	759	626	5,733	6,868	959	953	1,459	1,850	15	26
	June	19,919	505	109	760	627	5.744	6,895	958	954	1,464	1,862	15	26

Source: Estimated population of Canada by provinces (91-201), D.B.S.

Table 2: immigration to Canada, by country of last permonent residence (number)

quarterly averages or guorters	tatal	United Kingdom and Ireland	France	Germany	Nether- lands	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Other Europe	Asia	Austra- lasia	United States	West Indies	all other
1965 1966	36,690 48,686	10,180 16,266	1,306 1,968	2,232 2,316	655 937	1,410	6,600 7,906	1,434 1,982	3,138 3,810	2,921 3,582	678 1,015	3,786 4,378	774 984	1,577
3 4 1964 1 2 3 4 1965 1 2 3 4	13, 410 28, 034 27, 900 23, 807 17, 546 33, 777 33, 343 27, 940 22, 279 40, 619 45, 511 38, 349 30, 713 55, 288	2,894 8,767 7,899 5,633 3,915 10,332 9,005 6,707 4,819 12,266 12,680 10,953 8,216 19,555	341 1,164 1,345 719 396 1,473 1,851 822 681 1,510 1,841 1,193 962 2,338	803 2,696 1,871 1,374 849 2,110 1,764 1,269 1,249 3,205 2,652 1,821 1,454 3,499	231 873 448 176 257 911 579 282 338 1,183 613 485 529	579 1,611 1,147 1,422 797 1,231 1,081 1,282 711 1,111 1,806 2,014 1,172 1,869	2,440 4,386 3,489 4,112 3,706 5,571 4,915 5,105 4,828 7,639 7,200 6,731 5,894 9,020	891 837 930 1,342 1,058 1,701 1,057 1,493 1,015 1,542 1,576 1,601 1,806 1,764	1,117 2,648 2,410 2,301 1,679 3,495 2,882 2,818 1,996 3,396 3,450 3,711 2,803 4,542	746 835 1,160 1,171 867 1,646 1,958 2,055 2,020 2,749 3,784 3,131 2,206 3,620	331 438 472 451 460 497 786 562 549 689 888 585 863 1,068	1,942 2,423 4,361 3,010 2,129 2,752 4,565 3,119 2,415 3,214 5,898 3,616 3,022 3,896	308 461 862 766 439 414 781 565 502 606 999 988 535 788	787 895 1,506 1,330 994 1,644 2,119 1,861 1,156 1,509 2,124 1,520 1,251 1,886

Source: Quarterly Bulletin, Department of Manpower and Immigration.

Table 3: immigration to Canada by (intended) occupational groups 1 (number)

						destined to the labour force							not destined to the labour force			
guarterly overoges	tatol Immi- gratian	mana- geriol	profes- sional and technical	clerical	commer- ciol and fi- nancial	service		agricul- ture	mining ond quarry- ing ²		labourers	sub- total ⁴	wives	children	students (18 years and over) ⁵	sub- total ⁶
1965 1966	36,690 48,686	432 573	4,164 5,909	2,480	665 826	1,897 2,170	301 452	590 788	104 148	6,042 8,512	1,778	18,549 24,802	6, 452 8, 554	10,079 13,474	259 354	18,141 23,883
quarters: 1963 1 2 3 4 1964 1 2 3	13, 410 28, 034 27, 900 23, 807 17, 546 33, 777 33, 343	217 283 341 318 248 308 370	1,489 2,264 3,567 2,320 1,891 2,785 4,455	826 2,108 1,731 1,521 1,055 2,637 2,299	240 437 425 394 265 633 611	923 1,919 1,494 1,763 1,105 1,807 1,810	95 213 186 158 94 252 244	336 940 597 525 421 800 482	35 79 44 38 27 58 56	1,995 5,260 4,104 3,056 2,593 6,171 5,039	592 1,082 865 1,020 1,109 1,751 1,461	6,761 14,599 13,370 11,136 8,850 17,279 16,919	5, 061 3, 471 6, 349 5, 865	3,097 6,538 7,363 6,228 4,399 8,610 8,986	295 159 150 226 244	6, 649 13,435 14,530 12,671 8,696 16,498 16,424
1965 1	27, 940 22, 279 40, 619 45, 511 38, 349	286 311 431 521 465	2,834 2,468 3,623 6,359 4,204	1,940 1,425 3,030 2,971 2,493	490 431 847 774 608	1,698 1,244 2,115 2,139 2,089	178 174 365 352 312	531 358 716 595 693	46 52 146 107 112	3,673 3,462 7,731 7,107 5,867	1,416 1,322 2,037 2,068 1,685	13,142 11,297 21,137 23,121 18,640	5, 338 4, 075 6, 940 7, 751 7, 043	7,824 5,762 10,788 12,786 10,979	166 190 245 359 240	14,798 10,982 19,482 22,390 19,709
1966 1 2 3 4	30, 713 55, 288 58, 533 50, 209	414 610 673 595	3,488 5,329 8,964 5,856	1,910	541 1,022 884 859	1,526 2,439 2,214 2,502	290 579 490 450	683 1,013 747 710	115 205 153 121	5, 476 10, 984 9, 393 8, 194	1,470 2,339 1,845 1,939	15, 992 28, 736 29, 605 24, 877	5, 455 9, 478 10, 149 9, 134	8,016 15,058 16,662 14,159	287 372 468 290	14,721 26,552 28,928 25,332

The occupational status of the majority of the persons destined to the labour force is determined by immigration officials by an examination of documentary evidence provided by the immigrants. The classification of occupations is similar to that used in the 1961 Census; see Occupational Classification Monual, Census of Canada, 1961, Catalogue Number 12-506. Includes logging, fishing, trapping and hunting. Includes mechanical and construction. Includes a small number in non-specified occupations. Does not include students entering Canada on students' visas. Includes also retired persons, elderly dependents, fiancées and other unspecified persons not intending to enter the lobour force.

Source: Quarterly Bulletin, Department of Manpower and Immigration.



				loble	4: births, b	y pravinces ((number)				
monthly overages		11/11	0.51	A1. C		^					
or months	Canada	Nfld.	P. E. I.	N.S.	N. B.	Que.	Ont.	Mon.	Sosk.	Alto.	В. С.
1965	34,883	1,228	210	1,377	1,181	10,051	11,801	1,665	1,708	2,722	2,806
966	32, 531	1,194	184	1,261	1,067	9, 452	11,047	1,536	1,555	2,516	2,719
965 A	35, 058	1,240	209	1,470	1,264	9, 953	11,991	1,722	1,645	2,656	2,776
5	35, 238	1,331	228	1,371	1,153	10,059	12,047	1,669	1,704	2,633	2,908
0	33,603	1,253	1 97	1,317	1,168	9,390	11,482	1,589	1,664	2,635	2,792
N	30,987	1,217	167	1,199	1,050	8,435	10,817	1,483	1,530	2,436	2,533
D	31,503	1,248	188	1,209	1,113	8,470	10,842	1,456	1,614	2,564	2,65
966 J	33,936	2,515	1 52	1,246	1,063	9,253	10,855	1,533	1,466	2,840	3,013
F	31, 160	1,032	195	1,137	1,053	9,796	10,267	1,500	1,312	2,368	2,500
M	36,273	901	169	1,483	1,237	12,068	11,687	1,503	1,910	2,629	2,686
A	29,890	1,179	180	1,195	985	7,951	10,444	1,585	1,519	2,348	2,504
М	33, 126	452	200	1,444	1,264	8,215	12,447	1,680	1,744	2,765	2,915
J	34, 481	1,676	201	1,330	1,022	10,837	11,175	1,672	1,543	2,259	2,766
ز	31, 174	1,167	188	1,188	1,033	8,761	10,755	1,383	1,528	2,546	2,625
A	36, 217	1,054	173	1,284	1,008	11,364	12,106	1,635	1,710	2,962	2,921
5	31, 354	968	204	1,271	1,071	9,100	10,635	1,572	1,405	2,463	2,665
0	32, 674	1,552	184	1,264	1,079	8,574	11,504	1,595	1,504	2,395	3,023
И	31,740	904	198	1,205	1,113	9,355	10,970	1,349	1,741	2,359	2,546
D	28, 351	924	162	1, 089	879	8,149	9,720	1,428	1,279	2,261	2,460
1967 J F	34, 224	2,499 699	159	1,346	1,215	9,145	11,612	1,403	1,462	2,562	2,821
	27, 941	044	169	1, 091	851	8,360	9,396	1,333	1,346	2,126	2,570

Toble 5: deaths, 1 by provinces (number)

					J. dedilis,	by provinces	(110.11001)				
monthly overages or months	Canada	Nfld.	P. E. I.	N.S.	N. B.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	5osk.	Alta.	В. С.
1965	12,412	269	86	528	392	3,211	4,529	643	618	794	1,315
1966	12,534	238	87	538	404	3,267	4,547	670	619	807	1,357
1965 A	11,876	229	74	494	414	3,153	4,228	637	631	784	1,215
S	11, 932	276	77	514	405	3,120	4,227	681	599	767	1,245
0	12,658	284	92	536	417	3,224	4,625	673	632	798	1,348
N	12,513	270	104	488	387	3,179	4,615	685	629	793	1,344
D	13, 112	281	83	590	357	3,259	4,890	649	656	818	1,502
1966 J	13, 736	489	1 08	584	478	3,413	4, 903	734	694	918	1.415
F	11,885	234	73	5 06	325	3,152	4,231	648	575	823	1,318
М	13,659	224	94	608	491	3,654	4,875	658	676	720	1,659
A	13, 178	242	92	538	372	3,694	4,425	769	686	837	1,523
M	12,653	101	70	622	453	2,727	5,084	664	6 03	994	1,335
j	12,320	286	112	539	368	3,056	4,614	674	571	724	1,376
J	11,749	254	78	457	316	3,175	4,508	604	564	647	1,146
Α	12,460	96	118	4 94	333	3,313	4,585	700	639	835	1,347
S	12,090	228	59	5 98	382	3,580	4,019	641	554	806	1,223
0	12, 093	290	44	487	384	3,264	4,367	669	561	837	1,190
N	12,626	2 06	110	5 0 9	485	3,063	4,580	572	6 93	830	1,578
D	11,965	208	85	510	466	3,115	4,377	711	609	711	1,173
1967 J	13,615	487	97	631	453	3,218	4,949	774	635	907	1,464
F	12,027	175	52	581	400	3,431	4,206	598	561	725	1,298

Toble 6: marriages, 1 by provinces (number)

monthly overages or months	Canada	Nfld.	P. E. I.	N.S.	N. B.	Que.	Ont.	Mon.	5osk.	Alto.	В. С.
10/5		204		4/2	207	2 400	4 272	504	5/7	02.4	1 127
1965	12, 127	284	59	462	397	3,408	4,273	584	567	934	1,137
1966	12,940	331	61	485	423	3,731	4,518	604	579	986	1,222
1965 A	16,599	415	124	724	646	5,109	5,207	851	816	1,218	1,470
5	16, 134	345	81	571	530	5,253	5,570	793	580	1,036	1,353
Ō	15,318	272	62	520	518	3,872	5,788	823	928	1,156	1,362
N	9, 235	302	60	435	372	1,387	3,516	498	562	989	1,102
D	9,450	273	43	315	257	2,370	3,330	411	384	827	1,204
1966 J	7,771	622	24	316	273	2,295	2,217	314	249	574	887
F	6,993	212	42	213	175	1,590	2,872	291	298	568	732
M	6, 793	185	29	312	209	1,604	2,382	291	225	698	858
A	8, 221	320	33	344	281	960	3, 486	419	469	766	1, 143
М	11,067	94	36	450	415	1,486	5,295	526	612	1,026	1,127
1	14, 152	477	70	614	419	3, 038	5, 664	786	611	1,122	1,351
Ĭ	19,055	341	98	717	703	6,093	6,079	903	1,070	1,457	1,594
Ā	20, 544	349	142	664	528	7,267	6,730	976	1,000	1,439	1,449
S	20, 058	323	72	774	712	7,614	5, 950	935	608	1,311	1,759
Ô	16,533	519	54	583	486	5,133	5,868	783	798	969	1,340
й	14,601	240	89	448	556	5,515	4,228	557	645	1,164	1,159
Ď	9, 492	294	45	380	315	2, 182	3,445	470	362	733	1,266
1967 J	9, 112	618	30	347	362	2,755	2,784	373	344	541	958
F	7, 177	183	44	272	215	1,647	2,607	323	284	752	850

¹Figures for births, marriages and deaths for 1966 and 1967 are provisional and represent registrations filed in provincial vital statistics offices during the month under review, regardless of the month of occurrence. Figures for these years are exclusive of the Yukon and the Northwest Territories.

Sources: Vital Statistics (84-001), D. B. S.



TABLE XII

IMMIGRANT ARRIVALS IN CANADA AND THOSE GIVING ONTARIO AS THEIR PROVINCE OF DESTINATION, 1901-1963

Year	Canada	Ontario	Ontario as % of Canada	Year	Canada	Ontario	Ontario as % of Canada
1901	49,149	6,208	12.6	1936	11,643	4,913	42.2
1902	67,379	9,798	14.5	1937	15,101	6,463	42.8
1903	128,364	14,854	11.6	1938	17,244	7,107	41.2
1904	130,331	21,266	16.3	1939	16,994	5,957	35.1
1905	146,266	35,811	24.5	1940	11,324	4,447	39.3
1906	189,064	52,746	27.9	1941	9,329	3,365	36.1
1907	124,667	32,654	26.2	1942	7,576	3,315	43.8
1908	262,469	75,133	28.6	1943	8,504	3,852	45.3
1909	146,908	29,265	19.9	1944	12,801	5,361	41.9
1910	208,794	46,129	22.1	1945	22,722	9,342	41.1
1911	311,084	80,035	25.7	1946	71,719	29,604	41.3
1912	354,237	100,227	28.3	1947	64,127	35,543	55.4
1913	402,432	122,798	30.5	1948	125,414	61,621	49.1
1914	384,878	123,792	32.2	1949	95,217	48,607	51.0
1915	144,789	44,873	31.0	1950	73,912	39,041	52.8
1916	48,537	14,743	30.5	1951	194,391	104,842	53.9
1917	75,374	26,078	34.6	1952	164,498	86,059	52.3
1918	79,074	23,754	30.0	1953	168,868	90,120	53.4
1919	57,702	13,826	24.0	1954	154,227	83,029	53.8
1920	117,336	39,344	33.5	1955	109,946	57,563	52.4
1921	91,728	35,538	38.7	1956	164,857	90,662	55.0
1922	64,224	26,448	41.2	1957	282,164	147,097	52.1
1923	133,729	59,944	44.9	1958	124,851	63,853	51.1
	124,164	52,069	41.9	1959	106,928	55,976	52.3
1925	84,907	28,113	33.1	1960	104,111	54,491	52.3
1926	135,982	38,968	28.7	1961	71,689	36,518	50.9
1927	158,886	45,847	28.9	1962	74,586	37,210	49.9
1928	166,783	44,989	27.0	1963	93,151	49,216	52.8
1929	164,993	61,684	37.4	1964	112,606	61,468	54.5
1930	104,806	37,851	36.1	1965	146,758	79,702	54.3
1931	27,530	12,316	44.7	1966	194,743	107,621	55.2
1932	20,591	9,312	45.2				
1933	14,382	6,210	43.2				
1934	12,476	5,582	44.7	SOURC	ES:		
1935	11,277	4,786	42.4			ada Year Bo cial Tabula	
NOTE:	Figures	auoted for	both Canada	1,21-	*	ario Econom	
	_	e on a fisc		1926-		ada Year Bo	

and Ontario are on a fiscal year basis for the period 1901 - 1920 and on a calendar year basis thereafter. 1956.

1926-1949 - Canada Year Book 1942, 1947, 1948-49, 1950, 1951.

1950-1963 - Various publications of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.



Because of recent changes in the Federal Government's immigration policy, immigration to Canada is expected to increase to the 250,000 range in 1967. This could cause Metropolitan Toronto's population growth to increase by 4.5 to 5 percent, or 90,000 to 100,000 per year, as a result of 60,000 to 65,000 net migration and 30,000 to 35,000 natural increase. This Metro population growth rate would compare with an average of about 50,000 per year over the past several years.

TABLE XIII

Metropolitan Toronto

Census Estimates

	1951,	1956,	1961	and	1966
1	951	-		1,	,117,470
1	956	-		1,	,358,028
1	961	-		1,	,618,787

1,870,568

In the process population growth in the City of Toronto is not increasing. In fact it has declined steadily from a high of 696,555 in 1946 to a present level of approximately 650,000.

1966

The problem is that yesterday's rural poor have been moving to the City just as many of the jobs they seek and need have been moving to the suburbs. Inadequate transportation and inability to afford suitable housing make it difficult for them to follow the jobs; and deficiencies of education, health and skills compound the problem.



Most cities cannot afford the massive expenditures
necessary to solve these problems. The flight of higher income
families and businesses and industries to the suburbs erodes
sources of revenue for cities, even as expenditure demands
escalate. Inflexible city limits have created a hodge-podge
of local taxing jurisdictions, often dividing the tax base from
the need. The City cannot collect for the many benefits it
supplies to residents of the suburbs.

The problems of the city flow across irrelevant boundaries established by historical accident. So solutions must draw on the resources and imagination of a larger area. A Metropolitan approach to Metropolitan problems should be encouraged.

After the demolition of unsatisfactory housing, the City's poor, unable to relocate in the suburbs, have sometimes been worse off, having to crowd into the reduced supply of cheap housing still available. To compound this pressure on the available supply of housing, recent immigrants, who either must be economically competitive in terms of education, training, skills and personal qualities, or have sponsors able to provide adequate care and maintenance for those for whom they apply, are more financially able to take up the supply of existing housing in downtown areas.

IMMIGRATION POLICY

Traditionally, Canada has sought to increase its population through immigration in order to expand the domestic market, reduce per capita costs of administration, stimulate economic activity by providing new skills, ideas and enthusiasm, and support a higher level of cultural independence and creativity.



Canadian experience indicates that a substantial volume of immigration is highly desirable. Technological change and the development of Canadian society to its present complex state require that new settlers must be able to establish themselves successfully.

A primary objective of the immigration programme is satisfactory settlement. The Federal Government assists immigrants in establishing themselves in the Canadian community through the work of the specialized settlement officers of the Immigration Branch.

All items considered, the Federal Government probably spends more money on immigration than it does on urban renewal. Only recently the Minister of Manpower and Immigration moved that the House go into Committee at the next sitting to consider the following Resolution, which has been recommended to the House by His Excellency:

"That it is expedient to introduce a measure to amend the Immigration Act to increase from twelve million dollars to twenty million dollars the present limit on the total amount of outstanding advances at any one time that may be made to enable the Minister of Manpower and Immigration to make loans to immigrants to assist them with expenses of their transportation to Canada."

The Motion was agreed to.

The Toronto Real Estate Board suggests that it is completely irrational and unconscionable for the Federal Government to give priority to persons from outside Canada for financial assistance while ignoring the needs of Canadian citizens to be comfortably relocated.



The 1961 Census of Canada revealed that Metropolitan

Toronto contained 10,747 dwellings in need of major repair, while

the City of Toronto had 6,129 in the same category. It would

require a Federal Government investment of less than \$20 million

to relocate the owners and tenants of all the substandard dwellings

in the City of Toronto at an average subsidy of \$3,000 per unit.

With Provincial, Metro and City participation in a system of

relocation allowances, blighted housing conditions in the entire

Metro region could be eliminated.

It is the responsibility of the Federal Government to assist in the relocation of unemployed workers from other parts of the country in their new environment. This should include responsibility for the supply or financial contribution toward the cost to municipalities in the form of grants to workers and municipalities.

In every major city of the United States and Canada, except Toronto, it is still possible to find a new single family home priced at less than \$17,000. In the Chicago area, for example, a six room detached home with a floor area of 1,600 square feet is priced at \$16,500.

As a result of unusual demand brought about by immigration and mobility to Metro Toronto, the vacancy rate for rental housing units completed for more than six months is less than one percent. This compares with the following vacancy rates in the United States at the end of 1966:

Area	Percent Vacant
United States	7.0
Northeast	4.9
North Central	5.8
South	7.6
West	10.9



Residential overbuilding, which was probably the result of overestimation of demand from population growth and mobility, has provided an adequate supply of moderately priced homes in most U.S. centres. Real estate sales throughout the U.S. declined in 1966.

TABLE XIV (page 81) illustrates the extent of residential overbuilding in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas of the U.S

Housing starts in Los Angeles-Long Beach dropped from 140,917 in 1963 to 20,592 in 1966, while San Francisco-Oakland suffered a similar decline from a record 42,207 units started in 1963 to only 14,331 last year.

Only three Metropolitan areas in the United States issued permits for more housing units than the Metropolitan Toronto area, in spite of our slowdown brought about by the lack of mortgage funds.

On a per capita basis Metropolitan Toronto is outgrowing every City in North America.

Building permits were issued in Metropolitan Toronto last year to allow \$781,074,000 in construction

Only three areas of the U.S. — Chicago, Los Angeles and New York — issued building permits for more construction than Metropolitan Toronto. These areas all have at least two-and-a-half times Metro's population. SEE TABLE XV (page 82).

The demand for housing in Metropolitan Toronto is greater than in any other City on the continent. As a result average prices are higher. The average price of a new house in Metro is now \$29,666 while resales are around \$24,000 per unit.



Table C-9. — Total Hausekeeping Residential Construction (Private and Public) Authorized in Selected Permit-Issuing Places:
in the United States: Number of Hausing Units, by Selected Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area

Perjad	Anahelm- Snnta Ana- Garden Grave, Calif.	Atlanta, Ga.	Balti- mare, Md.	Birming- ham, Ala.	Bastan, Mass.	Buffala, N Y.	Chicaga,	Cleve- land, Ohia	Calum bus, Ohia	Denver,	Detrait, Mich.	Indian- apalis, Ind. ³
1763 1764 1765 1766	26 882 17,698 12 654	17, 303 22, 731 19, 507 19, 973 16, 210	10 590 14 253 14 755 14 086 15, 150	3, 653 4 262 3, 048 3, 773 3, 439	13, 242 13, 401 19, 526 13, 259 9, 820	3,796 3,931 4,620 5,544 4,647	38, 619 35, 957 33, 817 36, 445 34, 324	11, 348 14, 680 12, 193 11, 068 7, 979	8, 816 10, 470 7, 792 8, 006 6, 168	11 810 4 9,399 5 8,228	17 245 19, 202 22, 413 27, 454 20, 995	6, 299 6, 488 6, 857 7 959 8 064
1765 Dec. 177 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jure July Aug Sept O t Nov	843 1,644 1,633 1,721 2,289 1,036 923 866 496 491 668 414	1, 561 1, 467 2, 018 2, 647 2, 033 1, 558 1, 154 1, 039 928 1, 056 752 1, 098 454	1, 242 1, 045 707 1 682 1 563 2, 069 1 809 1, 065 1, 097 1 150 776 1, 108 1, 079	213 224 341 393 328 370 347 233 311 277 219 162 234	1, 082 821 673 626 1, 138 688 1, 066 822 601 433 726 861 1, 365	382 261 239 473 568 569 644 412 396 376 304 238	2 685 1 909 2 537 4 398 3, 215 2 737 2 798 2, 733 3, 333 2, 681 2, 868 2, 789 2, 326	1, 936 449 296 1, 052 1, 367 681 639 752 413 960 795 236 339	388 309 413 617 68- 1, 444 720 387 495 370 24 14 3 3 38	587 560 782 4790 55978 704 564 664 675 776 786 787 796 796 796 796 796 796 796 79	2, 320 1, 851 1, 734 2, 661 3, 011 1, 759 1, 956 1, 567 1, 420 1, 713 1, 500 999 824	731 501 597 1, 025 763 1 322 619 593 1, 030 700 269 504
	<u> </u>					Percent	change					
Dec 1965 66	-44	71	-13	+ 10	- 26	-56	-13	-82	-13	-4	-64	-81
1965 66	-29	- 19	8	-9	-26	-16	-6	-28	-23	-8	-24	+ 1
Period	Las Angeles- Long Beach, Calif.	Miami Fla.		Jukee, N	lew Yark, N Y.	Phila- delphia, PaN.J.	A P 1 7	, Di		San Francisca- Oakland, Calif. ²	Seattle- Everett, Wash.	Washing- tan, D.C MdVa.
1962 1963 1964 1965	113,795 140,917 88,255 51,665 20,592	10, 18 9, 89 12, 28 16, 13 13, 85	99 33 32	5, 400 6, 707 8, 476 8, 372 5, 881	96, 854 74, 090 43, 685 51, 081 42, 778	23, 577 18, 374 20, 265 22, 161 19, 446	14,66 10,73 5,70	33 1 32 1	9, 015 2, 694 3, 822 9, 424 7, 409	37, 100 42, 207 38, 144 30, 978 14, 331	13,416 11,567 7,439 7,945 13,133	37, 816 46, 225 42, 689 55, 878 39, 194
1965 Dec 1966 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept O t N s	2 606 3, 096 2, 420 2, 952 2, 230 2, 265 1, 447 1 553 1 324 7.40 665 927 973	2, 03 86 1, 27 1, 72 62 1, 42 80 1, 65 1, 75 80 1 32 90 68	58 73 23 28 27 50 50 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 6	469 529 579 923 889 900 364 372 334 212 386 259 134	3, 640 3, 353 1, 735 5, 713 5, 426 3, 962 4, 884 2, 467 4, 369 2, 786 1, 882 4, 732 1, 469	2, 129 1, 425 755 2, 405 2, 198 1, 990 1, 622 2, 406 2, 415 1, 240 1, 091 765 1 134	43 31 73 37 60 51 50 57 54 46	72 01 14 02 73 48	491 742 771 1,032 560 633 444 539 503 499 536 664 486	1,710 1,571 1,134 2,091 1,784 1,766 1,245 1,195 945 908 756 623 313	494 757 1, 078 1, 136 1, 426 1, 352 1, 135 1, 132 1, 166 996 1, 273 833 849	5, 410 4, 808 3, 602 3, 085 5, 635 4, 471 4, 875 1, 636 3, 098 1, 682 2, 868 1, 631 1, 803
						Percent	: Iran ge					
	bearing and											
De 1765 66	-63	-6	6	-71	-60	-47	. 1	.1	1	82	+72	-67

¹ The selected standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA's) are represented by those permit-issuing places falling within the nationwide group of 3,014 places.

Newly established SMSA caextensive with Orange County, California part of Las Angeles-Lang Beach area through December 1963).

Beaming with January 1964, data are not directly comparable with data for prior years because of change in area. definition, see page 26

Source U. S Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Censos.



Table C-10.—Tatal Private Canstruction (Residential and Nanresidential) Authorized by Building Permits in Selected Permit-Issuing Places in the United States: Valuation, by Type of Canstruction by Selected Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 1966

[Millions of dollars]

Type of construction	Anaheim, Santa Ana- Garden Grove, Calif. ²	Atlanta, Ga.	Baltimore, Md.		ngham, Ia.	Bostor Mass.		Buffalo, N. Y.	Chicago,	Cleveland, Ohio
All authorized private construction*	435.9	346.2	284.7		85.4	336	2	127. 4	1, 123. 2	297 9
New housing units	268. 2	154.6	155.8		40.4	124		59.4	508.8	134.1
New nonresidential buildings	131.8	162.9	92.7		33.6	157		52.6	514 2	127.7
Industrial buildings	29.5	20.8	20.4		6.6	30	. 5	14.4	120.2	45.7
Office buildings	16.5	57.0	13.6		4.5	13	. 1	1.3	186.7	12.2
Service stations and repair										
garages Stores and other mercantile	2.5	3.8	. 8		1.2	1	. 3	. 7	4.7	3.0
buildings	45.3	32.5	22.0		8.8	25		17.3	54.6	22.7
Religious buildings	8.4	7.5	5. 3		2.4		. 9	2.4	16.2	5. 1
Educational buildings	4.3	11.1	7.7		2.3	30	. 1	2.8	40.6	9.3
Hospitals and other inst. bldgs	2.4	1.2	12.7		. 9	24	. 9	1.9	15.6	16.7
Amusement buildings	3.8	11.0	1.8		. 6		. 5	. 3	4.4	. 9
Residential garages	1.8	. 4	. 8		. 3		. 1	8.6	13.5	5.3
All other nonresidential bldgs	17.4	17.7	7.6	1	5.9	16		2.8	57.6	6. 7
Additions and alterations	35.2	24.0	31.6		11.5	47	. 7	12.8	86.4	32.4
	Columbus, Ohio ³	Denver, Colo.	Detroi Mich			napolis, nd. ³		os Angeles- ong Beach, Calif. 3	Miami, Fla.	Mil waukee, Wis.
All authorized private construction*	156.9	196. 2	6	15.3	1	30. 7		1, 114. 4	229.3	184.5
New housing units	80.4	104.5		08. 9		76.3		366.0	135. 5	70.6
New nonresidential buildings	58.6	69.0		39.0		43.6		504.9	49.9	91.9
Industrial buildings	14. 1	18. 7		80.7		18.6		86.6	6. 1	29 6
Office buildings	4.7	6.6		39.6		6.4		129.0	4.7	13 4
Service stations, etc	1. 2	1. 2		3.2		1.1		10.3	1.2	1 6
Stores, etc	19. 1	15.6		45. 2		6.7		90.5	16. 2	12.6
Religious buildings	2.7	2.2		18.4		3.2		18.3	1.8	5 0
Educational buildings	1.3	3.9		8.5		1.1		44.7	. 8	10 3
Hospitals, etc	9. 9	6.6		11.9		2.4		27.9	5. 0	10.3
Amusement buildings	. 7	1.4		3. 9		1.2		5.7	1 4	. 8
Residential garages	1.9	1.6		15.4		1.0	-	3.2	. 6	3.8
All other nanresidential bldgs	3.0	11. 2		12.3		2.0		88.6	12.1	4 4
Additions and alterations	15.5	17.8		61.3		10. 2		226.7	31 4	20 0
	New York, N. Y.	Philadelphic PaN.J.	n, Phoer			Diego, alif.		Francisca- Oakland, Calif. ²	Seattle- Everett, Wash.	Washington, D.CMd. Va
All authorized private construction*	1, 108. 9	408.0	1	51.4	1	97. 0		640.6	398 9	641.3
New housing units	533.0	194.8		62.2	1	09.3		256. 1	187 7	407.3
New nonresidential buildings	452.1	173.0		71.5	1	56.8		283.6	187. 7	184 5
Industrial buildings	63.3	69.0		26.6		8. 0		40.2	119.9	10.9
Office buildings	201.5	17.1		11.4		5. 0		133.7	9.7	96 6
Service stations, etc	3.0	2.9		1.1		1.7		3 6	2.3	3.0
Stores, etc	59.2	27.6		11.9		10.2		43.1	17. 1	38.0
Religious buildings	24.0	14.5		3 2		2. 7		12.2	4 7	11.5
Educational buildings	49.8	12.1		. 9		2.1		1 8	2.0	9 6
Hospitals, etc		16.1		6.1		3.7		26 5	20.7	2.5
Amusement buildings	3.7	2.0		1.1		. 9		5 0	1.5	2 2
Residential garages	7	1.5		. 2		2.4		16	1. 1	6
All other nonresidential bldgs	14.4	10.2		9 2	1	20. 1		16 0	8. 7	9 5
Additions and alterations	117.0	38.6		15.3		22 2		98.5	22.5	40 9

^{*}Includes data for new nonhousekeeping residential buildings, not shown separately.

The selected standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA's) are represented by those permit-issuing places falling within the nationwide group of 3,014 places.

Newly established SMSA coextensive with Orange County California (part of Los Angeles-Long Beach area through December 1963).

³ Beginning with January 1964 data are not directly comparable with data for prior years because of change in area definition. See page 26.

Note Components may not add to totals, due to rounding.

Source U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.



TABLE XVI (page 84) shows the inflation in new house prices across Canada over the past three years.

The final point in the terms of reference concerning "the state of the market in respect of homes within the Metropolitan area during the past 12 months at prices comparable to those paid by the City during the same period for properties in urban renewal areas" has been covered in the foregoing.

RENT SUPPLEMENTS

Public policies for housing the City's poor have advanced through several stages. Newly constructed public housing has been made available at low cost to those with incomes below a fixed level. To assure that only the poor occupy such housing, families are required to vacate if their incomes rise substantially and if there is other good housing they can afford in the community. This tends to leave in public housing the chronically poor families, least able to help themselves. Moreover, local public authorities have had difficulty producing an adequate number of housing units through this approach.

A rent supplement programme offers promise of increasing the supply of low-income housing by tapping private resources. Under this programme, multi-family housing would be constructed and operated by approved non-profit or limited-profit private sponsors.

Subsidies to tenants are provided for the difference between a fair market rental of such apartments or houses and 25 percent of the assisted tenant's income. The recipient pays more of his rent as his income rises, but he is not obliged to move out.



Estimated Costs of New Bungalows Financed Under the National Housing Act, Canada, 1964-1966 Coût estimatif des nouveaux bungalows financés aux termes de la Loi nationale sur l'habitation, Canada, 1964-1966

CMHC Field Office Bureau local de la SCHL	Total Cost ¹ Coût total ¹ \$			Land Cost ² Coût du terrain ³ \$			Construction Cost Per Sq. Ft, Coût de construction le pi. car.		
	1964	1965	1966	1964	1965	1966	1964	1965	1966
Fredericton	13,621	15,408	15,943	1,952	2,392	2,787	11.03	12.04	12.48
Halifax	15,307	16,302	16,998	1,974	2,018	2,016	11.81	12.50	12.90
Moncton	13,898	14,997	15,393	1,975	1,974	2,016	10.71	11.41	12.18
Saint John	14,424	15,779	17,119	1,874	2,457	2,014	11.14	11.28	12.77
St. John's	16,406	18,317	19,115	2,659	2,978	3,291	11.46	12.73	13.24
Baie-Comeau	15,845	16,737	20,013	1,243	1,603	1,849	12.93	13.48	17.26
Chicoutimi	13,807	13,595	13,853	1,317	1,171	1,212	11.04	11.32	11.98
Hull	14,666	15,299	16,395	2,286	2,161	2,292	11.27	12.17	13.24
Montréal	16,232	17,034	18,066	2,434	2,455	2,558	10.46	10.89	11.70
Québec	14,941	14,933	15,708	2,004	1,954	2,149	11.67	12.01	12.72
Rimouski			15,377	* *	* *	1,522	* *	* *	12.36
St-Lambert Sharbracks	14,740	15,445	16,685	1,763	1,826	1,947	10.81	11.27	12.02
Sherbrooke Trois-Rivières	13,401	13,982 13,825	14,504	1,320	1,504	1,473	10.39	10.78	11.13
110is-Rivieres	13,422	13,823	15,152	1,280	1,420	1,566	10.31	10.69	11.54
Barrie	15,682	17,279	18,942	2,297	2,625	2,770	11.16	11.85	12.60
Fort William	14,946	15,930	17,452	2,327	2,585	3,097	11.64	12.19	13.05
Hamilton	16,551	17,951	19,947	4,327	4,839	5,349	10.76	11.36	12.31
Kingston	16,528	17,408	19,063	2,594	2,675	2,964	11.58	11.92	12.99
Kitchener	15,328	16,671	18,907	2,544	3,006	3,838	11.31	12.03	13.00
London North Bay	15,107	15,122 16,193	16,675 18,552	2,983	3,010	3,293	10.91	11.12	11.98
North Bay Oshawa	16,757	17,367	18,552	2,081	2,048 4,366	2,851	11.62	12.16	12.40
Ottawa	17,269	17,880	19,800	3,515	3,355	5,098 3,259	11.45	11.00 11.68	12.05 12.35
Peterborough	14.379	15.905	16.583	1,940	2.356	2,543	11.03	11.74	12.55
St. Catharines	15,777	17,509	19,395	3,005	3,708	4,401	11.15	12.15	13.03
Sault Ste. Marie	16,274	17,118	17,026	2,699	2,952	2,855	12.27	12.39	12.66
Sudbury	15,845	15,914	19,168	2,524	2,585	3,156	11.59	12.18	13.29
Toronto	17,455	19,677	23,056	5,126	5,777	7,097	9.90	10.77	11.86
Windsor	16,348	18,450	21,774	2,348	3,013	4,200	12.12	13.21	15.57
Calgary	15,330	15,999	17,980	2.972	3,071	3,319	10.77	11.13	11.99
Edmonton	15,632	16,486	17,954	3,347	3,541	3,578	10.85	11.13	12.07
Lethbridge	13,598	14,386	16,037	1,634	1,741	1.905	11.06	11.61	11.89
Red Deer	14.912	15,855	17,242	2,326	2,207	2,386	11.36	11.93	12.63
Regina	14,721	15,162	16,549	1,873	1,973	1,974	11.49	11.84	12.76
Saskatoon	14,756	15,093	16,391	1,978	1,998	2,226	11.66	12.12	12.91
Winnipeg	16,602	17,164	18,297	3,211	3,241	3,095	11.46	11.73	12.58
Kelowna	16,904	18,186	19,450	2,558	2,973	3,176	11.67	12.03	12.84
Prince George	17.299	20,006	21,451	1,967	2,845	3,112	13.06	14.39	15.07
Trail	16,779	18.347	19.629	1,751	2,024	2,336	12.40	13.69	14.36
Vancouver	17,007	18,326	19,554	3,413	3,516	3,781	10.72	11.66	12.36
Victoria	16,925	19,339	20,732	2,471	2,764	3,017	11.87	13.61	14.41
Canada	15,807	16,572	18,059	2,813	2,816	3,006	11.01	11.62	12.56

¹ Includes land, construction and other costs, but excludes the mortgage insurance

² Land cost data reflect the prices paid for lots regardless of the extent of servicing or the method of financing.

¹ Comprend le prix du terrain, le coût de construction et autres frais, mais

n'inclut pas le droit d'assurance du prêt hypothécaire.

2 Les données sur le coût du terrain sont un indice des prix payés pour les terrains à bâtir, indépendanment du nombre de services installés ou du mode de linancement.



It would be unfortunate if the rent supplement programme were to die in its infancy and not be able to prove itself a more effective and desirable substitute for public housing.

The rent supplement programme provides the first promising substitute for public housing, and supplement projects would be privately owned, while public housing is government owned.

Rent supplement projects would be subject to full local real estate taxes. Public housing is almost wholly tax-exempt.

The rent supplement programme as adopted by the Council of the Corporation of the City of Toronto and administered by the Housing Authority of Toronto appears to be working well.

It is recommended that Central Mortgage & Housing Corporation and the Metropolitan Corporation provide financial assistance in connection with the cost of the rent supplement programme now being administered by the Housing Authority of Toronto.

SEE APPENDIX X and XI



SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

GENERAL

The Toronto Real Estate Board is not entirely satisfied that the City of Toronto is doing all within its power and existing legislation to equitably compensate property owners expropriated for urban renewal.

Any examination of a social economic problem must surely take into consideration existing legislation to determine whether the objectives of such regulations are being achieved.

In the case of expropriation for urban renewal, it is generally unclear as to the exact aims of the legislation and the declared public objectives with respect to it.

Interpretations of existing legislation would lead one to conclude that a broad use of the present machinery would allow for financial assistance for the relocation of occupants of homes expropriated for urban renewal.

Whether special consideration in the form of relocation allowances could be awarded to property owners expropriated by urban renewal schemes may be a matter of modification, interpretation and application of existing legislation, i.e. Section 23 of the National Housing Act and/or Section 2 (1)(c) of the Housing Development Act.



The Real Estate Department of the City of Toronto maintains that it is now paying the maximum amount of compensation that it is warranted in paying, based on its interpretation of the compensation provisions of the Expropriation Procedures Act, 1962-63.

In the respectful submission of this Association, a restrictive or limiting interpretation of the existing statute is neither warranted nor justified. It is not uncommon for expropriating authorities, endowed with a genuine desire to compensate the owners to the extent that they will not suffer pecuniarily as a result of the expropriation, to pay more than the market value of the property, indeed frequently to pay in excess of an amount which might be rationally suggested as "value to the owner", if such added payment appears warranted in order to achieve the desired results, that is to say to make the expropriated owner whole. Numerous examples are available.

In our respectful submission the due compensation provisions of the Expropriation Procedures Act were never intended to be limiting. In the report of the Select Committee on Land Expropriation of February 19, 1962, the Committee in reviewing suggestions to codify the compensation provision in the then proposed Expropriation Procedures Act, had rejected the recommendations on the grounds that a codification would tend to limit and restrict the compensation, whereas the general provision permitted a broader interpretation under all circumstances.



However, if some expropriating authorities elect to place a restricted interpretation on the general compensation provisions of the existing statute, an amendment to the said statute appears essential so as to insure that the expropriated owner receives adequate compensation to enable him to reinstate himself elsewhere without any financial hardship.

Existing NHA legislation discriminates against the homeowner in that it does not provide for his relocation other than in public rental housing.

Existing NHA legislation creates a demand for public housing in that some owners in the urban renewal area ultimately become tenants in public housing.

Most subsidized public housing built to replace the blighted housing removed by urban renewal is occupied by persons from outside the area.

Provincial Housing administrators have joined Federal and Municipal authorities in acknowledging the need for special assistance for the relocation of homeowners expropriated for urban renewal.

While social conscience dictates it, the public demands it, politicians would like it, urban renewal requires it, responsible enterprise feels it is justified and legislation just about provides for it, the relocation allowance still remains impossible to secure within existing circumstances, except by (a) a broader



interpretation in the existing compensation provision to include it as part of the due compensation or (b) by an amendment to the Expropriation Procedures Act providing for the payment of this special financial assistance to the expropriated owner.

Something is surely wrong with the principles behind regulations which allow for the subsidization of people in public housing at an enormous expense to the taxpayers without obligation to pay back such assistance while insisting, upon death of the surviving partner in a self-supported family, or in the event that the property is no longer occupied by the lessee and/or his spouse (sold), all deferred charges shall become due and payable.

This is tantamount to suggesting that, notwithstanding individual circumstances, if one wishes to become dependent on the state for accommodation, he may certainly be provided for but if he wishes to continue to enjoy the dignity and justifiable pride which comes from providing, through his own resources, a home for his family, he is subject to a different set of rules even though, from an economic standpoint, the investment of public funds is comparatively smaller.

One might be inclined to query whether the objective of urban renewal is to force private owners to become dependents at subsidies currently averaging \$54 per month per unit in the Metropolitan Toronto area, or whether the goal is to assist families to improve their housing and living conditions through their own productivity and resources with a relatively small government financial supplement.



It requires little debate to determine the most acceptable alternative between the expense of subsidizing a government owned housing unit over its economic life on land acquired at between \$10,000 to \$15,000 per unit and the one-time investment of an average of \$2,000 or \$3,000 per unit to assist persons dispossessed of housing to relocate themselves, through purchase, in decent, safe and sanitary accommodation with no further administrative or management costs.

It is the respectful submission of The Toronto Real Estate Board that relocation allowances should be paid in the form of outright cash payments to expropriated owners because of the special circumstances which tend to devalue properties prior to expropriation not only particularly for the purpose of urban renewal but in takings for other public projects.

There should be no obligation for the recipient to repay the cash relocation allowance.

It is debatable in many instances because of the basis for compensation whether urban renewal is in the best interests and to the ultimate benefit of residents in the area. Although expropriation of the land in part or in whole is reasonably necessary for the purpose of the applicant, it may not be in the best public interests, bearing in mind that "the public" are the owners of substandard homes who will suffer financially and emotionally as a result of the expropriation.



A deliberate effort to guide redevelopment assumes articulated goals and these goals must represent at best the will and at least the acceptance of a considerable part of the population.

DATE FOR DETERMINING COMPENSATION

The terms of reference for this Study as set out herein-before are related essentially to economic considerations. The following section will deal with <u>Point (a)</u> in the terms of reference, specifically "The increase in the price level of houses between the date of taking and the date of payment to the homeowner in a strongly rising market".

TABLE I (page 21) illustrates the increase in the price level of houses sold through the Multiple Listing Service of The Toronto Real Estate Board over the past thirteen years and four months. This survey shows that the average price of properties sold through MLS has increased 64 percent from \$14,424 in 1953 to a present level of \$23,695. This is an average increase of approximately 5 percent per year and illustrates the nature of real estate investment as a hedge against inflation. This is not to suggest that the annual increase was constant from year to year. Indeed, during certain periods the rate of increase was substantially in excess of or less than this average.



Alexandra Park Area - The average prices of houses sold through MLS in District C-1, where Alexandra Park is located, have increased from an average of \$15,322 in the first four months of 1965 to \$17,910 at the end of April 1966 and \$21,301 in the similar four month period of this year. This is a two-year increase of 39 percent or \$5,979 per unit.

Don Mount Village Area — The average prices of houses sold through MLS in District E-1, where Don Mount Village is located, have increased from an average of \$12,242 in the first four months of 1965 to \$14,210 at the end of April 1966 and \$16,109 in the similar four month period of this year. This is a two-year increase of 32 percent or \$3,867 per unit.

Trefann Court Area - The average prices of houses sold through MLS in District C-8, where Trefann Court is located, have increased from an average of \$12,735 in the first four months of 1965 to \$13,814 at the end of April 1966 and \$20,338 in the similar four month period of this year. This is a two-year increase of 60 percent or \$7,603 per unit.

It is recommended that an owner whose property has been expropriated should be entitled to have his compensation monies increased if it can be shown that values in general have increased between date of filing of the plan of expropriation and the date he receives compensation, provided however that the owner was not responsible for the delay in reaching settlement.



SUPPLY AND DEMAND DETERMINE PRICE

The Committee has drawn upon present and past practical experience in dealing with <u>Point (b)</u> in the terms of reference for this Study. This section seeks to determine "The effect on the market brought about by expropriation of a large number of homes and the effect of the sudden withdrawal from the market of these homes and the sudden introduction onto the market of a large number of buyers, all occurring subsequent to the date of expropriation and as a direct result of the expropriation."

It has become obvious from our conversations with recently expropriated homeowners that their main concern is to find suitable places to live when they lose possession of their properties.

These families invariably seek similar accommodation in the same price range within the same neighbourhood. This set of circumstances and preferences creates a demand for a specific type of property when there is no corresponding increase in supply.

Although more than 40,000 homes were sold for over \$1.1 billion in Metropolitan Toronto in 1966, relatively few properties could be found at prices below \$12,500. In fact less than one percent of the properties sold through Multiple Listing Service this year will be at a price below \$10,000. This compares with three percent in the under \$10,000 category just one year ago.



The Toronto Real Estate Board recommends that expropriating authorities should make every reasonable effort to acquire real property through negotiated purchase on the open market well in advance of urban renewal, rather than suddenly affect the market by the expropriation of a large number of homes at one time. The senior levels of government should provide financial assistance to accommodate this in order to encourage the acquisition of real property by amicable agreements with owners, to relieve congestion in the courts, to assure consistent treatment of owners in the many programmes, and to promote public confidence in land acquisition practices.

THE MARKET VALUE STANDARD

Point (c) of the terms of reference for this report

queries "The usefulness of considering market value if there

is no substitute home on the market since the scheme of expro
priation is to remove the substandard home from the market."

It is not generally clear that the objective of urban renewal is "to remove the substandard home from the market".

The only substitute home on the market is another substandard dwelling in perhaps another area designated for urban renewal.

And expropriated owners are certainly reluctant to take a chance on a second round of expropriation.

If a government decides to remove all houses priced under \$12,000 then it has a responsibility to provide for all those families who cannot afford to buy from the remaining stock.



It is the view of this Association that the test of "value to the owner" which is that presently applied by the Courts, is satisfactory if its full potential is realized by the claimants in the development of their evidence and by tribunals in dealing with it. Unfortunately a sophisticated use of this test is not always made either by claimants or by tribunals assessing compensation.

TABLE VII (page 45) shows that Metropolitan Toronto has a lower percentage of dwellings in need of repair than any other city in Canada. Therefore Metro has a relatively small supply of inexpensive houses for which normally there is a great demand.

In the case of expropriation, the prior knowledge of the contemplated expropriation for urban renewal in effect eliminates this demand on the open market, with the result that properties within areas designated for urban renewal are devalued.

Furthermore the expropriation or intended expropriation causes an increased demand and higher prices for substitute housing in areas outside urban renewal areas.

It is apparent therefore that if the compensation payable to an expropriated owner is limited to the depressed market value caused by the scheme for which the property is required, he would be unable to acquire even an equally desirable substitute property at the inflated price likely caused by the same scheme.



We would suggest market value based on evidence of sales outside the urban renewal area should form the basis of compensation, but the compensation should not be limited to the market value.

Prices paid by the City of Toronto to owners expropriated for urban renewal are generally lower than those paid to owners selling on the private competitive market in areas adjacent to urban renewal areas. As evidenced in TABLES VIII and IX this would suggest that the compensation paid to these owners was inadequate.

In Alexandra Park the average price paid by the City was \$12,739.69 for 210 owner-occupied residential properties and \$10,398.53 for 124 tenant-occupied properties, or \$11,870.52 for the total 334 properties. This does not include 37 commercial properties nor two vacant properties.

In Don Mount Village the average price paid by the City was \$9,516.85 for 127 owner-occupied residential properties and \$8,668.75 for 88 tenant-occupied properties, or \$9,169.72 for the total 215 properties. This does not include 2 commercial properties nor 2 vacant properties.

TABLES VIII and IX (pages 49 to 70) provide historical data on sales prices of residential properties in areas adjacent to the urban renewal areas: Alexandra Park and Don Mount Village. In each case average prices paid to expropriated owners in the urban renewal areas were considerably lower than the average sales prices of similar properties sold on the private market in areas adjacent to the urban renewal areas.



The record of sales comparisons of residential properties sold on the private market in areas adjacent to the Alexandra Park Redevelopment Area Project shows that 193 properties were sold for \$2,804,306 or an average of \$14,530 per unit.

The record of sales comparisons of residential properties sold on the private market in areas adjacent to the Don Mount Village Redevelopment Area Project shows that 220 properties were sold for \$2,183,444 or an average of \$9,924 per unit.

POPULATION GROWTH AND IMMIGRATION

To illustrate "the difference between the small home market in Metropolitan Toronto and in any other city as a result of the dynamic influx of immigrants" is Point (d) of our terms of reference.

Housing demand arises from several factors: 1. Population growth due to (a) natural increase, (b) urbanization, and (c) family formation; 2. Replacement due to (a) structural deterioration, and (b) relocation of public works; and 3. The improvement of living standards.

The existing housing stock is replaced in three general situations: (1) When a structure ceases to be habitable due to advanced physical deterioration; (2) When the environment deteriorates; and (3) as a result of expropriation to carry out a public work or urban renewal programme.



Because of the dynamic and prospercus economies of the Province of Ontario and Metropolitan Toronto, this area has become one of the most powerful attractions for people from all parts of the world.

Metropolitan Toronto is the fastest growing area of over 2,000,000 population in North America.

Over the past 20 years Ontario was the Province of destination for more than 50 percent of all the immigrants to Canada, and Metropolitan Toronto received half of the immigrants to Ontario, according to the estimates of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. See TABLE X11 (page 75).

All items considered, the Federal Government probably spends more money on immigration than it does on urban renewal.

The Toronto Real Estate Board suggests that it is completely irrational and unconscionable for the Federal Government to give priority to persons from outside Canada for financial assistance while ignoring the needs of Canadian citizens to be comfortably relocated.

It is the responsibility of the Federal Government to assist in the relocation of unemployed workers from other parts of the country in their new environment. This should include responsibility for the supply or financial contribution toward the cost to municipalities in the form of grants to workers and municipalities.



In every major city of the United States and Canada, except Toronto, it is still possible to find a new single family home priced at less than \$17,000. In the Chicago area, for example, a six room detached home with a floor area of 1,600 square feet is priced at \$16,500.

RENT SUPPLEMENTS

A rent supplement programme offers promise of increasing the supply of low-income housing by tapping private resources.

Under this programme, multi-family housing would be constructed and operated by approved non-profit or limited-profit private sponsors.

Subsidies to tenants are provided for the difference between a fair market rental of such apartments or houses and 25 percent of the assisted tenant's income. The recipient pays more of his rent as his income rises, but he is not obliged to move out.

It is recommended that Central Mortgage & Housing Corporation and the Metropolitan Corporation provide financial assistance in connection with the cost of the rent supplement programme now being administered by the Housing Authority of Toronto.



CONCLUSION

This Study of Expropriation for Urban Renewal in the City of Toronto by The Toronto Real Estate Board on behalf of the Council of the Corporation of the City of Toronto for submission to the Ontario Provincial Government provides recommendations for the establishment of an equitable basis for compensation for owners who are affected by expropriation for urban renewal.

The Toronto Real Estate Board is convinced that the present unsatisfactory basis for fixing the amount of compensation to be paid to owners of substandard properties in urban renewal projects is the root of the problems of expediting urban renewal in the City of Toronto.

We are hopeful that this Study, as proposed in the report of the City Solicitor, the Commissioner of Real Estate and the Commissioner of Finance dated March 20, 1967 will enlighten those responsible for and concerned with the legislative framework which governs the equitability and the success of urban renewal.

All of which is respectfully submitted by

THE TORONTO REAL ESTATE BOARD



Appendix I



EXCERPT FROM METROPOLITAN TORONTO URBAN RENEWAL STUDY - STAFF REPORT FOR THE METROPOLITAN TORONTO PLANNING BOARD August, 1966

Relocation

The stipulation that families who are displaced in the course of redevelopment must be provided with adequate housing elsewhere is a relatively recent requirement. In the earlier redevelopment projects (Regent Park North and South), relocation was handled primarily by providing on-site accommodation in the new development for eligible families, and at Moss Park relocation assistance was provided on requestit is only since the establishment of the Alexandra Park and Don Mount Village projects that there has been a clear understanding among all of the levels of government concerned that relocation is an integral part of the redevelopment process, and that the costs of relocation, both for moving expenses and to operate the program, are properly part of the cost of the project.

Despite the prevailing low-income levels in both Alexandra Park and Don Mount Village, public housing does not represent the major source of supply for relocation purposes. In Alexandra Park, nearly 400 of the 600 households had been relocated as of June, 1966, and of these only 82, or 21%, moved into publicly owned housing. Of the 135 households in Don Mount Village that had been relocated by the end of July, only 27, or 20%, moved into public housing. It is significant that the initial surveys for these two projects indicated that about 1/4 of the households at Alexandra Park and 1/3 of the households at Don Mount Village would require public housing. In fact, while many of these families have required substantial help in locating suitable accommodation, the proportion moving into public housing has been lower than was indicated in the initial survey of the families concerned.

This may be partly due to the fact that there are relatively few vacancies in the existing downtown public housing projects, and that most of the available public housing is in suburban locations some distance from the redevelopment areas involved. Whether the public housing ratio will become higher as more public housing becomes available in the central areas will not be known until the renewal program is much further advanced.

Residents in Alexandra Park and Don Mount Village have secured or been provided with suitable accommodation within an average period of 1 to $1\frac{1}{2}$ months, and the experience in these two projects has demonstrated the importance of treating relocation as a full-fledged public responsibility, with adequate staff and adequate compensation for moving expenses.



The Don Mount Village project has also brought out the serious problem which arises when resident home owners receive less in compensation than they are required to pay for satisfactory accommodation elsewhere. This problem is likely to arise in other renewal areas with a high proportion of owners. While some of the owners, particularly elderly persons, will find suitable accommodation in rental housing, financial assistance may have to be provided for some of the owners possessing inadequate equities. The possibility should be explored of providing loans to cover the difference between the compensation received for a house in a renewal area and the cost of purchasing satisfactory accommodation elsewhere. Such loans could be provided on generous terms under the Ontario Housing Development Act, and it may even be possible to arrange for "conditional loans" with a moratorium on repayment until such time as the new property is sold.

In addition to displacement arising from the renewal program, a substantial number of families and individuals will be displaced over the next 15 or 20 years by public and private projects of various kinds. It is estimated that there will be up to 6,000 dwellings demolished in carrying out public works in the metropolitan area, and about 7,000 dwellings demolished through private residential redevelopment. The question of public responsibility for relocating these households will also require attention.

In general, it does not appear that most of this displacement will require an organized relocation program. Of the major transportation facilities, it is likely that only the Queen Subway and the Highway 400 Extension will create substantial relocation problems; the other transportation facilities are generally in locations which do not involve extensive dislocation of residences, and in most cases the residents involved will be able to relocate themselves without public assistance. However, if these two major transportation projects are carried out, it will be necessary that they be brought into the general relocation machinery developed as part of the renewal program. This would also be the case with respect to school site extensions and park extensions in the older sections of the metropolitan area. It is strongly recommended in this report that all such public projects be undertaken as part of the overall renewal program rather than independently, and if this policy is adopted, the displacement arising from such public undertakings would be dealt with as a matter of course through the urban renewal relocation machinery.



While relocation activities in the metropolitan area generally are fairly straightforward, in the renewal areas relocation frequently has a substantial social component. Many families and individuals, particularly elderly persons, do not adjust readily to the pressures brought on by forced removal from their dwellings and their immediate associations. It is often essential that relocation operations be viewed in this social service context as in the basic real estate context, and the renewal program should be administered with this consideration well in mind.



Appendix II



EXCERPT FROM METROPOLITAN TORONTO URBAN RENEWAL STUDY — STAFF REPORT FOR THE METROPOLITAN TORONTO PLANNING BOARD August, 1966

Relocation

As already noted, it is essential that the machinery required to assure adequate relocation of displaced residents and businesses, and the costs of providing such services, be an integral part of the renewal schemes. In addition to providing alternative accommodation and adequate moving expenses, the relocation machinery must inevitably be concerned as well with the social "dimension" of renewal. The urban renewal agency is not a social welfare or social service agency, but renewal is in a very real sense a social as well as a physical program. While most families will readjust satisfactorily with the normal relocation aids (provision of alternative accommodation and moving expenses), others require more intensive assistance. It is essential that adequate professional and technical services be available to bring together those requiring such assistance with the public or voluntary agencies able to provide such assistance.

Financial assistance

A critical element in the proposed renewal program involves the provision of suitable financial assistance in order to achieve the expressed objectives of the program. Two particular aspects of this problem have been noted.

First is the need to develop a method of assisting owners of expropriated property whose equities are insufficient to secure suitable accommodation. Because of the high proportion of home owners to be found in most of the proposed renewal areas, this is likely to be a serious problem in many of the project areas. It is considered essential that some form of financial assistance be provided for those families who are not suitably accommodated in available purchase housing and not readily relocated into rental housing. Some form of loan arrangement, possibly with a moratorium on repayments until the new property is sold, would appear to be the most reasonable way to deal with this problem, and the costs of doing so should properly be considered part of the real cost of the renewal program.



The second problem, which as noted earlier will be of serious dimensions, is the need to provide financial assistance to home owners whose properties require improvement but who can not readily absorb the necessary expenditure or the consequent indebtedness. For the low-income families a system of direct grants similar to the U.S. program is necessary; for families with somewhat higher incomes, loan assistance, either at below-market rates or with a moratorium on repayment until sale of the property, would appear to be indicated. The success of the renewal program will depend to a considerable extent on the ability to secure a reasonable level of improvement by home owners whose properties are not acquired for public renewal action, and this in turn will depend on the development of suitable procedures for providing them with financial assistance.



Appendix III



APPENDIX III

EXCERPTS FROM METROPOLITAN TORONTO PLANNING BOARD URBAN RENEWAL STUDY — THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN URBAN RENEWAL. A STUDY CARRIED OUT BY MURRAY V. JONES March, 1966

CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Urban renewal was defined in Chapter I as any action undertaken by whomever it may be, to redevelop, rehabilitate or conserve any part of the urban fabric. It can be divided into renewal or redevelopment by private individuals or corporate enterprise on the one hand, and publicly-initiated renewal under the applicable legislation, in which private enterprise may also participate, on the other. Because of public planning powers, the influence of public expenditures for basic urban services and other facilities, and the detailed intervention by public bodies in private development and redevelopment, public and private interests and activities affecting renewal are inseparably interwoven. This study has focussed on the cole of private corporate enterprise; its underlying object has been to consider ways in which this role could be enlarged and in which public-private cooperation might be improved in order to enhance the quality and accomplishments of renewal, both under the legislation and as a whole

The need for renewal on a growing scale, both public and private, arises from three tactors. The first is the age, deterioration and blight of many urban areas; age and obsolescence alone often lead to renewal, even if there is no physical deterioration or blight. The second is the rapid growth in urban population, creating a demand for the development of non-urban land on the fringes or the city and for the redevelopment, usually at higher densities in order to accommodate more people, of built-up areas within the city. The third is a distribution of income which results in the residents of areas which need to be renewed being unable to afford new or often alternative housing without assistance. Effective demand for the re-uses which renewal of physically deteriorated areas would provide is lacking, and this may apply to non-residential as well as residential re-use, neither of which may be able to yield an "economic" return Renewal due to the first factor and that due to the second often do not coincide locationally or economically, unless aided by some form of publicly-furnished incentive.

Constraints on Urban Renewal

Whereas the need for urban renewal is growing, renewal itself is up against several constraints which inhibit its expansion, while renewal in the legislative sense faces a number of further constraints. The general constraints which appear to stand out are:

- (1) The general pace of economic activity at present and, in particular, the fact that the construction industry is working to capacity and under pressure of rising costs and prices;
- A shortage of urban land available for redevelopment at a price which might tend to mitigate rather than add to the rise in other costs. The cost of land for new apartment projects in Toronto for example now runs as high as \$3,500 per suite and continues to go up.



- The financial capacity of municipalities to provide essential services for the increased population associated with both growth and renewal. Basic services are often inadequate in capacity and worn out by age; they need to be replaced and expanded, and will require large capital expenditures;
- (4) The need to provide alternative housing of an acceptable standard and at a reasonable cost for those whom renewal will desplace.

The first of these constraints may in part be temporary. But its complete removal would only come about by a change in economic conditions going well beyond a relaxation of the current upswing, to the point where demand would decline as much if not more than supply would be eased. It follows that the maximum renewal is likely to be achieved in the ideal circumstance of neither too much nor too little "give" or slack in the economy. As things are now, a deliberate policy of encouraging renewal would involve in part stretching resources still further and adding to the pressures by which prices are being pushed up, and in part cutting back in some other sectors of economic activity whose output meets less basic needs or staisfies less important wants. Although on Galbraith's reasoning these should not be hard to find, renewal does not yet seem to command the priority which many people think it should.

Applications for zoning changes, are as has been indicated, evidence of demand for floor space in excess of the permissible supply in the most desired areas and locations; they may also in some cases indicate, although not in all, a shortage of land at prices which facilitate redevelopment. Where the value of land in its present use is high, the way to raise the redevelopment value above it, while at the same time keeping the land cost per unit of floor space to reasonable levels, is to increase the permitted density. This may be opposed on other grounds, beyond the notion of "excessive" density; but, when there is a choice, these should be weighed against the economic consequences. In designated areas, the alternative of acquisition and write-down at public cost is available. Elsewhere, if the supply of land multiplied by the permitted density is insufficient to meet the demand which can afford (or is willing) to pay middle-income scaled rents, the volume of redevelopment will be limited and the supply of new buildings, residential and other, will be confined to those with high incomes and able to pay accordingly.

In Metropolitan Toronto, the problem of land prices, supply and densities under the pressure of rapid growth is illustrated by the fact that so many high-rise apartments are being built on the outskirts of the city: the high cost of land and the relatively limited supply available in the city result in rents which are higher than most people want to pay (or the developers would like to charge), while the growing demand for apartments, coupled with the rising cost of undeveloped peripheral land, favours apartment buildings relatively



to single-family dwellings in the outer areas. People who would prefer to live nearer to the centre are at a price disadvantage characteristic of many large cities. The long-term consequence is a slower population growth in the inner areas, with effects on transportation, trade, social and cultural life, and the tax base.

Municipal finances are a constraint because the property tax, as the main source of municipal revenue, is relatively inelastic and responds slowly to changes in economic conditions, while the borrowing power of municipalities is regulated by the O.M.B. in terms of a criterion which is also inelastic and unresponsive to need. This is not to say that without O.M.B. supervision, municipalities would be able to borrow more; their credit might indeed be less. The basic problem is the need for broader and more flexible sources of municipal revenue, or for increased provincial and federal contributions to municipal expenditures and renewal, or for the province to take over some expenditures which now fall to the municipalities.

The fourth constraint is closely related to legislative renewal and the possibility of a public-private partnership which offers results clearly superior to what has been achieved so far. It may be that renewal with no public housing component and unaccompanied by any concern or provision for the people who are displaced would in the long run be better than no renewal at all. But this would be a harsh choice, with consequences which are considered unacceptable, and which only a failure to use the legislation and funds available would impose. It is true that if the record in public housing were to be taken as a measure of the future, the outlook would not be encouraging. Publicly-initiated renewal, including public housing, is evidently subject to some constraints of its own.

The first is the degree of initiative itself, its adequacy, drive and grounding in an informed and active concern with needs and possibilities. The initiative lies mainly with the municipalities where public opioion and political leadership are sometimes indifferent or even adverse. When these handicaps are overcome, there is likely to be a lack of qualified staff and, inevitably, the need to gain experience of knowing what to do and how. Secondly, there are the problems and pitfalls of coordination between three or four levels of government, each with its own viewpoint, policies and practices, financial accountability and sources of funds - added to the political and administrative complexities of municipal government in a large city. Along with these is the coordination of public and private effort which, in the context of our terms of reference, ought to aim at maximizing the latter. If it is granted that private enterprise tends to be less tied up in red tape, this would in itself be a reason for doing so. Thirdly, as compared with the need, is the over-all shortage of knowledge and experience, both professional and practical, with, apart from a few major cities, some concentration of those who are professionally qualified at C.M.H.C. This leads to a degree of centralization, with undue attention to matters of more local or at most provincial concern, which may hinder initiative and action. This is not to counsel haste or less than the utmost feasible care; it is merely to note that, all the deliberation and precautions notwithstanding, someone has to take the responsibility of making mistakes. Fourth is again the financial capacity of municipalities, in this case to pay for their share of renewal schemes, in addition to the many other pressing demands on their resources. Lastly, if incentives are needed, including greater assistance by senior governments to municipalities, they have to be adequately applied.



Conclusions and recommendations are divided into two parts: those relating to renewal as a whole and those relating to renewal under the legislation.

A - Renewal as a Whole

Private renewal operates in a market economy. In development and redevelopment, private enterprise is able to build new housing for sale or rent to those in the upper half at best of the income scale; most people with below average incomes cannot afford and do not get new housing — unless it is subsidized. But the supply of new housing for those who can afford it is not sufficient to provide decent second—hand housing for all those who cannot; the so—called "filtering down" process does not work, and is least able to do so when normal market demands are growing at a rate which taxes or overtaxes the capacity of the industry to build. Hence the need of assistance for existing, second—hand housing as well.

It has been stressed that a main deterrent to the private renewal by way of clearance and redevelopment of old and run-down properties is the fact that, their condition notwithstanding, they are still generally expensive, reflecting heavy demand for their present use. Such properties house all too many of the low-income population, and their prices and overcrowding are the market expression of a socio-economic fact which cannot be ignored: large numbers of people are unable to find better accommodation and, for those with no choice, these properties meet a vital need even though offending middle-class standards. Although the prices of such properties include a speculative element, their profitable present use helps to maintain speculative expectations by allowing owners to hold out over long periods. There is little doubt that a sharp reduction in demand for the present use would lower prices and, through competition among sellers, bring them nearer to the acquisition costs which redevelopers are able to pay; in a buyer's market, private assembly for redevelopment would also be easier.

It follows that an effective long-term strategy calls for lessening the demand for the present use of deteriorated properties by providing alternatives. Renewal is inextricably tied to the housing problem and, in the light of considerable experience of "slum clearance breeding slums", no renewal program ought to be accepted unless it includes or is accompanied by measures to deal with it.

These should aim primarily at creating an expanding, more competitive market for private renewal. Market expansion should include attracting private activity to "gray areas" in which renewal costs and potential revenues currently do not allow a sufficient profit. The role of private enterprise in these areas can only be enlarged if assisted in one way or another by public means. It is in this respect in the same position as many of Canada's gold mines which, but for the subsidy under the Emergency Gold Mining Assistance Act, would long ago have had to close down. Steps both to lower costs and raise revenues by additions to income and demand will offer the best prospects of success.



This is not to discount the contribution of public housing and redevelopment in renewal areas. But, in the light of experience, all the optimism which one can reasonably muster as to the possibility of expanding renewal activity by public bodies still leads to the conclusion that the main reliance should be placed on expanding private enterprise operating both within and outside the renewal legislation.

To begin with, then, a better understanding of the renewal market and its relationships with the market for new construction is needed, with emphasis on consumer resources, preferences and behaviour. Compared to other industries, the private sector involved in supplying these markets is perhaps unlikely to undertake research of the scope required; the federal government should consider undertaking such a program, with incentives to enlist the participation of private firms, other levels of government, and the universities.

Second, costs of property acquisition, construction, money, and current operation, including taxes, are of concern to the private entrepreneur - along with costs of delays in getting permission to proceed, and of the extra risk involved when such permission is uncertain. All of these can be influenced by public action, as can the potential revenue from the permitted re-use.

Measures aimed at reducing both the price of deteriorated properties and the extent of them required for the site of a given renewal project should be examined. Price reduction can be brought about by long-term easing of demand for the present use as discussed above, and by increasing the supply of properties in competition for sale to developers.

Deteriorated areas are not all residential, and asking prices for commercial and industrial properties needing renewal also remain high. But the majority of business firms do have alternatives they can afford, as their exodus to new buildings testifies; aside from the minority of marginal businesses which sustain a shrunken demand for rundown factories, warehouses, offices and stores, the existence of alternative choices has generally led to significant vacancy levels not found in deteriorated housing. Some properties have already been sold for redevelopment, while many others have been cleared of their buildings to reduce municipal taxes, and perhaps bring in some parking revenue. A lowering of the asking prices for obsolete non-residential properties can be forestalled only if owners are able to "hold on" or to find re-uses able to pay the prices asked; since holding onto a vacant property is expensive, and re-uses are scarce, lower prices may reasonably be expected in the long run, leading to an alternative supply of land for redevelopment.

An increase in the supply of suitable land would also be brought about by zoning changes and improvements in transportation, street pattern, municipal services, parks, playgrounds, community buildings and facilities which would make more areas of the city attractive for private renewal.



Zoning changes should aim at facilitating renewal by way of rehabilitation at standards consistent with the property and neighbourhood involved; home improvement and extension loans serve little purpose if the zoning requirements preclude their use. Zoning should facilitate renewal by way of redevelopment at relatively low density, by relaxing the requirements of set-backs, limited coverage, open space etc. which make low-density redevelopment either impossible or prohibitively expensive. More flexibility and realism in respect of rezoning and maximum densities for apartment buildings in areas of concentrated demand is a likewise major need.

The heavy cost of replacing and expanding municipal services has been mentioned. The City of Toronto proposed last fall to levy on new buildings half the cost, estimated at \$154 million, of enlarging the city's sewer system, by means of an impost of 40¢ a square foot of floor space. For a suite of 1,000 square feet, this would mean an extra charge of \$400 - a sum which would undoubtedly have raised rents even if it would not, as claimed on behalf of developers opposing the proposal "smother the city's development boom." The impost as adopted was reduced to 20¢ a square foot, with an exemption for the first 3,000 square feet, and is to take effect as of July 1, 1966, subject to 0.M.B. approval.

The larger area municipalities outside the City have for some time imposed a Metro sewer levy at the time of approving plans of subdivision, and more recently some of them have also levied charges in cases of rezoning where redevelopment is involved: for example, \$1,090 per acre plus \$100 per suite in North York, one-half of these amounts in Etobicoke, \$1,415 per acre and \$50 per suite in Scarborough and \$200 per suite for high-rise development (and redevelopment) in East York. It does seem that, if there is to be a levy for new sewers in newly developing areas, a levy to repair and enlarge old ones to accommodate redevelopment is also reasonable. A drawback of the levy is that it will also tend to raise rents, although probably not by as much, on existing buildings an impost on the tenants which will yield nothing to the City. A preferable method would be a graduated levy geared to density and the granting of zoning exemptions: a small sum for new residential buildings up to a density of say 1.5, somewhat more for each suite added between 1.5 and 2.0, and increasing sharply for the additional suites made possible by densities above the by-law maximum. (In the central area, the steps could be adjusted according to the higher densities permitted.) Part of the saving in land cost resulting from higher densities would thus be recovered by the City for services which have to be paid for somehow, while the effect on rents would be more than offset by the lower land cost per suite. A further advantage would be that the levy would be in some proportion to the increased sewage flow. Relocation costs could be charged to redevelopment in a similar way, and the same principle could perhaps also be applied to non-residential buildings.

Another zoning revision worth considering would permit the construction of new dwellings with flats or rooms properly designed for subletting; nor would this be limited to redevelopment. Such accommodation, suitable for sharing, should enable more people with moderate incomes to afford new shelter. In effect, a family and a half would share in the cost of one house, and the demand for similar though much less satisfactory space in deteriorated structures would be eased. The housing design would be flexible, to make possible single occupancy when income rises or a family grows.



The possibility of public assistance in land assembly for private renewal, without any cost write-down, also deserves exploration. If there were assurance that completion of site assembly for a private renewal project would not be blocked by one or two "holdouts", more developers might be attracted to the field - and in most cases, the possibility of public intervention to break such a deadlock would probably be enough to forestall it. Safeguards would be essential however, and from this point of view the procedure of expropriation needs a basic change.

Expropriation Procedure

Under the present procedure, the expropriating authority makes an offer which the owner can either accept or reject; in the latter event, the matter goes to arbitration and in some cases then to court. In the ordinary market, the purchaser makes an offer, based on the usevalue or benefit which he expects to derive from his purchase, but which the seller is free to decline. This analogy breaks down however in a forced purchase, with the buyer in the position of having the power of government behind him, and against which the seller can only defend himself at possibly great cost and inconvenience; although believing he is getting less than fair value, he may prefer to accept nonetheless. An independent valuing authority should be established with the sole function of determining a fair value of the property in accordance with the applicable principles. The right of appeal would remain as at present. This system is used in Great Britain and France and, apart from being desirable on general grounds, would be indispensable in connection with the proposal under discussion, to avoid the impression of developers and the municipality acting in combination against property owners.

In addition, when the acquisition value does not enable displaced homeowners to find suitable houses elsewhere, a relocation bonus or other assistance should be given. In renewal areas, the fact of acquisition is prima facie evidence that the house is substandard and will have a lower value than one which ought to be considered acceptable, not only by the owners who must relocate, but by renewal authorities and the community aiming to eliminate slums. The same reasoning should apply if a municipality were to step in to assist private land assembly with a view to renewal: the project would have to be deemed in the public interest and, if the houses to be cleared were blighted or substandard, relocation should be effected on financial terms at least that would avoid recurrence of these conditions in the new areas to which the residents moved.

Nor should this relocation bonus be limited to expropriation in designated renewal areas. Consideration should be given to extending it to all cases of expropriation involving financial hardship to residents who must relocate to make way for any public project serving the city's growth, possibly by way of amendment to the Expropriation Act.



Appendix III (cont'd.)

To reduce the cost of construction is the third specific policy recommended, and while the particular concern here is with renewal, the long-term goal of providing alternatives to ease the demand for deteriorated properties argues for extension of this 'renewal' policy to new construction as well. Any measures tending to reduce construction costs would, under present conditions, do no more than counterbalance other factors pushing costs up; that is, they would slow the rise rather than reverse it, but would be nonetheless useful on that account.

Three methods of implementation are recommended. The first is an expanded program of building research, forming part of the general program suggested earlier. Another important component would be 'social' research into ways of furthering the acceptance and widespread application of the most efficient building methods, with the aim of shortening the time between development of technological innovations and their use.

The second method of implementation, closely related to the first, is a thorough review and revision of municipal building codes to:
(a) permit the use of the most efficient construction methods; (b) set more realistic standards for rehabilitation, in accord with the quality of the basic structure; and (c) establish uniformity among the code requirements of various municipalities (particularly within each metropolitan area) so that builders do not have to alter their methods each time they move from one municipality to another.

The third and most direct means of lowering construction costs would of course be to reduce or remove the federal and provincial sales taxes on building materials. Although this should perhaps be delayed until the capacity of the construction industry is not stretched as at present, eventual lifting of the tax is recommended. In the meantime, a small part of the receipts from the tax should finance the research program recommended. Special exemption of materials used in renewal projects might also be considered, to see in the first place if it would be administratively feasible.

To reduce the cost of money - i.e. the interest rate on loans - for redevelopment is the fourth proposal, of particular significance in a country with interest rates as high as Canada's. And again, because a solution to the housing problem is in the long run essential to solving the renewal problem, the policy should extend to loans for new, low-cost housing as well as renewal construction.

With the N.H.A. mortgage rate at 6-3/4%, a full 1% above the long-term government borrowing rate, a reduction without public subsidy would be possible, provided the federal (and provincial) governments were willing to increase direct lending, which they would have to do, given that a lower interest rate would dissuade rather than encourage lending by insurance and trust companies. Other potential sources of funds are the chartered banks, presently excluded from N.H.A. mortgage lending because the N.H.A. rate is over 6%, as well as pension funds, and the development in Canada of savings and building loan societies of the kind found in several other countries. A review of the N.H.A. mortgage insurance premium rate in the light of the actual risk experience might also be undertaken.



Extending N.H.A. lending to all existing housing — not limited to renewal areas — and the adoption of less exacting 'minimum property standards' for such loans, would help and might ease the pressure of over-crowding to some extent. More important, it should stimulate private rehabilitation and while this would no doubt be undertaken mainly by individual owners, a broader market for firms specializing in rehabilitation construction might be created. Corporate enterprise in the acquisition, rehabilitation and resale or rental of deteriorated housing might also develop if more favourable financing were available. Raising the ceiling on home improvement and extension loans, improving the loan to value ratios, and possibly lengthening the repayment period, would have similar effects.

However, lower interest rates and extended N.H.A. lending will probably have to await an easing of the country's present heavy capital program. Construction expenditures this year are estimated to rise to \$9,180 million, 12% above 1965, with housing taking a substantially smaller share than in 1963-64. Interest rates have also been rising and are a means of stemming the demand for capital funds and rationing them among competing uses according to which can show the highest return. The federal government has also taken steps to limit construction programs and induce business to defer capital expenditures. Under these circumstances, a decision by the government to lower the rate of interest for housing or urban renewal implies at the same time, if it is to be effective, a decision to obtain and supply the required funds. It would thus be in a direction contrary to the government's general policy and would at the same time add to the already immense demands on its resources and borrowing powers. Such a decision is unlikely at present, but may well become appropriate at a later time.

To reduce the cost of delays and uncertainties which the private redeveloper frequently encounters, improvements in municipal administration are called for. There is a growing need for better defined municipal policies with regard to private renewal and their incorporation into official plans. Whether combining the renewal and planning functions in one department is an effective way to achieve this is not yet clear. Certainly, much work on improving or preparing new official plans is indicated, and the role private enterprise is expected to play should be made as explicit as possible. Consultation with developers, possibly in the form of open hearings, would be useful in this regard. With municipalities deciding as far as possible in advance what kind of private activity will be anticipated and encouraged, the groundwork would be laid for faster processing of private renewal applications.

Even so, many applications are inevitably contentious and call for detailed public consideration (and public hearings) which is not possible before the application is received, and this will be all the more true insofar a system of "development control" begins to replace traditional, less flexible zoning standards. Administrative procedures to reduce the number of approvals and the time they take would be helpful.



Additions to Rents

Loans for limited dividend housing should be resumed. An increase to 8% in the dividend allowed would have little effect on costs and would be more realistic in terms of the return obtained on capital in other fields. Standards of construction and amenity could be less spare than in the past, and a federal contribution to operating and amortization costs could be made on the same formula now provided for public housing.

Similarly, a federal contribution is necessary if the Ontario Housing Corporations' rent certificate plan is to be revived. The rent offered per dwelling should be raised and, as an incentive for suitably located projects in or outside renewal areas, long-term leases should be taken on a number of units, in particular for large family units which might not otherwise be included in the project.

The percentage of rental revenue guaranteed under Section 14 of the N.H.A. should be significantly raised and, if the initial rents are adequate in terms of the capital and operating costs, the period during which rents must not be raised could be lengthened to five years, with an option for extension by agreement with C.M.H.C. if operating costs are found to have gone up.

Most of what has been said above relates to residential renewal. Insofar as non-residential renewal faces special problems and requires greater incentives, these can be selectively dealt with in renewal areas.

B - Legislative Renewal

Legislative and Procedural Recommendations

- (1) There is no fundamental difference between the work involved in preparing an official plan, the studies relating to the condition of urban areas under Section 33(1)(h) of the N.H.A. and the economic, social and engineering research necessary to the preparation of an urban renewal scheme. Apart from the fact that all are inter-dependent, a thoroughly researched and well prepared official plan would provide a valuable framework and guide to private renewal generally. A uniform sharing of the costs of these three aspects of the planning process by the federal, provincial and municipal governments is recommended.
- (2) An "urban renewal area" and a "redevelopment area" mean essentially the same thing, and this also applies to "urban renewal scheme" and "redevelopment plan". The Planning Act should be amended to reflect this similarity and as a preliminary to a more important change.

At present, the redevelopment plan (renewal scheme) for an area is worked out and informally approved by the Minister of Municipal Affairs before the area is designated. The Planning Act should be amended to combine the designation with a formal approval by the Minister of the redevelopment plan. This approval should be given simultaneously with final acceptance by C.M.H.C. and agreement between the province and the Corporation.



Approval by the O.M.B. of the redevelopment plan would be eliminated, although not of course its debenturing requirements. If moreover the plan involved amendments to existing by-laws to which objection was taken, appeal to the O.M.B. would remain open, as it now is under Section 30 of the Planning Act.

- (3) Municipal debentures required for renewal schemes should be guaranteed federally and/or provincially, not as in some cases at present the other way around (cf. Sections 23C and 36B of the N.H.A.). Loans which must be secured by debentures issued by the province or municipality (the latter subject to 0.M.B. approval) are in inverse ratio to the financial capacity of the three levels of government and to the interest rate at which they can borrow.
- (4) 0.M.B. approval of municipal debentures should remain, affording the Board a proper if more limited opportunity of passing on a redevelopment plan. But the criterion by which municipal borrowing is now limited should be re-examined, and made more flexible according to the revenue likely to result from the expenditures incurred.
- (5) Economic feasibility studies should form an important part of the preparation of renewal schemes when a private component is expected. The studies will give a general idea of the type and extent of the re-uses envisaged. The study reports will make developers aware of the prospects opening up and enable them to give some preliminary thought to becoming involved; the reports will then form a basis on which initial discussions with developers can take place, it being clearly understood that these are exploratory only. Consultation with organizations representing developers the U.D.I. and Chambers of Commerce for example would be useful in preparing the studies, which are particularly necessary when land in renewal areas is to be acquired with a view to private redevelopment.
- (6) The "call procedure" in connection with disposing of publicly-acquired land should be essentially for the purpose of determining the qualifications and interest of bidders; the minimum of hard-and-fast specifications of the development contemplated should be contained in the call documents. The documents should however state the criteria to be used in selecting a developer, and reasons for the selection made should later be stated publicly.

Once the developer has been chosen, real discussion and detailed elaboration of the project will take place, as opposed to the present practice of "bargaining at arm's length". The final terms on which the land is to be leased (or sold) will be determined at this stage.

(7) Section 23B of the N.H.A. provides for contributions towards the cost of staff to assist owners of property affected by an urban renewal scheme to adjust to its implementation and to assist in the relocation of people dispossessed of their housing, but no contribution to the actual cost of residential and non-residential relocation is envisaged. This is a serious weakness. Expenses of relocation arising out of the implementation of renewal schemes ought to be borne in part at least by the governments concerned and shared by them in the same way as other costs of the scheme.



(8) Following the reports of the Federal Royal Commission on Taxation and the Ontario Committee on Taxation, the 50%-25%-25% sharing of the costs of renewal should be reviewed in light of the reports' recommendations and their implementation.

Incentives

Land acquisition and write-down is the principal incentive at present available in renewal areas. It can be applied both when clearance is planned and where existing buildings are to be rehabilitated. Other incentives to be considered are:

- (1) The interest on improvement and extension loans for buildings in renewal areas made under Section 23D of the N.H.A. should be lowered to conform with the rate on public and limited dividend housing on other renewal loans under Section 23C.
- (2) New and rehabilitated buildings in renewal areas should be exempted from taxation for a period of three to five years. The cost of this exemption should be shared by the three levels of government in the same ratio as the cost of land acquisition and write-down 25% municipal, 25% provincial and 50% federal, or whatever new formula may be agreed on following the recommended review.
- (3) Federal contributions to the operating losses of limited dividend projects have been suggested earlier. In renewal areas, rent subsidies should be applicable to all projects which are appropriate for moderate and low-income tenants. The renewal scheme will in any case largely determine the character of the project, the appropriate scale of rents and the income groups to which the project will appeal. Rent subsidies will however broaden the range of incomes of the prospective residents of a scheme, as well as facilitate relocation.

A more general point affecting private enterprise participation in renewal schemes is that these should not be too heavily weighted with public or what look like institutional housing projects. Publicly-assisted housing, it is now generally agreed, should if possible be widely dispersed, and this is also true of tenants receiving rent subsidies. Complementing the larger renewal schemes, in which many uses may be combined, a way of expediting low-cost housing would be to treat a number of separate, small "spot" schemes as one from the point of view of renewal procedure, approvals, agreements, etc. Private enterprise will then be more readily attracted to the larger renewal areas, involving non-residential as well as residential re-uses.

Lastly, if incentives are to be made more generous, should different policies govern incentives to residential and non-residential renewal? A principal theme of the history of renewal legislation has been its broadening from an initial concentration on slum clearance and public housing.



Appendix III (cont'd.)

The 1964 N.H.A. amendments and the accompanying changes in provincial legislation and policy were a milestone in this sense. The result is that, as regards the costs of land acquisition and write-down, all reuses are now treated in the same way; the re-use value is determined independently of the cost of acquisition. Thus, although there are of course different zoning requirements and different services related to each use, and the N.H.A.'s residential mortgage loan provisions do not apply to commercial and industrial re-uses, the basis for a valid distinction in the application of further incentives seems lacking.

It is true that public money to assist residential renewal is relatively easy to justify in terms of need and the manifest benefits of improved housing - by clearance when necessary, by rehabilitation otherwise. In non-residential renewal, there is first of all the difference between commercial and industrial renewal on the one hand and renewal of public buildings, facilities and amenities on the other. In terms of private enterprise and the role of the market, this is a much more important difference than that between housing and other uses. Nevertheless, from the point of view of renewal, a rigid separation of non-residential uses into those whose value is thought to be measurable mainly in terms of the usual economic criteria, and others which are not expected to produce revenue, is untenable. Public buildings frequently have an important economic function, at the same time as buildings built for profit make (or can make) a visual and architectrual contribution to the city equal to that of public buildings, and they will often form an integral part of renewal schemes which include both. If, in their economic aspect, it appears that they will fall somewhat short of paying their own way, they should not on that account be excluded from assistance in favour of public buildings which do not pay any of their way at all. The notion that market values are the expression of natural laws, not to be tampered with by human intervention, is fortunately not as common as it used to be; but a more recent version of the same idea, that market values are the only safe guide to the general welfare and what people really want, is no less a handicap to fruitful policies in a mixed economy. In urban development and redevelopment, the terms and conditions of the market are peculiarly determined by public policy and decision, and are properly subject to change whenever a given object is desired and seems likely to be achieved as a result. Hence, the relevant tests in every case, residential and non-residential, are: Is the object a good one and is it worth the cost, and will the measures proposed be effective?

Residential and non-residential renewal alike are recognized as necessary and in the public interest. Both are among the legislation's declared objectives and, since the resources of government are not unlimited, the fullest participation of private enterprise in both is desirable in achieving these objectives. A variety and scale of incentives should accordingly be furnished as required so that this participation may be forthcoming and to make it successful.



Appendix IV



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TORONTO, SATURDAY, AFRIL 1, 1967

Urban renewal

URBAN RENEWAL in the city is mired in a swamp of controversy, confusion and delay, according to Toronto Controller Margaret Campbell.

She should know since she has accepted responsibility for the implementation of the program.

Her candor is to be commended. Her admission allows for rethinking of this complex problem and for a new approach to it.

Controller Campbell attributes the obstacles which have frustrated smooth progress in urban, renewal to her own mistakes in trying to move too quickly and to the querulous criticism of aldermen who, she says, have undermined public confidence in the city's efforts.

But that is not all. The stocktaking she has called for will reveal other reasons.

Too impersonal

Some of them were mentioned by a panel of professionals at a recent meeting of the Toronto Area Council of the New Democratic Party.

Eli Comay, former Metro Commissioner of Planning, said that urban renewal "doesn't really do anything to secure housing for that segment of the community which requires low income housing."

Another town planner, Hans Blumenfeld, stated: "First they call it slum clearance, then urban redevelopment, then urban renewal, but if you look it's always the same old bulldozer."

Social worker Anthony Barclay said: "The politicians pick on a small area of the city; they decide to destroy it quite ruthlessly, and they do it in the name of the greater good of the community."

• The implication of these comments is that the practice of urhan renewal has lost human touch,

that it is more concerned with bricks and concrete than with people.

This attitude, no doubt unconscious, has in fact caused distress and uncertainty among residents of the Trefann Court area and other areas scheduled for redevelopment. They feel that they are being deprived of their homes with no prospect of other accommodation they can afford.

Disturbing questions

They suspect that they are pawns in a dehumanized game of blockbusting, that they are being pushed around to make way for buildozers for the glorification of the city and for the convenience of others.

The stocktaking Controller Campbell wants should appraise the basis of this criticism and determine to what extent it is justified.

Are people who are being dispossessed of their homes sufficiently consulted and informed? Do they know the purpose of the renewal program? Is alternative accommodation that they can afford available to them? Are they assured of effective plans to relocate them and will they be helped? What will relocation cost them? Will they be out of pocket as a result, and if so what help can they expect? When will they have to move?

Such questions are immensely important to people whose lives are being dislocated by a renewal program. They are disturbingly personal questions affecting their families, their employment, their future.

The uncertainty prevailing in areas designated for redevelopment indicates that the people in them are afraid of the future, and their fear generates the criticism and frustration of the city's renewal, program.



Appendix V



THE TORONTO DAILY STAR - EDITORIAL PAGE November 27, 1966

A fairer deal on expropriation

Families fear having their homes expropriated by public authority. That's due not just to sentimental attachment to the old place. It's a serious expense to them, sometimes an impossible one.

The family has to move, and that eosts money. If the dispossessed resident is the homeowner, he has legal eharges to meet in aequiring a new home. And there is the dire probability in Metro these days that he will have to pay thousands more for a replacement house than he was allowed for the old one. The family may not be able to raise the extra money.

The urban renewal seheme recommended for Metro this week—involving the public aequisition of 7,400 dwellings in the next 15 years—realistically recognizes this financial stress and proposes humane relief.

The planning report says that when properties are taken over to be demolished, the relocation and moving expenses of displaced families (and business firms) should be paid by the authority.

also recommends that displaced

homeowners be offered low-eost loans to help purehase another home.

These provisions would take much of the sting out of the seizure of private property for public purposes.

They would also tend to reduce a eouncil's reluctance to help private developers assemble properties (by using its expropriation powers) even though the development would be of public benefit.

Since the Metro renewal study was authorized in part by Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (the federal agency through which half the seheme's eosts would be met), the proposals to give displaced homeowners a fair shake aren't a pipedream.

Metro and provincial authorities should approve these recommendations when dealing with the report.

They could become the pattern for all transactions in which the tool of public expropriation is the lever—from the take-over of houses for highways and the TTC, to expropriation for schools and universities.

NOV. 27 STAR. IEDITURIAL



Appendix VI



Panel questions urban renewal

Urban renewal does not a social worker agreed last solve the housing problem, two planners, a developer and

housing.

The four were members of a newal, sponsored by the To-ronto Area Council of the New panel discussion on urban re-Democratic Party.

largely a process of tearing else," sald Eli Comay, former Metro Commissioner of Plan-"Urban renewal is still placing It with something down one structure and rening and now a private con-

thing to secure housing for that segment of the communi-"It doesn't really do any-

"Twelve hundred people

munity."

have to leave their homes so that 900 people can live better. "When a black line on a

destroyed but the slum across ficult for people to undermap means your house will be the street will be left, It's dif-"These people see the whole stand," Mr. Barclay said. ty which requires low Income those people living In the area being renewed, but It is "Urban renewal is not really renewal for the benefit of

Inder any name "it's always the same old bulldozer"

Urban transportation and planning authority Hans Bluever how people commented: business as a jungle." strange menfeld

people from outside the area,"

Mr. Comay said.

usually for the benefit of other

"I've seen this in Don Mount," social worker Antho-

cians pick on a small area of

ny Barclay said. "The politi-

they decide to

the city;

destroy it quite ruthlessly. And they do it in the name of the greater good of the com-

thought that slum clearance helps the people there.

street with torn pants and you the torn ones. You don't tear want to help, you either buy "If you see a fellow on the him a new pair or patch up

housing crisis could be solved Mr. Blumenfeld said the by building new housing or them down."

renovating existing housing. "But the people displaced by urban renewal are simply poing to other slum areas just

Mr. Blumenfeld said. "But If opment, then urban renewal," "First they called it slum clearance, then urban redevelyou look, it's always the same old bulldozer. as bad."



Appendix VII



D. ALEXANDER



REAL ESTATE DEPARTMENT

CITY HALL

TORONTO 1. ONTARIO

March 21, 1967

ADDRESS ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO THE COMMISSIONER

Mr. Alexander

367-7201

Chairman,
Alexandra Park and Don Mount
Village Co-ordinating Committees,
West Tower, 17th Floor,
City Hall:

Dear Mr. Manthorpe:

Re: Sales of Residential Property
Under \$12,000.00 - Metropolitan
Area

With the concurrence of your Co-ordinating Committees, this Department has been conducting a survey of the sales of residential property in the entire Metropolitan area, during the year 1966, in the price range of \$8,000.00 and under, and from \$8,001.00 to \$12,000.00.

Our source of information has been the sales cards received from Teela Sales. This Department has the Teela Sales for the City of Toronto and use has been made of the facilities of the Metropolitan Property Department for the suburbs. Care has been taken to eliminate the acquisition of properties for municipal purposes, sales of vacant land, duplexes, etc. In many cases, the sales



have been advertised through the Multiple Listing Service of the Toronto Real Estate Board, in which event pictures are available together with details of the contents of the buildings, etc. Where the M.L.S. is not available it has been considered advisable, for a proper study, to have photographs taken of the properties in question, which work has now been completed. The photographs are pasted on a sheet of paper with details of the sales typed at the top together with the address. This information is kept, at the moment, in loose-leaf binders.

A perusal of the photographs and the M.L.S. data has made it advisable to eliminate properties that are obviously "suspect" in some manner or other. After so doing, there are in the price range up to \$8,000.00 a total of 366 sales with an average price of \$7,018.00. In the range from \$8,001.00 to \$12,000.00 there are 1,643 sales with an average price of \$10,460.00. However, it is also quite likely that many of the remaining sales recorded were not arms-length transactions and the only manner in which these could be eliminated would be for direct contact to be made by the Department with the purchasers involved. It is undoubtedly true also that some of the properties have been improved since the purchase and that the actual photographs will show the properties in their improved condition and not the condition at the time of purchase. All this information could be acquired by direct contact. It



is also true that many of the properties recorded have had substantial improvements made to them and subsequent sales at prices in excess of \$12,000.00. This has been investigated and it has been found that 502 properties included in the survey were resold at prices in excess of \$12,000.00.

Of this total 446 were originally sold in the \$8,001.00 to \$12,000.00 range and resold at an average price of \$14,985.00; and 56 were in the \$8,000.00 and under range and resold at an average price of \$15,358.00.

In all, 744 M.L.S. listings are included in the survey of which 432 were sold as a result of the listing and 312 were sold prior to the listing and the listings were at higher prices.

Notwithstanding the above comments, from the amount of information acquired to date and a study of the photographs and the details available, it is not unreasonable to come to the conclusion that it can be proven without doubt that many hundreds of houses were available during 1966 in the price range up to \$12,000.00.

The survey has now been completed to the extent agreed upon and the cost will be slightly less than that estimated. It should be pointed out, however, that the time of two members of my staff engaged in this work is



March 21, 1967

normally charged to the Alexandra Park and Don Mount Village Projects and this charge has been continued.

Respectfully submitted,

DA:bk

Commissioner of Real Estate.

Sililizander



Appendix VIII



PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY THE CITY OF TORONTO THROUGH EXPROPRIATION IN THE ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

	Expropriated		Expropriated
Address	Price	Address	Price
529 Dundas St.W.	\$ 23,000.	150 Grange Ave.	\$ 13,000.
533-541 Dundas St.W.)		152 Grange Ave.	13,500.
24-28-30 Willison Sq.)	71,000.	154 Grange Ave.	13,500.
545 Dundas St.W.	145,000.	156 Grange Ave.	14,800.
547 Dundas St.W.	17,100.	158 Grange Ave.	14,500.
549 Dundas St.W.	15,965.	160 Grange Ave.	14,500.
553 Dundas St.W.	15,000.	162 Grange Ave.	18,000.
561 Dundas St.W.	15,750.	93,95,97 Denison Ave.	32,500
565 Dundas St.W.	17,000.	101 Denison Ave.	9,500.
567 Dundas St.W.	16,000.	103 Denison Ave.	9,500.
569 Dundas St.W.	22,500.	105 Denison Ave.	14,900.
571 Dundas St.W.	21,500.	107 Denison Ave.	15,000.
575 Dundas St.W.	28,250.	109 Denison Ave.	14,500.
577 Dundas St.W.	15,000.	111 Denison Ave.	14,500.
581 Dundas St.W.	17,000.	113 Denison Ave.	13,900.
583 Dundas St.W.	20,000.	115 Denison Ave.	13,700.
587 Dundas St.W.	21,700.	117 Denison Ave.	16,000.
589 Dundas St.W.	30,500.	119 Denison Ave.	13,900.
591 Dundas St.W.	22,000.	121 Denison Ave.	17,000.
605-706 Dundas St.W.	23,000.	123 Denison Ave.	16,000.
611-619 Dundas St.W.	99,500.	125 Denison Ave.	19,000.
625 Dundas St.W.	17,000.	113 Augusta Ave.	9,000.
98 Grange Ave.	16,750.	115 Augusta Ave.	8,800.
100 Grange Ave.	15,000.	117 Augusta Ave.	7,500.
9	15,000.	119 Augusta Ave.	8,000.
102 Grange Ave.	15,500.		9,000.
104 Grange Ave.	•	121 Augusta Ave.	
106 Grange Ave.	47,000.	123-125 Augusta Ave.	13,000.
108 Grange Ave.	14,100.	127 Augusta Ave.	14,200.
110 Grange Ave.	26,000.	129 Augusta Ave.	10,500.
112 Grange Ave.	12,500.	131 Augusta Ave.	9,500.
114 Grange Ave.	13,500.	133 Augusta Ave.	10,200.
116 Grange Ave.	11,500.	135 Augusta Ave.	8,000.
118 Grange Ave.	15,700.	110-112 Augusta Ave.	13,500.
120 Grange Ave.	32,000.	114 Augusta Ave.	12,500.
122 Grange Ave.	19,000.	116 Augusta Ave.	11,500.
124 Grange Ave.	14,500.	118 Augusta Ave.	15,000.
126 Grange Ave.	14,000.	120 Augusta Ave.	11,000.
128 Grange Ave.	16,000.	122 Augusta Ave.	10,500.
130 Grange Ave.	14,120.	124 Augusta Ave.	10,000.
132 Grange Ave.	14,000.	126 Augusta Ave.	11,500.
134 Grange Ave.	14,500.	128 Augusta Ave.	11,700.
136 Grange Ave.	13,500.	130 Augusta Ave.	10,500.
138 Grange Ave.	14,000.	1 Napanee St.	3,000.
140 Grange Ave.	12,000.	3 Napanee St.	4,000.
142 Grange Ave.	14,250.	5,7,9,11 Napanee St.	26,000.
146 Grange Ave.	13,400.	2,4,6,8,10,12 Napanee S	
148 Grange Ave.	14,500.	22 Willison Sq.	11,500.



APPENDIX VIII (cont'd.)

ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

22 11:11: C-	¢ 0 200	20 6	¢ 0 200
32 Willison Sq. 34 Willison Sq.	\$ 9,300.	30 Cameron St.	\$ 8,300.
	8,800.	32 Cameron St.	13,000.
36 Willison Sq.	7,085.	34 Cameron St.	10,500.
44 Willison Sq.	7,000.	36 Cameron St.	12,300.
44½ Willison Sq.	6,750.	38 Cameron St.	11,700.
46 Willison Sq.	6,500.	40 Cameron St.	11,700.
48 Willison Sq.	6,900.	42 Cameron St.	14,000.
50 Willison Sq.	7,000.	44 Cameron St.	12,500.
52-54 Willison Sq.	10,000.	46 Cameron St.	15,500.
53 Cameron St.	9,500.	48 Cameron St.	13,100.
55 Cameron St.	6,900.	50 Cameron St.	12,100.
57 Cameron St.	6,100.	52 Cameron St.	12,800.
59 Cameron St.	7,000.	54 Cameron St.	12,000.
61 Cameron St.	4,000.	58 Cameron St.	13,500.
63 Cameron St.	3,766.	60 Cameron St.	14,500.
65-67 Cameron St.	7,350.	62 Cameron St.	14,250.
69 Cameron St.	11,000.	70 Cameron St.	10,000.
33 Augusta Ave.	14,500.	2 Cameron Place	25,000.
37-39 Augusta Ave.	21,300.	1 Cameron Place	10,500.
43 Augusta Ave.	16,500.	3 Cameron Place	8,000.
45 Augusta Ave.	13,000.	7 Cameron Place	15,200.
47 Augusta Ave.	13,750.	9 Cameron Place	15,200.
49 Augusta Ave.	10,500.	11 Cameron Place	13,200.
E.Pt.Lt.6,s/e Pt.Lt.7		13 Cameron Place	14,000.
Augusta Ave.	13,500.	15 Cameron Place	12,800.
53-53½ Augusta Ave.	19,500.	79 Grange Ave.	16,800.
55 Augusta Ave.	14,000.	81 Grange Ave.	13,500.
55½,57½,59½ Augusta Ave.	18,350.	83 Grange Ave.	12,000.
59 Augusta Ave.	6,000.	85 Grange Ave.	19,100.
61,61½,63,63½ Augusta Ave.	41,500.	87 Grange Ave.	14,000.
65, 65½ Augusta Ave.	19,500.	89 Grange Ave.	14,200.
67, 67½ Augusta Ave.	18,400.	91 Grange Ave.	32,833.
69 Augusta Ave.	9,500.	93 Grange Ave.	17,500.
71 Augusta Ave.	9,100.	93½ Grange Ave.	18,300.
73 Augusta Ave.	9,500.	95 Grange Ave.	11,500.
93 Augusta Ave.	11,000.	97-99 Grange Ave.	30,500.
95 Augusta Ave.	12,000.	101 Grange Ave.	13,200.
97 Augusta Ave.	11,150.	103 Grange Ave.	14,500.
99 Augusta Ave.	11,000.	105 Grange Ave.	13,000.
101 Augusta Ave.	32,500.	107 Grange Ave.	12,500.
14,16,18 Cameron St.	37,500.	109 Grange Ave.	10,500.
20 Cameron St.	10,300.	111 Grange Ave.	11,150.
2012 Cameron St.	11,500.	113 Grange Ave.	10,500.
22 Cameron St.	13,000.	115 Grange Ave.	11,000.
26 Cameron St.	14,000.	117 Grange Ave.	12,500.
28, 56 Cameron St.	23,500.	119 Grange Ave.	9,300.



APPENDIX VIII (cont'd.)

ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

101 0	A 0 500		â 0 750
121 Grange Ave.	\$ 9,500.	66 Vanauley St.	\$ 8,750.
123 Grange Ave.	10,200.	68 Vanauley St.	7,500.
125-129 Grange Ave.	16,000.	70 Vanauley St.	7,600.
131 Grange Ave.	8,250.	72 Vanauley St.	8,500.
133 Grange Ave.	8,700.	74 Vanauley St.	7,800.
137-141 Grange Ave.	62,385.	76 Vanauley St.	7,600.
21 Vanauley St.	9,700.	78 Vanauley St.	11,000.
23,25,27 Vanauley St.	26,500.	80 Vanauley St.	11,800.
29 Vanauley St.	11,000.	82 Vanauley St.	16,500.
31 Vanauley St.	14,000.	84 Vanauley St.	9,000.
33 Vanauley St.	11,000.	86 Vanauley St.	12,700.
35 Vanauley St.	17,000.	86½ Vanauley St.	7,500.
37 Vanauley St.	14,500.	88 Vanauley St.	23,500.
39 Vanauley St.	16,500.	90 Vanauley St.	10,500.
41 Vanauley St.	11,500.	92,96,96½ Vanauley St.	26,000.
47 Vanauley St.	8,200.	98 Vanauley St.	10,500.
49 Vanauley St.	9,000.	100 Vanauley St.	10,700.
53 Vanauley St.	10,000.	14 Augusta Ave.	10,900.
53 Vanauley St.	15,800.	16 Augusta Ave.	10,600.
59 Vanauley St.	12,500.	18 Augusta Ave.	11,000.
73 Vanauley St.	9,000.	18½ Augusta Ave.	12,300.
77 Vanauley St.	8,000.	84 Augusta Ave.	12,300.
79 Vanauley St.	18,000.	86 Augusta Ave.	12,200.
81 Vanauley St.	19,850.	88 Augusta Ave.	12,300.
83 Vanauley St.	9,000.	90 Augusta Ave.	13,500.
85 Vanauley St.	9,400.	98 Augusta Ave.	12,000.
87 Vanauley St.	9,600.	225 Bathurst St.	12,750.
89 Vanauley St.	9,700.	227 Bathurst St.	11,500.
91 Vanauley St.	9,900.	1 Cameron St.	13,500.
93 Vanauley St.	8,250.	11 Cameron St.	13,200.
95 Vanauley St.	9,450.	17 Cameron St.	12,300.
97 Vanauley St.	7,000.	37 Cameron St.	15,000.
99 Vanauley St.	7,300.	39 Cameron St.	14,750.
32, 34 Vanauley St.	18,000.	41 Cameron St.	15,000.
36 Vanauley St.	18,000.	8 Cameron St.	11,500.
38 Vanauley St.	14,000.	48 Carr St.	15,000.
40, 42 Vanauley St.	35,000.	9 Denison Ave.	19,500.
44 Vanauley St.	·	43 Denison Ave.	15,500.
	9,300.		· ·
46 Vanauley St.	8,750.	63,65,67 Denison Ave.	28,500. 15,000.
50 Vanauley St.	8,250.	79 Denison Ave.	
52 Vanauley St.	6,600.	80 Denison Ave.	16,000.
54 Vanauley St.	26,500.	5 Eden Place	16,700.
58 Vanauley St.	27,000.	13 Eden Place	13,350.
60 Vanauley St.	14,200.	19 Eden Place	14,000.
62 Vanauley St.	14,500.	21 Eden Place	12,500.
64 Vanauley St.	9,300	25 Eden Place	12,750.



APPENDIX VIII (cont'd.)

ALEXANDRA PARK REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

27 Eden Place	\$ 12,300.
26 Eden Place	12,000.
15 Eden Place	13,500.
17 Eden Place	13,500.
23 Eden Place	10,700.
8 Eden Place	11,000.
12 Eden Place	12,500.
26 Eden Place	16,000.
14 Eden Place	14,500.
16 Eden Place	12,500.
18 Eden Place	12,500.
20 Eden Place	14,000.
22 Eden Place	12,500.
30 Eden Place	12,000.
75 Grange Ave.	19,000.
_	
77 Grange Ave.	19,600
145 Grange Ave.	14,750.
147 Grange Ave.	13,500.
149 Grange Ave.	14,000.
151 Grange Ave.	13,700.
183 Grange Ave.	12,200.
185/189 Grange Ave.)	7/ 050
Rear of 185 Grange Ave.)	74,250.
101 Ryerson Ave.)	
406 Queen St. W.	33,650.
454 Queen St. W.	32,000.
39 Ryerson Ave.	17,000.
75 Ryerson Ave.	12,650.
91 Ryerson Ave.	14,000.
95 Ryerson Ave.	13,000.
99 Ryerson Ave.	15,100.
36 Ryerson Ave.)	
38 Ryerson Ave.)	18,100.
77 Ryerson Ave.	8,000.
85 Ryerson Ave.	14,000.
93 Ryerson Ave.	14,500.
Rear 93-95 Ryerson Ave.	14,500.
7 Wolseley St.	15,500.
9 Wolseley St.	9,000.
43 Wolseley St.	12,000.
55 Wolseley St.	10,500.
77 Wolseley St.	9,500.
93 Wolseley St.	13,000.
32 Wolseley St.	11,000.
	,



Appendix IX



PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY THE CITY OF TORONTO THROUGH EXPROPRIATION IN THE DON MOUNT VILLAGE REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

DON HOUN	Expropriated	LEOT MENT AREA TROJECT	Expropriated
Address	Price	Address	Price
114 Broadview Ave.	\$ 17,000.	37 Matilda St.	\$ 7,500.
116 Broadview Ave.	12,250.	39 Matilda St.	8,800.
118 Broadview Ave.	11,700.	6 Munro St.	9,300.
120 Broadview Ave.	11,700.	8 Munro St.	9.700.
122 Broadview Ave.	12,300.	10 Munro St.	14,000.
124 Broadview Ave.	16,000.	12 Munro St.	11,200.
126 Broadview Ave.	12,200.	14 Munro St.	11,700.
10 Carroll St.	9,000.	16 Munro St.	13,500.
12 Carroll St.	8,200.	18 Munro St.	11,750.
14 Carroll St.	9,250.	36 Munro St.	7,800.
16 Carroll St.	9,200.	38 Munro St.	8,400.
18 Carroll St.	6,500.	19 Munro St.)	0,400.
	6,700.	42 Munro St.)	
	· ·	44 Munro St.)	36,750.
35 Davies Ave.	11,800.	46 Munro St.)	50,750.
37 Daview Ave.	12,600.	48 Munro St.)	
39 Daview Ave.	12,300.	9 Munro St.	11,500.
41 Daview Ave.	13,200.	11 Munro St.	7,500.
10 Hamilton St.	8,090.	13 Munro St.	9,100.
12 Hamilton St.	8,700.	15 Munro St.	8,500.
14 Hamilton St.	9,250.	17 Munro St.	9,800.
16 Hamilton St.	10,000.	21 Munro St.	8,800.
18 Hamilton St.	7,800.	25 Munro St.	9,800.
20 Hamilton St.	8,300.	27 Munro St.	9,500.
28 Hamilton St.	15,500.	29 Munro St.	9,500.
30 Hamilton St.	8,500.	31 Munro St.	6,300.
34 Hamilton St.	9,000.		6,200.
36 Hamilton St.	10,500.	33 Munro St. 37 Munro St.	8,500.
38 Hamilton St.	10,700.	39 Munro St.	8,500.
40 Hamilton St.	10,400.	41 Munro St.	
42 Hamilton St.	10,500.		10,000.
11-13 Hamilton St.	55 /00	43 Munro St.	9,000. 8,900.
Rear 114 Broadview Ave.	55.400.	45 Munro St.	
21 Hamilton St.	13,000.	47 Munro St.	6,100. 5,500.
5 Matilda St.	9,700.	49 Munro St.	8,200.
7 Matilda St.	9,000.	51 Munro St.	
9 Matilda St.	8,800.	53 Munro St.	8,085.
ll Matilda St.	7,500.	55 Munro St.	5,750. 6,500.
15 Matilda St.	11,500.	57 Munro St.	
17 Matilda St.	10.750	11 Thompson Ave.	7,700.
19 Matilda St.	18,750.	15 Thompson Ave.	5,000.
21 Matilda St.	8,800.	31 Thompson St.	10,800.
23 Matilda St.	10,750.	33 Thompson St.	9,800.
25 Matilda St.	7,750.	35 Thompson St.	12,100.
27 Matilda St.	7,000.	10 Thompson St.	8,200.
29 Matilda St.	6,800.	14 Thompson St.	7,900.
31 Matilda St.	6,000.	16 Thompson St.	8,250.
33 Matilda St.	8,800.	18 Thompson St.	9,000. 7,900.
35 Matilda St.	8,900.	20 Thompson St.	7,500.



APPENDIX IX (cont'd.)

DON MOUNT VILLAGE REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

22 Thompson St.)		44 Matilda St.	\$ 8,000.
26 Thompson St.)	\$ 17,300.	46 Matilda St.	8,000.
24 Thompson St.	9,800.	62 Munro St.	8,500.
28 Thompson St.	9,800.	66 Munro St.	16,200.
32 Thompson St.	9,800.	68 Munro St.	9,550.
2 Napier St.	8,100.	70 Munro St.	8,500.
4 Napier St.	4,500.	72 Munro St.	11,700.
6 Napier St.	7,200.	74 Munro St.	8,600.
8 Napier St.	5,000.	76 Munro St.	7,800.
12 Napier St.	9,000.	78 Munro St.	8,250.
14 Napier St.	8,100.	82-84 Munro St.	30,500.
16 Napier St.	7,900.	86 Munro St.	8,500.
18 Napier St.	7,500.	112 Munro St.	8,500.
20 Napier St.	7,800.	Rear 114 Munro St.	15,750.
22 Napier St.	7,500.	116 Munro St.)	,,,
24 Napier St.	7,512.	Rear 116 Munro St.)	14,750.
26 Napier St.	7,478.	120 Munro St.	13,500.
28 Napier St.	7,200.	122 Munro St.	12,000.
30 Napier St.	7,400.	124 Munro St.	12,500.
32 Napier St.	8,608.	126 Munro St.	14,000.
34 Napier St.	8,700.	59 Munro St.	11,000.
38 Napier St.	8,200.	59A Munro St.	10,500.
l Napier St.	8,500.	61 Munro St.	7,000.
3 Napier St.	8,500.	63 Munro St.	7,000.
7 Napier St.	7,000.	67-69 Munro St.	19,500.
ll Napier St.	8,500.	73 Munro St.	7,800.
13 Napier St.	7,800.	75 Munro St.	11,500.
15 Napier St.	8,000.	77 Munro St.	11,200.
17 Napier St.	8,800.	79 Munro St.	5,500.
19 Napier St.	8,052.	81 Munro St.	7,750.
21 Napier St.	7,325.	83 Munro St.	7,200.
23 Napier St.	8,000.	85 Munro St.	7,200.
25 Napier St.	8,000.	87 Munro St.	11,500.
27 Napier St.	7,750.	89 Munro St.	5,000.
29 Napier St.	8,100.	91 Munro St.	7,500.
31 Napier St.	9,500.	93 Munro St.	8,600.
33 Napier St.	8,000.	93A Munro St.	8,740.
35 Napier St.	9,200.	95 Munro St.	9,000.
37 Napier St.	9,800.	97 Munro St.	9,200.
39 Napier St.	6,500.	101 Munro St.	8,000.
228 Broadview Ave.	13,500.	101½ Munro St.	5,000.
232 Broadview Ave.	12,150.	103 Munro St.	9,700.
230 Broadview Ave.	13,500.	105 Munro St.	9,700.
851 Dundas St. E.	6,600.	105½ Munro St.	11,850.
28 Matilda St.	12,800.	107 Munro St.	10,900.
34 Matilda St.	12,000.	109 Munro St.	9,800.
36 Matilda St.	13,400.	109½ Munro St.	7,500.
38 Matilda St.	7,500.	111 Munro St.	12,000.
42 Matilda St.	6,800.	115 Munro St.	10,500.



APPENDIX IX (cont'd.)

DON MOUNT VILLAGE REDEVELOPMENT AREA PROJECT

117 Munro St. 11 Steiner St. 13 Steiner St.)	\$ 10,100. 10,500.
21 Steiner St.)	17,500.
15 Steiner St.	11,000.
19 Steiner St.	15,100.
23 Steiner St.	8,000.
25 Steiner St.	9,700.
25½ Steiner St.	6,000.
27 Steiner St.	8,100.
29 Steiner St.	10,500.
33 Steiner St.	4,000.
35 Steiner St.	5,500.
28 Steiner St.	8,000.
23 Munro St.)	
36 & 5 & 9 Napier St.)	30,600.



Appendix X



CITY OF TORONTO - CITY CLERK'S DEPARTMENT - COUNCIL MAETING

APRIL 12, 1967

39

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE -- RENT SUPPLEMENT PROGRAM.

The Board submits the reports from the Executive Director of The Housing Authority of Toronto, viz.:

(February 23, 1967)

"Subject: Proposal that Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation and the Metropolitan Corporation provide financial assistance in connection with the cost of the Rent Supplement Program now being administered by The Housing Authority of Toronto.

"Origin: Board of Control on February 16th, 1967, (when approving seven properties to be included in the Rent Supplement Program) requested the Executive Director of the Housing Authority to submit a report re the sharing of costs.

"Report: The Rent Supplement Program was approved by City Council on October 12th, 1966. The program was set up on a demonstration basis whereby an amount of \$20,000.00 would be set aside for one year for the leasing of 25 housing units to be used in the housing of families requiring emergency housing.

"Attached herewith is a report to date setting out in detail the average rental paid to landlords, the rent received from the tenants, and average rent supplement. The program is being carried out within the terms of reference which was a suggested \$50.00 average supplement and is accommodating families most disadvantaged in seeking out their own accommodation.

"The program has proved successful in two areas. We have been able to retain families in their present accommodation who would otherwise have been evicted through inability to pay the required rent. By arrangement with the landlords, we have agreed upon a rental and the Housing Authority has taken on the responsibility of payment to the landlord, and in many cases through negotiation has obtained reduced rent where minor maintenance was offered during the period of the lease. We have also been able to assist emergency families who were resident in the family hostel. We have now completed our rental program as we have exhausted the funds appropriated.

"This type of assistance to low income families has proved successful where implemented in the United States and while we have had our program in operation only four months, we are convinced of the



benefits of such a program. We are, however, restricted in being able to rent houses only in the City of Toronto, and feel if we could expand this program into the metropolitan area it would alleviate the present crisis of shelter required for families in emergency situations.

"I have been advised by Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation that they have no legislation to support such a program. We will, however, document our experience when we have completed the full administration program and they have offered to give every consideration to the study of a subsidy."



Average Rental Paid Landlords -	\$126.72
Average Revenue Received from Tenants -	77.62
Average Rent Supplement -	49.10
Total number of Properties under Rent Supplement	
Programme as at February 22, 1967 -	29

(March 10, 1967)

"Origin: On March 1, 1967, the Board of Control had before it my report of February 23, 1967 on the proposal that Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation and the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto provide financial assistance in connection with the cost of the Rent Supplement Programme administered by The Housing Authority of Toronto. The Board decided to request me to submit a further report on this matter, setting out recommendations to support a request to the Metropolitan Corporation that Metro share in the costs of the Rent Supplement Programme.

"Report: In my opinion, one of the strongest arguments for Metro aid is the fact that residents from the entire Metropolitan area are eligible to be accommodated in the City's Family Hostel as a result of fires, evictions or other emergencies.

"As this accommodation is only temporary, the residents are encouraged to move as quickly as possible, and while many move on their own accord, a good proportion are placed in rented accommodation under the Rent Supplement Plan."

(April 3, 1967)

"Origin: At the meeting of the Committee on Housing, Fire and Legislation held on March 30, 1967, I was asked to furnish Board of Control for its next meeting with a report showing the number of persons involved in the Rent Supplement Programme who are residents of the City of Toronto or one of its Boroughs or the Province of Ontario or outside of the Province of Ontario.

"Report: As requested, I enclose the attached report which is summarized as follows:

No. of Premises Leased to Residents of City of Toronto Metropolitan Area Province of Ontario Outside the Province -

Total ---- 32



APPENDIX X (cont'd.)						
Location	Monthly Rental	Effective	Geared-to Income Rent- al	. Effective	Differen- tial	Size of Family Adults Children
4	, C	٦/ ١	Ċ	9/10	57.1.00	
Charles St		9/10		Dec. 1/66		9
Wowkjer Driv		/0[**		c.1/6	0	
Wembley Dirke		99/1		9/["	0	
/U Wildwood cre	15.0	0,1/6		sc.1/6	Ö	
oo oblace ou ce	ノン	9/1-0	\$ O	c.1/6	0.7	
323 Sumacn Screec		072		an. 1/6		
一つ「はないない」ということのことのことには、これは、これには、これには、これには、これには、これには、これには、これに	50.0	c. 15/6	•	an. 1/6	0.0	
Millooks Str	25.0	c. 15/		an. 1/6	L. 0	
CA WILLCOCKS CO. CO.	95.0	c.15/6	0	an.1/6	0.3	
OS Helena	25.0	c.1/6	0.0	sc.1/6	0.0	
Jarvis Stree	0,00	9/4°A	0.0	ec.1/6	0.	
An Willow Avenu	0,04	an.1/67	0 +	an.1/6	0	
48 High Park Av	0,04	an.15/	0 +	9/1-qa		
Windermere	0,0	3/1/q	•	eb.1/6		
27 Edith Dri		b.1/6	00.48	3/T•Q8	•	
7 Henning Avenue	000	00.1/C		0/T• Qe) C	
L Gainsborough	000	90.1/08	フィ ナヤ	ン/T・CCC		
Rosebury R	2 C	0/T•08		7/T 40		
S Cairns Avenue	27.0	0 / T • 0 6	υ ν.	7/T•00		
50 Darrel	してい	/CT • 0 = 7/6)	eb. 1/6		
8 Untario otree	ノン	/T - C - C - C - C - C - C - C - C - C -		eb. 1/6	5.0	
Juxon Avenue)/L.de		eb.1/6	6.0	
A DIXON Avenue) \ \ \ \ \)/L 40	7	eb.1/6	-	
Rawlinson Avenu	70	/L. ud	100	ar. 1/6	2.0	
63 Broadview Av		ar. 1/6	100	ar. 1/6	2.0	
Uncarto Sere		7/1	3	r.1/6	7.0	
40 veneva Avenue 61 Highcroft Road		Mar. 1/67		ar.1/6	0.9	
40 to the state of	\$3,675.00		\$2,251.00		\$1,424.00	55 152
1 1 2 2		Ŷ.				



Appendix XI



APPENDIX XI

EXCERPTS FROM METROPOLITAN TORONTO PLANNING BOARD URBAN
RENEWAL STUDY - THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN URBAN
RENEWAL. A STUDY CARRIED OUT BY MURRAY V. JONES
March 1966

Demand Incentives

Supplements to demand by way of subsidies to rents or incomes of low-income families are rare outside public housing projects. They may take several forms:

- (i) A rent certificate plan, under which a public agency leases dwelling units from private owners at specified rents and then collects from the tenants rents based on their family income and the size of the family. In Toronto, where this plan was operated by the province's Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority, the maximum rents at which units were leased were equal to those established for limited dividend projects, and the number of units made available under the plan was small. The Ontario Housing Corporation is gradually terminating the plan because there is not provision in the legislation for a federal contribution to its cost, which is entirely borne by the province. As an incentive to private enterprise and as a way of increasing the supply of housing for low-income families, this plan will remain of limited scope unless the rents offered for housing are considerably increased. A formula whereby the different levels of government would share in its cost would also have to be worked out.
- (ii) A guaranteed return of rentals. Under Section 14 of the National Housing Act, C-M-H.C. determines the rents which are to be charged during the first three years of the project and guarantees 85% of the annual revenue from these rentals for up to 30 years. In effect, the guarantee allowed for a vacancy rate of 15% and, if after the first three years rents go up, the implied vacancy rate above which the guarantee comes into play increases likewise. In the present circumstances of the apartment market, in Metropolitan Toronto at least, developers normally allow for a 5% vacancy factor in their calculations; a guarantee based on 15% or over, with low rentals to begin with, thus has little incentive effect.
- (iii) In the United States, the 1965 Housing and Urban Development Act includes a rent subsidy plan which was the cause of much controversy. Under the plan, families and individuals whose incomes are below the maximum established for public housing are eligible for rent subsidies. They will pay 25% of their income towards the established fair market rents; the rent supplement will pay any difference above that. However, the private enterprise in respect of which the plan is to operate is confined to non-profit, cooperative and limited dividend housing. In other words, the plan is similar to Canadian limited dividend housing under Section 16 of the N.H.A. combined with what is in effect a rent reduction fund provided by U.S. government. Why assistance to non-or limited-profit private enterprise was thought to be more controversial than the assistance which is furnished in so many forms to the genuine article is rather hard to understand, unless the criticism was directed at the prospective tenants whose need was viewed as a mark of insufficiently rugged and successful individualism.



APPENDIX XI (Cont'd.)

Be that as it may, Congress has refused to appropriate money to implement the plan which it had adopted earlier in the year. A favourable vote is expected this year.

An effective program of supplements to demand would combine the best features of all the above plans. It would aim principally to supplement public housing in meeting the needs of the two groups mentioned earlier for whom private enterprise alone is least able to provide adequate housing, namely, "modest or low-income families with large numbers of children, and elderly couples who have retired on modest and usually fixed incomes." Rents paid by tenants would be limited to 25% of incomes (or the sliding scale used by the Ontario Housing Corporation for public housing) and the maximum income would be fixed so as to comprise a significant number of families above the lowest income rung. The housing units could be rented from developers on a long-term lease by a public housing authority (in the same way as the Ontario Housing Corporation purchases housing built by private developers) or, alternatively, the rent subsidy could be paid directly to tenants. The rent subsidy or reduction fund would be provided by the federal and provincial governments together, rather than depending as now on "contributions, donations, gifts and bequests made by the government of the province or by a municipality, social agency, foundation, trust, estate or person;" In short, the cost of the plan would be shared by all levels of government, perhaps in the same proportion as the subsidies to public housing. The rents offered for dwelling units would be at a scale sufficient to bring forward a significant response from developers and, where a guarantee of rental revenue was involved, it would imply a vacancy rate consistent with current facts. Finally, if private enterprise is to be encouraged, let it be both private and enterprising according to the standards prevailing and deemed appropriate in most areas of production and trade, including the bulk of urban development and redevelopment.

This raises of course a basic problem with respect to all the incentives we have been considering. Their purpose is to attract private enterprise to participate in renewal in areas where it is not at present doing so. For this purpose, it is not enough to ensure a certain rate of return which may be thought "fair" or adequate; the return must be at the "going rate" being earned in areas where private enterprise operates unassisted. Under conditions of excess capacity and sagging demand, this rate may not be high and financial and material resources may yield relatively easily to the encouragement provided. But under the present conditions of a building boom, rising prices and infaltionary pressures which the government is taking steps to dampen, the incentives which would be necessary are naturally greater. They must be sufficient to bid resources away from areas where they are already fully engaged; they would mean adding to demand and more rather than less upward pressure on prices.



Incentives under these conditions have the same effect on building costs and prices generally as they do on the price of land, whose redevelopment and speculative values are increased. Aids to private enterprise which seem partly to add to the inflationary spiral and partly to land prices and windfall gains for land owners, with perhaps little in the way or noticeable additions to the amount of renewal achieved, do not look like a very attractive proposition This of course is the negative side of the picture But, as to the first, it must be admitted that even in less buoyant periods, as long as resources, manpower and enterprise are adequately occupied in meeting ordinary market and profitable demands, it is not at all easy to divert them to new, less attractive and perhaps more risky fields, great though the social needs and the desirability of meeting them may be, and it cannot be done on a shoestring. As to the second, many devices to control land prices have been tried and some have worked, although the only one which seems foolproof is public acquisition based solely on the value of land in its present use to the owner, with no allowance for its potential development or redevelopment value as expressed in the market, rather than its reuse value to the taker. The root of the matter is that in a market economy where property owners as well as others are free to buy cheap and sell dear, land prices are bound to vary with changes in the balance of demand and supply, and the prospect of gain is an inevitable and perhaps necessary part of urban development and renewal. The result is that it is very difficult to separate the wheat from the chaff, and much easier to apply measures which, as the Economist suggested, "would indeed knock speculation on the head, but at the same time would lay out stone cold the desirable impetus to voluntary development."

It is with the impetus to voluntary development that this study is concerned. The alternative of discouraging redevelopment in areas where it is now occurring, in order to make the areas where incentives are otherwise needed relatively more attractive, has not been considered. General measures to restrain the construction boom and check the rise in building prices may have to be applied, but measures which would in effect penalize redevelopment outside designated renewal areas, for example by special taxes from which activity in these areas would be exempt, do not seem appropriate. They would be a direct addition to costs — intentionally so, as a means of squeezing profits and curtailing demand outside renewal areas — when the general concern is to check the rise already under way; they would accordingly more than probably be unacceptable.

The incentives discussed in this chapter are therefore of the carrot rather than the stick variety. They have proceeded from the twin assumptions, about which there is room for wide differences of opinion, that renewal which cannot pay its own way is as important and urgent as renewal which can; and that, in the context of Canada's economy, much of the former as well as most of the latter can be done more effectively and expeditiously by private than by public enterprise, provided the necessary public guidance and assistance are given.



Toronto Real Estate Board,

STUDY OF EXPROPRIATION FOR URBAN
RENEWAL IN THE CITY OF TORONTO
Submission to the Ontario Provincia.

Covernment
Date Due

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